Non-abstractness as mental simulation in the representation of number by Myachykov, Andriy et al.
Citation:  Myachykov,  Andriy,  Platenburg,  Wouter  P. A. and Fischer,  Martin  H.  (2009) 
Non-abstractness as mental  simulation  in  the representation  of number. Behavioral  and  
Brain  Sciences, 32 (3-4). pp. 343-344. ISSN 0140-525X
Published by: Cambridge University  Press
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990811
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link:  
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/10834/
Northumbria  University  has  developed Northumbria  Research  Link  (NRL)  to  enable 
users to access the University’s research output.  Copyright  © and moral  rights  for  items 
on NRL  are retained by the individual  author(s) and/or other  copyright  owners.  Single  
copies of full  items can be reproduced, displayed or performed, and given to third  parties  
in  any  format  or  medium  for  personal  research or  study,  educational,  or  not-for-profit  
purposes without  prior  permission  or  charge,  provided  the  authors,  tit le  and  full  
bibliographic  details  are  given,  as  well  as  a  hyperlink  and/or  URL  to  the  original  
metadata  page. The content  must  not  be changed in  any way.  Full  items must  not  be 
sold commercially  in  any format  or medium  without  formal  permission of the copyright  
holder.  The full  policy is available online: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document  may differ  from the final,  published version of the research and has been 
made available online in  accordance with  publisher  policies. To read and/or cite from the  
published  version  of the  research,  please visit  the  publisher’s  website  (a subscription  
may be required.)
Numerical representation in the
parietal lobes: Abstract or not
abstract?
Roi Cohen Kadosh
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Department of Psychology, University
College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
roi.cohenkadosh@psy.ox.ac.uk
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/neuroscience/Page.php?ID¼12&
ResearcherID¼238
Vincent Walsh
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Department of Psychology, University
College London, London WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom
v.walsh@ucl.ac.uk
http://www.icn.ucl.ac.uk/Research-Groups/Visual-Cognition-Group/
index.php
Abstract: The study of neuronal specialisation in different cognitive and perceptual domains is important for our understanding of the
human brain, its typical and atypical development, and the evolutionary precursors of cognition. Central to this understanding is the
issue of numerical representation, and the question of whether numbers are represented in an abstract fashion. Here we discuss and
challenge the claim that numerical representation is abstract. We discuss the principles of cortical organisation with special reference to
number and also discuss methodological and theoretical limitations that apply to numerical cognition and also to the field of cognitive
neuroscience in general. We argue that numerical representation is primarily non-abstract and is supported by different neuronal
populations residing in the parietal cortex.
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1. Introduction
In today’s high tech society, numbers play a central role.
We use them to calculate budgets, compare prices, under-
stand food labels, and discuss journal impact factors. Not
surprisingly, difficulties in handling numerical information
can lead to serious impairments in everyday life (Ansari
2008; Butterworth 1999; 2004; 2005; Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh 2007; Parsons & Bynner 2005; Rubinsten &
Henik 2009; von Aster & Shalev 2007). Numbers can
come in many forms; we can represent the same quantity,
say “two” (here a word) as a digit (2), in Roman numerals
(II), non-symbolically as on a dice (††), with our fingers, in
a temporal series (e.g., a drum beat), or with other words
(pair, duo, brace) that carry semantic as well as numerical
meaning. The question of how we represent numbers and
whether there is a unitary neuronal basis for all forms of
numerical representation is therefore important. A full
understanding of numerical representation is also impor-
tant for the correspondence between comparative and
developmental studies that use non-symbolic represen-
tation and studies in adults that can use symbolic and
non-symbolic stimuli. Moreover, insights into the way
we represent numbers are proving to be important for
educational interventions, for diagnosis, classification,
and the design of effective rehabilitation programs for
people who suffer from numerical difficulties known as
developmental dyscalculia. For example, the way in
which some intervention programs are designed in order
to help children with dyscalculia (Wilson et al. 2006a;
2006b) is based on the idea of abstract representation.
Therefore, it is assumed that training on numerosity will
improve the numerical computation with digits.
2. The consensus
Over the last ten years a consensus view has emerged that
assumes the underlying representation of numerical infor-
mation to be abstract and to be focussed in the intraparie-
tal sulcus (Dehaene et al. 1998). Here we reassess this
abstract representation point of view. By abstract we
adopt the previous operational definition (Dehaene et al.
1998, p. 356) that “Adults can be said to rely on an abstract
representation of number if their behavior depends only
on the size of the numbers involved, not on the specific
verbal or non-verbal means of denoting them.” (See also
McCloskey, 1992, p. 497, for a similar definition.) Other,
more recent studies, support this view and point out that
“the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) as an important region for
numerical cognition . . . represents number regardless of
whether the input notation is symbolic (e.g., number
words or symbols) or non-symbolic (e.g., dot patterns)
and regardless of whether stimuli are presented visually
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or auditorily” (Libertus et al. 2007, p. 2). Therefore, an
operationalization of abstract representation in the
present article is that neuronal populations that code
numerical quantity are insensitive to the form of input in
which the numerical information was presented (e.g.,
digits, verbal numbers, auditory, numerosity, etc.). In con-
trast, we define non-abstract representation as neuronal
populations that code numerical quantity but are sensitive
to the input in which the numbers were presented. There-
fore, the neuronal populations that code the magnitude of
the digit 7, or the word “SEVEN” will not be identical.
However, the expected output for abstract and non-
abstract representations is similar. For example, for both
representations we know that 7 is larger than 6, and
SEVEN is larger than SIX. Nevertheless, we will show
here that non-abstract representation can be masked as a
function of the response made by subjects and that detect-
ing differences between different notations are optimised
by probing automatic processing. Such a difference
cannot be explained if the same neuronal population
codes numerical quantity independent of the input.
There are several ways to define representation (for
reviews, see Barsalou 1999; 2003; Markman & Dietrich
2000), but in this target article we define representation
only in the general sense that is most common in psychol-
ogy and cognitive neuroscience. Here representation
refers to patterns of activation within the brain that corre-
spond to aspects of the external environment (Johnson &
Munakata 2005). We differentiate representation from
processing; the latter includes representation, but relates
to the sum of pre-representation (e.g., visual identification
of the digit) and post-representation components (e.g.,
working memory, response selection). In the current
case numerical representation relates to patterns of
activation that are modulated by the numerical magnitude
conveyed by the number.
We suggest in this review that the commonly held view
of abstract numerical representation needs to be chal-
lenged; we present evidence supporting a contrary view,
and provide future directions for empirical work in cogni-
tive and developmental neuroscience.
3. Architectures for number processing
Models of number processing differ with respect to the
issue of whether numbers are abstractly represented.
There are many cognitive models in the field of numerical
cognition (e.g., Cipolotti & Butterworth 1995; Gallistel &
Gelman 1992; Noe¨l & Seron 1993; 1997; Pillon &
Pesenti 2001; Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003), but three
central models are the most cited and are representative
of the key features of different classes of models.
McCloskey and colleagues in a series of neuropsycho-
logical studies (e.g., Macaruso et al. 1993; McCloskey
et al. 1985; Sokol et al. 1991) have shown that a single,
abstract representation can provide detailed qualitative
and quantitative accounts of the errors made by acalculics
(patients with acquired numerical difficulties). These find-
ings led McCloskey (1992) to offer the abstract modular
model that is composed of three distinct parts: the compre-
hension system, the calculation system, and the number
production system. The comprehension system converts
different notations of numbers (e.g., digit, verbal
numbers, roman, etc.) into a common abstract format.
The calculation system includes arithmetic facts such as
the comparison task and calculation procedure, both of
which are also a form of abstract quantity code. The
production system produces the output in various notations
as requested, such as digits, or spoken numerals. An impor-
tant assumption in McCloskey’s model is that an abstract
internal representation carries out all numerical operations.
This implies that all inputs, without exceptions, are con-
verted into a single, modality-independent abstract rep-
resentation and then are translated into the appropriate
form of output. Consequently, the pattern of reaction
times (RTs) between digits, verbal numbers, or any other
symbolic notation should follow predictions based on
abstract coding, because they are translated into one
common representation. A general difference among the
overall mean RTs might appear because of different proces-
sing times of different notation inputs (e.g., digits are
responded to more quickly than roman numerals).
However, an important prediction that follows from
abstract coding is that there should not be RT interactions
between the different notations. Rather, the abstract coding
model predicts additivity between different numerical
notations when one manipulates factors which influence
the level of numerical representation.
While McCloskey’s model strongly posits abstract rep-
resentation, Campbell and colleagues (Campbell 1994;
Campbell & Clark 1988; Campbell & Epp 2004) have
suggested that numbers are not represented abstractly.
According to their encoding complex hypothesis, separate
modality-specific number codes exist. Therefore, number
processing is mediated by modality-specific processes
(e.g., visual, digit) and not by an abstract code. Conse-
quently, they predict RT interactions between responses
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to numbers as a function of notation or stimulus modality.
More precisely, they do not predict any additivity between
different numerical notations; rather, they predict an
interaction between notation and factors that are influ-
enced by the numerical representations.
Dehaene (1992) combined features of the abstract
modular model and the encoding complex hypothesis
and composed the currently most accepted cognitive
model: the triple-code model. Similar to the encoding
complex hypothesis, this model does not assume a single
central number representation. Instead, it assumes that
there are three different codes with special and distinct
functions for each. The first two codes are modality- and
notation-dependent; The Arabic code, which resides in
the left and right inferior ventral occipital-temporal
areas, is responsible, for example, for multi-digit calcu-
lations. Simple calculations, verbal counting, and retrieval
of arithmetic facts are executed via a verbal code, which is
subserved by the left perisylvian area. However, numerical
comparison and number approximation, which access the
numerical representation, are performed using the third
code, the analogue magnitude code, in which the rep-
resentation, as in McCloskey’s model (1992), is modality-
and notation-independent. Hence, it is possible to find
notation-dependent processing for arithmetic operations
resulting from non-representation–related processes
outside the analogue magnitude code (e.g., verbal code),
while the numbers in the equation are represented
abstractly by the analogue magnitude code. Therefore,
this model, like the abstract modular model, predicts addi-
tivity between different numerical notations when one
manipulates factors that influence the level of numerical
representation. This idea was mentioned in several later
works, for example, in Dehaene (1996) where the author
writes “the same representation of number magnitudes
should be accessed regardless of input number notation”
(p. 60). In later works, which marked the transition of
the abstract view from a purely psychological concept to
a neurally instantiated one, it was stated that the IPS
codes the abstract, rather than non-abstract, quantity
meaning. For example, after reviewing neuroimaging
studies, Dehaene and colleagues concluded that, “Those
parametric studies are all consistent with the hypothesis
that the HIPS [horizontal IPS] codes the abstract quantity
meaning of numbers rather the numerical symbols them-
selves.” (Dehaene et al. 2003, p. 492).
4. Numbers are abstract
The logic behind the idea that numbers are represented in
an abstract fashion can be examined in a straightforward
way. If numerical representation is abstract, then the rep-
resentation-related effects caused by one type of notation
or modality should be identical for other notations or in
other modalities. That is, the effect for each notation or
modality should be additive, rather than interacting with
the notation. Such effects have been observed for a
variety of notations and modalities both at the behavioural
(e.g., Barth et al. 2003; Dehaene & Akhavein 1995;
Naccache & Dehaene 2001b; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) and the neuronal level (e.g., Dehaene 1996; Eger
et al. 2003; Libertus et al. 2007; Naccache & Dehaene
2001a; Pinel et al. 2001), thus supporting the idea that
numbers are represented abstractly. The spatial numerical
association of response codes (SNARC) effect is a classic
example; subjects respond more quickly to small
numbers with left-hand key responses than with right-
hand key responses, and faster to large numbers with
the right-hand key than with the left-hand key (e.g.,
responding to digit 3 will be faster with the left-hand
key, whereas responding to digit 8 will be faster with the
right-hand key) (Dehaene et al. 1993; Fias & Fischer
2004; Gevers & Lammertyn 2005; for a recent meta-analy-
sis see Wood et al. 2008). The effect is independent of
notation or modality (Nuerk et al. 2005; see also our
Figure 1a). Similarly, in the numerical distance effect,
RT increases as the numerical distance between two
numbers decreases (e.g., RT to decide if 8 is larger than
2 is faster than RT to decide if 8 is larger than 6) (Moyer
& Landauer 1967). This effect too, by and large, is inde-
pendent of notation (Dehaene 1996; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995; Naccache & Dehaene 2001b; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) (see our Figure 1b). These and other cognitive
effects gave support for the triple code model (Dehaene
1992). Extrapolating the idea of abstractness from this
cognitive model (Dehaene 1992) to the nervous system
implies that within the IPS, the area most associated
with numerical representation (see Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008f; Dehaene et al. 2003, for reviews and meta-
analyses), the same neural population will be recruited
to encode numerical quantity, whatever the format of
presentation. Neuroimaging experiments have reported
notation- and modality-independent brain activation in
the IPS (Eger et al. 2003; Naccache & Dehaene 2001a;
Pinel et al. 2001; see also Venkatraman et al. 2005, for evi-
dence of format-independent processing of exact and
approximate arithmetic in the IPS) (see our Figure 1c).
Together these findings, both at the behavioural and the
neuronal level, provide an apparently strong basis for the
abstract representation of numbers. However, there are
several limitations to this view.
5. Numbers are not abstract
Despite the evidence presented in the previous section,
the logic behind the assumption that numbers are rep-
resented in an abstract fashion is incomplete and suffers
both from methodological and theoretical shortcomings.
While it is true that different notations/modalities can
yield similar behavioural effects, it does not follow that
they therefore share a single neuronal representation. It
is entirely possible, for example, that similar behavioural
effects can be subserved by different brain areas, or neur-
onal populations in a single brain area, and in different
time windows (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007a; Rumelhart &
McClelland 1986). It is also often overlooked that, at
the behavioural and neural levels, the assumption that
numbers are represented in an abstract fashion is based
mainly on null results, that is, on finding no differences
between notation or modality and the behavioural or
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) variable that
correlates with numerical representation. Therefore, the
conclusion that numbers are abstract may be due to a
lack of statistical power, or the insensitivity of the para-
digms used. Indeed, some studies have found differences
or a tendency towards a difference between notations
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
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(e.g.,digits, verbalnumbers,numerosity,Mandarinnumerals)
(Campbell & Epp 2004; Dehaene 1996; Dehaene &
Akhavein 1995; Droit-Volet et al. 2008; Ganor-Stern &
Tzelgov 2008; Koechlin et al. 1999; Reynvoet & Ratinckx
2004) or modalities (i.e., visual or auditory) (Barth et al.
2003), but the implications of most of these results have
either been ignored, or alternative explanations have been
given that leave the idea of non-abstract representations
unchallenged.
In addition to the fact that similar behavioural effects
can be produced by different mechanisms (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2007a; Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), at
the neuronal level, similar brain activations can stem
from different neuronal populations that are co-localised
within a single imaged voxel (volumetric pixels) and
cannot be segregated with conventional neuroimaging
techniques (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b; Grill-Spector
et al. 2006b; Nieder 2004). In other words, in the parietal
lobes each voxel that is activated is sampled during the
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) exper-
iment (with a spatial resolution of  3 cubic mm) and
contains about 1.25 million neurons (Pakkenberg &
Gundersen 1997). Moreover, the neurons in this voxel
can fire tens of impulses per second for different functions.
However, different functions cannot be detected, as the
fMRI signal – which indicates an increase in oxygenated
blood bringing energy to active neurons – develops slug-
gishly, over several seconds. Therefore, observing similar
activations at the voxel level for different notations (Pinel
et al. 2001) or modalities (Eger et al. 2003), or alterna-
tively, observing similar time courses in event-related
potentials (ERP) experiments that lack spatial resolution
(Dehaene 1996; Libertus et al. 2007), is not sufficient to
indicate abstract representation. This theoretical point is
gaining experimental support from single-cell neurophysiol-
ogy in monkeys. It has been shown, for example, that
neurons that are sensitive to numbers, are also sensitive to
features that have little to do with magnitude information
(Nieder et al. 2006; see also Calabrese 2007). Note that
such a finding, although not speaking directly against the
idea of abstract numerical representation, challenges
the idea that numerical or magnitude representation is
modular (Dehaene et al. 1998; McCloskey 1992). Indeed
modular representation of any single class of stimulus fea-
tures of the world does not have a good history. Suggestions
that the monkey or human brain contained a colour centre
(Lueck et al. 1989; Zeki 1980), a motion centre (Zeki 1974),
or a word form area (Cohen et al. 2000; McCandliss et al.
2003) – all good cases for attributes of the external world
that one might expect to have a single locus of representa-
tion – have been found wanting; and each of these attri-
butes has been found either to be multiply represented
for different task demands at almost every level of the visuo-
cognitive system (cf. Orban et al. 1996; Otten & Rugg 2001;
Watanabe et al. 1998) or the “centre” has been found to be
not specific to the attribute (cf. Merigan 1996; Price &
Devlin 2003; Xue & Poldrack 2007). A priori, number infor-
mation – which is less constrained than simple object
features such as colour, form, and motion, and upon
which we perform explicit and implicit computations –
would seem to be a poorer candidate for a canonical
representation.
Numerical representation is also modulated by task and
automaticity. Various definitions have been attributed to
Figure 1. Effects that underlie the idea that numerical
representation is abstract. (A) The SNARC effect for different
notations (digits, words, dice) and modalities (visual, auditory).
In this experiment the subjects were instructed to decide
whether a numerical stimulus is odd or even (i.e., parity
judgement) by pressing the right or the left response key (key
assignment was counterbalanced within subjects). The slopes
that were obtained are independent of format. (B) The Distance
effect for digits and words shows the same function independent
of notation. In this experiment subjects were asked to decide by
a button press whether the displayed number (i.e., the numbers
1 to 9, excluding the number five) is numerically larger or
smaller than the standard number five. (C) Brain activation in
the IPS (in orange circles) is modulated in similar ways as a
function of the numerical distance between the compared digits,
independent of the notations that were used (i.e., words or
digits). Left IPS appears on the left side, right IPS appears on
the right side. In this experiment the subjects decided whether a
visually presented number was larger or smaller than a fixed
reference number (65) by pressing a button with their right or
left hand according to instructions. Adapted from Nuerk et al.
(2005), Pinel et al. (2001), and Schwarz and Ischebeck (2000)
with permission. A color version of this figure is available online
at www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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the concept of “automaticity” (e.g., Carr 1992; Hasher &
Zacks 1979; Logan 1985; Posner 1978). In the current
article, we adopt Tzelgov et al.’s (1996) definition (see also
Barge 1992) that a process is automatic if it does not need
monitoring to be executed. Most studies that support the
idea of an abstract representation are based on subjects car-
rying out intentional processing of numerical information.
However, numbers are also represented automatically
(for a review, see Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005). Automatic
and intentional processing can lead to very different infer-
ences about the underlying representation (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008b; 2008g; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005), and
brain activity (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007a, Lewis & Miall
2003; Orban et al. 1996). Indeed, task-dependency is a
fundamental feature of brain representation and has been
reported at every level of every perceptual and cognitive
domain, including time perception (Lewis & Miall 2003),
magnitude processing (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008c), face
processing (Cohen Kadosh et al., in press), and visual
processing (Orban et al. 1996). Mental representations can
be probed when they are engaged by task demands or
when their processing is automatic. The advantage of
using automatic processing is that processing and behaviour
are unaffected by task demands and intentional strategies
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; 2008g; Tzelgov & Ganor-
Stern 2005).
This might imply that specific task requirements may
induce humans to generate different representations
(e.g., shared representation for different notations).
Clearly, humans can generate numerical representations
according to task requirements (Bachtold et al. 1998;
Fischer & Rottmann 2005; Gertner et al. 2009; Hung
et al. 2008; Lindemann et al. 2008; Shaki & Fischer
2008; Shaki & Petrusic 2005). For example, Bachtold
et al. (1998), in a numerical comparison task of the
numbers 1 to 11 (excluding the number 6 which serves
as the standard), found that subjects showed a normal
SNARC effect when they conceived the numbers as dis-
tances on a ruler, which represents small numbers on
the left and larger numbers on the right. Importantly,
the SNARC effect was reversed (i.e., faster responses to
small numbers with right-hand key responses than with
left-hand key responses, and faster responses to large
numbers with the left-hand key responses than with the
right-hand key responses) when the subjects conceived
the numbers as hours on a clock face, which presents
small numbers on the right side, and large numbers on
the left side. Thus, a limit to the abstract representation
view we have to face is that observations consistent with
shared representations may be true only for specific task
conditions in any given experiment.
Clearly, then, the evidence that numbers are abstractly
represented has several limitations: null results (Cohen
Kadosh 2008a; Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000; Shuman & Kanwisher 2004), technical limitations
(Ansari 2008; Nieder 2004), and task specificity (Ansari
2007; Ansari et al. 2006a; Bachtold et al. 1998; Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008b; Go¨bel et al. 2004; Van Opstal et al.
2008a; Venkatraman et al. 2005; Wood et al. 2006a). In
the next section, we provide evidence that directly chal-
lenges the idea that numbers are represented abstractly.
The line of experiments we turn to next shows that non-
abstract representations exist in a variety of tasks and
cultures.
6. Two= II and 2 does not equal two
Given the ubiquity and importance of numbers and the
early stage in life at which we learn about them, it is not
surprising that, like words, they are eventually over-
learned and processed automatically. Automatic numeri-
cal processing is an important ability that exists not only
in human adults (Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Cohen Kadosh
& Henik 2006; Dormal et al. 2006; Fias et al. 2001a;
Henik & Tzelgov 1982; Lammertyn et al. 2002; Pavese
& Umilta` 1998; Schwarz & Heinze 1998; Schwarz &
Ischebeck 2003; Tzelgov et al. 1992; Verguts & Van
Opstal 2005), but also in children (Gebuis et al. 2009;
Girelli et al. 2000; Mussolin & Noel 2007; Rubinsten
et al. 2002; Szucs et al. 2007; Zhou et al. 2007), and
animals (Washburn 1994). The automaticity of numerical
information processing gives one the opportunity to
explore numerical representation per se, independent of
one’s strategies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008g; Ganor-
Stern & Tzelgov 2008; Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005).
Automaticity has been explored mainly by using conflict
tasks, for example, the size congruity paradigm. Usually,
in this paradigm subjects are presented with two digits
on the computer screen (one digit in the left visual field,
and one digit in the right visual field) and are required
to compare the stimuli according to their physical
size while ignoring their numerical value (e.g., 2 4), and
to press the button that corresponds to the side of the
physically larger stimulus (Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Cohen
Kadosh & Henik 2006; Gebuis et al. 2009; Girelli et al.
2000; Henik & Tzelgov 1982; Mussolin & Noel 2007;
Rubinsten & Henik 2005; 2006; Rubinsten et al. 2002;
Schwarz & Heinze 1998; Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003;
Szucs et al. 2007; Tzelgov et al. 1992; Verguts & Van
Opstal 2005; Zhou et al. 2007). The stimuli can be incon-
gruent (the physically larger digit is numerically smaller;
e.g., 2 4), neutral (the stimuli differ only in the relevant
dimension; e.g., 2 2), or congruent (the physically larger
digit is also numerically larger; e.g., 2 4). A common
finding is that incongruent trials, being slower to process
than congruent trials (size-congruity effect), as reflected
by slower RT, indicate that the numerical information
is processed automatically. This paradigm has been
employed in behavioural studies and has yielded an inter-
action between different notations and automatic proces-
sing of numerical information (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008e; Ito & Hatta 2003). For example, Ito and Hatta
(2003) found that when participants compared the
physical size of Kana scripts – the equivalent of verbal
numbers – numerical information was not processed
automatically. Therefore, the irrelevant numerical infor-
mation did not interfere with the relevant physical size
judgement. In contrast, when the same participants com-
pared digits or Kanji numbers (ideographic script), a
size-congruity effect was observed, thus indicating that
the numerical information was processed automatically,
and interfered the relevant physical size judgement.
Similar results were found and extended by another
laboratory (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e).
A recent study used a simple comparison task in which
subjects had to compare the numerical values of digits or
verbal numbers while examining the effect of numerical
information in trial n – 1 on processing of numerical infor-
mation in trial n (i.e., sequential effect) (Cohen Kadosh
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh: Numerical representation in the parietal lobes
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2008a). Others conducted a similar analysis on a similar
numerical task (Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000) and similar stimuli (Dehaene 1996), and did not
find an interaction between notation and the distance
effect or differential effects of trial n – 1 on trial n as a
function of notation. However, these studies used a long
response-to-stimulus-interval (RSI) (.1,500 msec),
which is likely to produce expectancy effects (Soetens
1998), whereas automatic processing occurs under short
RSI conditions (e.g., 200 msec) (see Neely [1977] for a
similar idea for priming tasks). By using a short RSI of
200 msec, and a large number of subjects and trials,
three results emerged which support the idea that
non-abstract representations of numbers exist: (1) an
interaction between notation and numerical distance in
reaction time; (2) an interaction between notation, nota-
tion repetition, and numerical distance in error rates;
and (3) an interaction between notation and the distance
between the numerical distance in trial n – 1 and trial n
with reaction time as the dependent variable (Cohen
Kadosh 2008a).
Dehaene and Akhavein (1995) used a same-different
task, in which participants were asked to decide via a
button press whether two members of a pair of stimuli,
which are presented simultaneously, were the same or
different. The notations were digit-digit (e.g., 2-2, 2-8),
verbal number-verbal number (e.g., TWO-TWO, TWO-
EIGHT), or a mixed notation (e.g., verbal number-digit;
TWO-2, TWO-8). When the subjects compared the simi-
larity of the numbers according to their numerical values, a
distance effect independent of notation was observed. In
contrast, in physical matching, when the participants com-
pared the numbers according to their perceptual simi-
larity, an interaction between notation and the distance
effect was observed with a flat and not significant distance
effect for mixed notation. Although the latter finding
indicates that numerical representation is non-abstract,
because numerical processing should be observed inde-
pendent of the input (i.e., mixed notation vs. pure nota-
tion), Dehaene and Akhavein (1995) argued that
numbers, whether digits or verbal, converge towards a
common semantic representation.
In a recent study, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov (2008) con-
ducted two experiments: one with a same-different task
and another with the size congruity paradigm. The
same-different experiment was similar to Dehaene and
Akhavein’s (1995) study but with Indian numbers (a differ-
ent notation for numbers that is used mostly in Arabic-
speaking countries) instead of verbal numbers. In the
physical comparison task they were not able to replicate
the distance effect for digits, Indian numbers, or mixed
notation. However, they argued that numbers were still
processed automatically by finding what they called the
“value interference effect,” that is, processing the
numbers’ numerical value impaired participants’ “differ-
ent” responses to different-notation pairs with the same
numerical values (e.g., 8 in digit notation vs. 8 in Indian
notation) compared with those with different numerical
values (e.g., 8 in digit notation vs. 2 in Indian notation).
However, this effect does not indicate semantic processing
and it can be attributed to asemantic transcoding (e.g., due
to phonological representation). In this case, the digit 8
and the Indian number 8 were recognized as representing
the same numbers, even though the numerical
representation was not accessed (see Dehaene & Akhavein
1995, for a discussion on this scenario). Indeed, the lack of
distance effect in Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov’s (2008) exper-
iment supports the idea that numerical information did
not reach the level of the semantic representation. In
another experiment, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov found that
digits, Indian numbers, and mixed-notation (digit and
Indian numbers) caused interference to a physical size
judgment, as reflected by the size-congruity effect.
Again, they argued that this effect indicates abstract rep-
resentation. However, one should note that the level of
the interference interacted with notation, as well as with
the numerical distance, thus replicating the findings by
Ito and Hatta (2003) and Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008e).
This result can be explained not as a result of abstract
representation, but simply an interference during
response selection, as was shown in several ERP and
fMRI studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c; 2008d; Szu´´cs
& Solte´sz 2007; Szu´´cs et al. 2007). Moreover, in another
experiment, when subjects were asked to compare pairs
of numbers for their numerical value, Ganor-Stern and
Tzelgov found that the distance effect was modulated as
a function of notation (i.e., interaction between notation
and distance effect).
Together, these interactions provide results which cannot
be explained by assuming an abstract representa-
tion – therefore challenging the central idea that numbers
are processed in an abstract fashion, as was strongly
suggested by the different architectures for numerical cog-
nition (e.g., the abstract modular model [McCloskey 1992]
and the triple-code model [Dehaene 1992] discussed
earlier). Nevertheless, Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov (2008,
p. 430) reached the conclusion that: “different notations
are automatically translated into a common representation
of magnitude, in line with M. McCloskey’s (1992) abstract
representation model.” However, as we have shown, exam-
ination of the details of their results does not allow one to
conclude that numerical representation is abstract; rather,
it seems to strongly support our view that numerical
representation is not abstract.
In another study (Droit-Volet et al. 2008) 5-year-olds, 8-
year-olds, and adults participated in a number bisection task
in which numbers were presented sequentially to one group
of participants or simultaneously to another group of par-
ticipants. In this task, the subjects are trained to discrimi-
nate a “few” standard (e.g., 8 dots) from a “many”
standard (e.g., 20 dots). They were then presented with
comparison stimuli that contain intermediate values (e.g.,
12 dots) or values equal to the standard, while being
asked to decide if the comparison stimuli is more similar
to the few or many standard. They found that the mode
of presentation yielded different Weber-ratios (which indi-
cate the sensitivity to discriminate two numbers). Namely,
the Weber-ratio was larger during sequential presentation
of numerical quantity compared to simultaneous presen-
tation, and this difference was highly significant for adults
and 8-year-old participants, and showed only a trend in
the case of 5-year-old children. Importantly, this study, as
in the study by Cohen Kadosh (2008a), used a large
number of participants (more than 60 participants in each
group), and thus increased the statistical power and sensi-
tivity to evidence of non-abstract representation.
Other evidence which challenges the existence of
abstract numerical representation and supports the
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existence of non-abstract representations comes from a
recent study by Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene et al.
2008). In their study, subjects from the Mundurucu
tribe, an indigenous Amazonian group with a reduced
numerical lexicon and little or no formal education, had
to indicate the location of a given number (e.g., 6 dots)
on a line segment with 1 dot at left and 10 dots at right.
The number to be mapped appeared in a random order
and in various forms (sets of dots, sequences of tones,
spoken Mundurucu words, or spoken Portuguese
words). For each number, adults and children pointed to
a screen location. The responses for both children and
adults were best fitted with a logarithmic curve (i.e., the
larger the numbers were, the more closely they were
mapped), a response that in the western culture is
usually characteristic of young children (Siegler & Booth
2004). In contrast, the responses of adults who have
been through a longer educational period were best
fitted with a linear curve. Importantly, performance
varied significantly with number notation within the
more educated group. Responses for Portuguese numerals
were best characterized by a linear function, but logarith-
mic for Mundurucu numerals and dot patterns from 1 to
10. These findings cannot be explained by an abstract
representation, as different verbal numbers such as the
Portuguese word QUATRO and the Mundurucu word
EBADIPDIP donate the same number (FOUR) and
should have led to similar mapping of the numbers inde-
pendent of their notations.
Some evidence for non-abstract representations comes
from replications of classic effects. For example, a recent
study examined the effect of different notations on the
SNARC effect (Hung et al. 2008). In this study, the partici-
pants were asked to make a parity judgement, similar to
the study by Nuerk et al. (2005) that we described
earlier (sect. 4, and Fig. 1a). While the numerical infor-
mation in the study by Nuerk et al. (2005) could appear
as digits, German words, auditory German words, or as
on a dice, the numerical information in Hung et al.
(2008) appeared in three different notations: digits,
which appeared horizontally in text, Chinese numerical
words in the simple form (e.g., —), and in the complex
form (e.g., ), which are presented in vertical text.
Hung et al. did find that the SNARC was affected by the
numerical notation, as indicated by the interaction
between the magnitude category and the responding
hand (i.e., the SNARC effect) and notation. This inter-
action was due to the SNARC effect only for digits.
Inspired by previous studies that found the SNARC
effect also with vertically aligned manual responses
(faster responses to small numbers with bottom-hand
key responses than with top-hand key responses, and
faster responses to large numbers with the top-hand key
than with the bottom-hand key) (Gevers et al. 2006a; Ito
& Hatta 2004; Schwarz & Keus 2004), they examined
the effect of notation on this vertical SNARC effect.
They found a consistent SNARC for the Chinese verbal
numbers, but not for the other notations. The results
might indicate, as Hung et al. suggested, that the represen-
tation of numbers in space is influenced, if not deter-
mined, by the dominant reading/writing experience. It is
an open question why Nuerk et al. (2005) obtained a
null result for the interaction between the SNARC effect
and notation. Different subjects, cultures, and stimuli,
might contribute to the discrepancy between the studies.
Nevertheless, the current study shows that different nota-
tions lead to different mapping of numbers in space. As
mapping of numbers in space was shown to take place
during the numerical representation (Mapelli et al. 2003;
Zorzi et al. 2002), or even later, during the response selec-
tion (Gevers et al. 2006b), this result indicates that differ-
ent notations do not converge into an abstract, single-
representation, at least at the level of the numerical rep-
resentation, and maybe even later.
Koechlin et al. (1999) conducted several experiments
on priming and subliminal priming. In these experiments
the subjects were asked to compare a stimulus (e.g., the
number 4) to the number 5, which served as a standard.
The numbers could appear as digits, verbal numbers,
or numerosity. Although most of the findings by the
authors were compatible with the abstract representation
view (i.e., they did not find an interaction between dis-
tance and notation), the authors also obtained some
results that are more in line with the non-abstract rep-
resentation view. For example, in one experiment they
used verbal numbers and digits. Although they did not
find an interaction between notation and distance under
regular priming, they obtained this interaction under
subliminal priming (which might reduce subjective
expectancy/strategies). In another experiment, they used
numbers in digits or numerosity notations. They found
an interaction between notation and quantity priming
(reduction in RT as the numerical distance between the
prime and target reduced), in both regular and subliminal
priming. These results indicate that there are different
representations of digits, verbal numbers, and numerosity.
Subsequently, Koechlin et al. proposed the existence
of separate notation-specific representations of quantity
that converge at a post-representational stage of proces-
sing. It is important to note that they assumed that these
distinct representations are revealed only under a
demanding temporal condition (e.g., subliminal priming
in which the prime is presented for as little as 66 msec).
Nevertheless, this position has been ignored by most
researchers in the field in favour of the abstract represen-
tation viewpoint.
Another effect which shows that numerical represen-
tation is not abstract is the compatibility effect (Nuerk
et al. 2001; 2004a; 2004b; Wood et al. 2006b). The compat-
ibility effect indicates that when people are comparing two
two-digit numbers they are faster to compare the numbers
if both the units and decades of a given number are
systematically smaller or larger. For example people will
be faster to compare the number 42 vs. 57 (4 , 5, and
2 , 7) than 47 vs. 62 (4 , 6, but 7 . 2). This effect
seems to be independent of the distance effect (in both
examples the distance effect is equal) (Nuerk et al. 2001;
2004b) or response selection (Nuerk et al. 2004a). This
effect indicates that the numerical representation is not
unitary, even within a single value (Dehaene et al. 1990),
but might incorporate additional representations for tens
and units. Importantly, the compatibility effect seems
to be modulated as a function of notation. That is, the
compatibility effect is smaller for verbal numbers than
for digits (Nuerk et al. 2002).
Further support for the non-abstract view comes from a
recent developmental study. Holloway and Ansari (2009)
collected the reading and mathematical achievements of
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children at the ages of 6 and 8 years. The mathematical
examination required the participants to answer as many
single-digit addition, subtraction, and multiplication pro-
blems as possible within a 3-minute period. The reading
skills were tested using a letter–word identification in
which the participants needed to correctly read real
words aloud to the experimenter, and word attack subtests,
which required them to correctly pronounce pseudo-
words. Holloway and Ansari correlated these scores with
the distance effect that was observed when these children
compared numbers in digits (symbolic) or squares (non-
symbolic) notations. The abstract representation would
predict that the distance effect independent of notation
might correlate with mathematical achievement. In con-
trast, the distance effect was only correlated with math-
ematical achievement (but not reading achievements)
when the numerical notation was in digit form. In contrast,
the distance effect when numbers appeared as squares did
not predict mathematical achievements. Moreover, they
also found an interaction between distance and notation,
and a lack of correlation between the distance effect for
digits and squares. These results clearly suggest that differ-
ent developmental trajectories underlie the representation
of symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude.
However, Holloway and Ansari interpreted these findings
as resulting from a better mapping between digits and
numerical magnitudes in children with better mathemat-
ical achievement, despite the fact that a better mapping
of digits to abstract representation can explain overall
faster RTs in children with better mathematical achieve-
ment, but cannot explain the differences in the distance
effect, as the symbolic distance effect occurs at the level
of the representation (Dehaene 1996; Schwarz & Ische-
beck 2000) or even later, during response selection
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; Link 1990; Van Opstal
et al. 2008a; Verguts & Fias 2004), but certainly not
earlier.
Other differences between different numerical nota-
tions have been found when stimuli have been processed
automatically. However, in these cases the explanations
provided considered only what was consistent with
the abstract view. For example, Fias (2001) used the
SNARC effect to examine the processing of verbal
numbers. A SNARC effect was observed when the partici-
pants were asked to make a parity judgement, but was not
found when verbal numbers were processed automati-
cally, that is, when the participants were asked to
monitor the occurrence of certain phonemes of verbal
numbers (i.e., whether there was an /e/ sound in the
name of the written verbal number). Notably, in a previous
study, the SNARC effect was observed for both parity and
phoneme monitoring tasks with digits (Fias et al. 1996).
These findings suggest that under unintentional proces-
sing, the spatial representation of the two notations
might differ. However, Fias (2001) suggested that this
difference between digits and verbal numbers was a
result of inhibition of the semantic route by the non-
semantic route only in the case of verbal numbers.
Other studies also found a dissociation between digits
and verbal numbers; however, these studies used naming
tasks (Fias et al. 2001b; Ischebeck 2003). Compared to
manual tasks, naming tasks are prone to include verbal/
phonological processes, because words are the preferred
output format for naming (Dehaene 1992). However,
this explanation cannot account for the differences
between different numerical notations in the studies that
we described earlier, as they all required a manual
response (Cohen Kadosh 2008a; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995; Dehaene et al. 2008; Droit-Volet et al. 2008;
Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008; Ito & Hatta 2003). Thus, it
might be that the differences between the notations
reflect, at least partly, non-abstract representations,
rather than solely preferred output format for naming
(Dehaene 1992).
Neuroimaging studies that have employed the size con-
gruity paradigm using a single notation (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2007c; Kaufmann et al. 2005; Pinel et al. 2004;
Tang et al. 2006a) found activity associated with interfer-
ence between digits and physical size in the IPS (i.e.,
larger BOLD signal change for an incongruent condition
vs. congruent condition). However, when different nota-
tions are used (Ansari et al. 2006b; Shuman & Kanwisher
2004) these interference effects are not seen in the IPS,
thus supporting the idea of non-abstract representation.
Numbers are apprehended automatically and even pas-
sively viewing them can activate a sense of magnitude, and
therefore modulate neural activation in the IPS (Cantlon
et al. 2006; Piazza et al. 2004). This is an important issue
because at least one previous study has shown that the
activation in the IPS during intentional numerical proces-
sing can be due to response selection rather than numeri-
cal representation (Go¨bel et al. 2004). This methodological
confound may therefore explain IPS activation that is
attributed to numerical processing (Eger et al. 2003; Nac-
cache & Dehaene 2001a; Pinel et al. 2001) when similar
response selection demands are associated with different
types of representation, a proposition that is in line with
recent studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; Van Opstal
et al. 2008a). Eger and colleagues (Eger et al. 2003), for
example, used a numerical target detection task to avoid
using direct magnitude judgements. In this task, the nine
subjects were presented with numbers between 1 and 9
and required to detect, via a button press, the appearance
of a target number (e.g., 7). Numbers have been found
to activate the IPS independent of modality (visual or
auditory presentation). However, this task required the
subjects to:
1. Process the numbers intentionally.
2. Look for a target number independent of modality.
Given that the numerical representation is flexible and
biased by task requirements (e.g., Fischer & Rottmann
2005; Gertner et al. 2009; Shaki & Petrusic 2005) this
may lead the subjects to create a modality-independent
response set.
3. Prepare a similar response selection for each type of
representation: The closer the number is to the target the
more likely it will be that the activity associated with
response selection is similar across stimulus types (i.e.,
pressing the button when detecting the target). For
example, if the target number is 7 (“SEVEN”), 6 (“SIX”)
is numerically closer to 7 than 1 (“ONE”). This idea has
been confirmed by behavioural results (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008b; Van Opstal et al. 2008a).
To examine whether numerical representation is
abstract and independent of task requirements, two
recent studies (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b; Piazza et al.
2007) employed passive viewing in a modified adaptation
paradigm (Grill-Spector et al. 2006a; Sawamura et al.
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2006). Using this paradigm, the repetition of the same
stimulus reduces the responsiveness of single neurons in
monkeys (Sawamura et al. 2006) and the BOLD signal
in humans (Grill-Spector et al. 2006a). In humans,
BOLD signal adaptation occurs when the stimulus
changes indicate that the neurons are not affected by the
stimulus-specific adapting attribute. In contrast, BOLD
signal recovery from the state of adaptation implies that
different neuronal populations are activated and that
these neurons are therefore differentially sensitive to
some property of the adaptation and test stimuli. Recently,
this paradigm has become popular in fMRI research, par-
ticularly because of the claim that it provides improved
spatial resolution by revealing sub-voxel effects (Grill-
Spector et al. 2006a). Therefore, the adaptation paradigm
can be used to address some of the limitations discussed
earlier, such as spatial resolution, subjects’ strategies,
and response selection. In the study by Piazza and col-
leagues (Piazza et al. 2007), for example, subjects passively
viewed dot arrays or digits that varied in numerical value; a
quantity presented to induce signal adaptation was fol-
lowed by a deviation in the quantity to result in signal
recovery. The abstract hypothesis suggests that similar
adaptation and recovery should occur, irrespective of
which combinations of dot arrays and digits were used at
the adaptation and test phases. The logic behind this sug-
gestion is that both notations denote the same numerical
quantity, and therefore the same neuronal correlate
should be sensitive to the numerical quantity, irrespective
of its format (Dehaene et al. 1998; 2003). The results,
however, challenged the abstract representation: that is,
there was an interaction between notation and recovery
in the left and right parietal lobes. Moreover, the abstract
representation posits that the recovery of the BOLD signal
following the deviant stimuli should be of the same magni-
tude, again, irrespective of notation. That is, greater recov-
ery should follow large numerical deviation (e.g., the
number 50 after constant presentation of quantities
between 17 and 19) in comparison to small numerical
deviation (e.g., the number 20 after constant presentation
of quantities between 17 and 19), and the magnitude of the
recovery should not interact with notation. This again was
clearly not the case; the left IPS, showed an interaction
between notation and recovery that was modulated as a
function of numerical distance. Although the authors
focused more on the similarity observed in the right IPS
between the notations, as indicated by the failure to find
a significant interaction between notation, recovery, and
numerical distance, the interaction between notation and
recovery in both left and right IPS, and particularly the
interaction between notation, recovery, and numerical
distance in the left IPS (Fig. 2a), lend themselves to an
explanation in terms of non-abstract representation.
Cohen Kadosh and colleagues (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2007b) presented digits and verbal numbers in pairs. The
pair could have an identical quantity (e.g., 8/eight after
8/eight), or a different quantity (e.g., 8/eight after 4/four).
Adaptation was identified as the difference in the BOLD
signal between pairs that did or did not differ in quantity.
The results again indicated a deviation from abstract rep-
resentation. Namely, the right IPS, but not the left IPS,
showed an interaction between adaptation and notation. In
Figure 2. Evidence of non-abstract representations from recent neuroimaging studies. (A) From the left, the recovery effect following
the adaptation period for dot arrays and digits due to numerical deviations (Far, Close) was modulated by notation in the left IPS
(turquoise circle). (B) The right IPS shows an adaptation effect (different quantity minus same quantity) for digits, but not for
words or mixed notation. (Adapted from Cohen Kadosh et al. [2007b] and Piazza et al. [2007] with permission.) A color version of
this figure is available online at: www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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particular, the adaptation in the right IPS appeared only
when a digit preceded a digit (Fig. 2b). The results again
challenge the idea that numbers are represented in an
abstract fashion, in this case, in the right IPS, and are best
explained in terms of non-abstract representation.
Thus, two studies, including one that purports to
support abstract representation, reveal notation-depen-
dent effects in the two key areas – the right and left
IPS – associated with different numerical representations.
One might suggest that the lack of interaction between
notation and adaptation in the left IPS in Cohen Kadosh
et al.’s (2007b) study indicates the existence of an abstract
representation. We examined the involvement of the left
IPS in abstract representation by using a different tech-
nique, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), together
with an adaptation paradigm. This innovative combination
of TMS and adaptation (termed TMSA) significantly
increases the functional resolution and allows one to dif-
ferentially stimulate distinct but spatially overlapping
neural populations within a stimulated region (Silvanto
& Muggleton 2008a; Silvanto et al. 2007). The paradigm
is based on findings that the effects of TMS are deter-
mined by the initial neural activation state, with attributes
encoded by the less active/excitable neural populations
within the stimulated region being more susceptible to
the effects of TMS. Thus, by using adaptation to manip-
ulate neural activation states prior to the application of
TMS, one can control which neural populations are stimu-
lated by TMS (for reviews see Silvanto & Muggleton
2008b; Silvanto et al. 2008). In our experiment the subjects
were adapted to the digit 7, which repeatedly appeared on
the screen for 45 seconds in different locations and fonts.
Following this adaptation period, the subjects had to
decide in a same-different task whether two numbers,
digits, or verbal numbers on the screen are perceptually
the same or different, while we stimulated the IPS with
TMS during the period of 180, 280, and 380 msec post-
stimulus presentation – a timing during which numerical
representation processes are believed to take place
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c; Dehaene 1996; Libertus
et al. 2007; Szucs et al. 2007; Turconi et al. 2004). Accord-
ing to the abstract representation view, the participants’
decision time would be affected by the adapted number
7, independent of the numerical notation. In contrast, if
separate representations for digits and verbal numbers
exist, as the non-abstract representation view predicts,
one should expect to find that only the representation
for digits was affected. The latter hypothesis was borne
out. Only digits were affected by TMS to the left IPS,
while words were not affected. Moreover, the TMS
effect was most effective when the digit 7 appeared, and
was attenuated as numerical proximity decreased. This
was not the case for verbal numbers (Fig. 3). In a
second experiment, the subjects were adapted to verbal
numbers rather than digits. The results were exactly the
opposite from the previous experiment, thus completing
a double dissociation; TMS to the left IPS was most effec-
tive when the adapted verbal number appeared, and was
attenuated as numerical proximity decreased. This exper-
iment shows that non-abstract representations for digit
and verbal numbers exist also in the left IPS (Cohen
Kadosh et al., submitted b). These apparent differences
between the neuroimaging findings and the current
TMS results are most likely to be rooted in the fact that
TMS and fMRI yield different measures of cause and
correlation, respectively (Walsh & Pascual-Leone 2003).
7. Multiple representations of number
The fMRA findings in Piazza et al. (2007) and Cohen
Kadosh et al. (2007b) and the TMSA results illustrate
the idea that improved spatial resolution and automatic
processing (or controlling for task-related responses) can
uncover non-abstract representations that are otherwise
masked. Notably, these studies used different notations,
different ranges of numbers, different designs, and differ-
ent techniques: the generalizability of these findings is
therefore likely to be high. Differences in the results
between these studies are also apparent. The results in
Piazza et al. (2007) indicate that numerical representation
for dots and digits is non-abstract in the left IPS, as illus-
trated by the interaction between notation and recovery
(which was also significant for the right IPS) and notation,
recovery, and numerical distance. In contrast, the study by
Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007b) points towards the opposite
conclusion, that is, that numbers in verbal number and
digit notations are represented non-abstractly in the
right IPS. However, the TMSA results showed that in
the left IPS, too, numbers in verbal number and digit nota-
tions are non-abstractly represented. It seems clear, then,
that non-abstract representation may be a feature of either
IPS, and across different notations.
However, the parietal lobes in the fMRI studies also
showed some pattern that at first sight supports the exist-
ence of abstract representation. There are four possibili-
ties for this pattern:
1. Non-abstract and abstract representations coexist.
2. While an interaction between notations is a strong
indication of the existence of non-abstract representation,
the lack of such interaction does not necessarily indicate
the existence of abstract representation, because it is
based on an absence of evidence.
3. Piazza et al. (2007) did control for task-related
responses, but explicitly asked the subjects to pay attention
to the quantity conveyed by the stimuli, and they were
informed about the different formats and their approxi-
mate values. Moreover, immediately prior to the scanning
session, subjects were shown approximately four exem-
plars of each numerosity (17:20 and 47:50 dots) and
informed about their approximate range (20 and 50,
respectively) in order to calibrate them to the respective
value (Izard & Dehaene 2008). Therefore, one cannot
be sure if at least some of the subjects still processed the
numbers intentionally (e.g., noting themselves that the
number 49 was changed to 18 dots).
4. As originally pointed out by Piazza and colleagues
(Piazza et al. 2007; for similar view, see also Tudusciuc &
Nieder 2007), to explain the cross-adaptation that they
observed, the apparent support for abstract representation
within the parietal region might be due to non-abstract
numerical representations that are characterised by separate
but highly interconnected subassemblies of neurons. There-
fore, when notations are mixed, activation of one given
population (e.g., digits) would quickly spread to the other
population (e.g., dots), thus leading to cross-notation adap-
tation in the absence of real abstract representation. This
idea gains support from findings in the primate brain. For
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example, based on fMRI studies in humans it was believed
that both covert and overt shift of attention are subserved
by the same mechanism in the frontal eye fields (FEF)
(Corbetta et al. 1998). However, single-neuron recordings
in monkeys, which provide better spatial and temporal resol-
utions, demonstrated that covert and overt shift of attention
in the FEF are associated with different neural populations
(Sato & Schall 2003), and that these dissociable populations
are functionally interconnected (Schafer & Moore 2007).
8. Resolving the resolution problem
Single-cell neurophysiology offers better temporal and
spatial resolution than human neuroimaging, and several
recent studies have reported neuronal responses to quan-
tity in the monkey brain (Nieder & Miller 2003; Roitman
et al. 2007), which resemble the predictions of numerical-
related behavioural effects and computational models
(Verguts & Fias 2004).
Neuronal populations coding for numbers are highly
distributed in the IPS, and also highly overlapping with
representations of other magnitudes (for a neuroimaging
meta-analysis, see Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f), therefore
making it difficult to disentangle numerical representation
from other magnitudes. However, a recent single-cell neu-
rophysiology study provided evidence for the existence of
neurons that are specialized for different magnitudes
(Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007).
Another study that examined whether numerical
representation depends on the format of presentation
Figure 3. Non-abstract representations for digits and verbal numbers in the left IPS. In this TMS-adaptation experiment, the subjects
were adapted to the digit 7. Top panel: Following this adaptation period the subjects had to decide whether a pair of numbers is
perceptually same or different, while TMS was delivered to their IPS. Bottom panel: Adaptation was appreciated by the subtraction
of the RT from a baseline condition, in which during the adaptation period the symbol # was presented instead of the digit 7 (i.e.,
no adaptation for numbers). TMS modulated only digits but not verbal numbers, as indicated by the interaction between notation
and distance from the adapted number. This effect was maximal for the adapted digit, and reduced as the numerical distance from
the adapted number increased. The straight white line shows the linear trend for the digits (which was significant), while the dotted
white line shows the trend for the verbal numbers (which was not significant). A color version of this figure is available online at
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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demonstrated that in the macaque parietal cortex
responses to the same quantity are initially format-
dependent (Nieder et al. 2006); different neuronal popu-
lations discharge to sequential presentation, while others dis-
charge to simultaneous presentation of numerosity. At a later
stage during the delay period, these format-dependencies
converge to a shared representation of quantity in the parie-
tal cortex. This shared representation may be due to recur-
rent processing in the prefrontal cortex, which was not
examined in the current study, but it showed longer
latency and greater activity during the memory-delay
period compared to the parietal cortex in a previous study
(Nieder & Miller 2004). This suggests that the parietal
lobe is equipped with primary non-abstract representations
that are later transformed into a shared representation, poss-
ibly due to the intentional task requirement. Recently,
Diester and Nieder (2007) showed that the neuronal popu-
lations for dots and digits in the parietal cortex of monkeys
are notation-dependent. After training the monkeys to dis-
criminate dot quantities, the monkeys were trained to associ-
ate digits with their corresponding dots (e.g., the digit 2 with
two dots). Similar to humans, the behavioural results for
digits and dots showed a similar function. However,
Diester and Nieder (2007) found that whereas many
neurons in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) were activated by
digits, dots, or by both digits and dots, neurons in the
parietal cortex were activated primarily for either digits or
dots (Fig. 4). Further training may lead to different
representations (e.g., further specialisation, or alternatively
a convergence towards a shared representation) and awaits
further exploration. Of course, this result cannot give
us 100% confidence that the basic representation of
numbers in the human parietal lobes is non-abstract,
because of the comparative question. However, it shows
that even after months of training and although digits
were explicitly associated with their corresponding dots, it
is possible for neurons in the parietal lobes to be
non-abstract. This result, together with the behavioural
and neuroimaging data in humans (sect. 6), supports the
idea that non-abstract representation is the basic represen-
tation in the parietal lobes.
9. Prefrontal cortex and number: Operations not
representations
We have confined our discussion so far to the parietal lobes,
while not discussing the PFC. Some might argue that the
PFC in the Diester and Nieder (2007) study showed
some pattern that might be compatible with the idea of
abstract representation (although one should note that the
majority of the neurons there showed activation that is in
Figure 4. Non-abstract numerical representations in the monkey’s IPS. Two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained initially
in a delayed match-to-sample protocol to discriminate small numbers of dots (between 1 and 4). Later, over several months they learned
to associate visual shapes (the digits 1, 2, 3, and 4) with corresponding numerosities. Finally, both notations appeared in a randomised
manner within an experimental session. (A) Behavioural performance for Monkey #1 for dots and shapes. The curves show how often
the monkeys judged the first test and sample to be equal. The performance to discriminate dots or shapes between 1 and 4 was quite
high and comparable. (B) Lateral view of a monkey brain. The red circle represents the location of recording sites in the parietal lobe.
(C) Venn diagram summarising the results in the IPS. Numbers correspond to the numbers of neurons selective for each class.
Association neurons indicate neurons that have similar tuning functions for the numerical values in both protocols; Numerosity
effect corresponds to neurons that were selective for a particular number; Type effect indicates neurons that were modulated by
non-numerical visuospatial properties (e.g., physical size, font). It appears that most of the neurons in the IPS were non-abstract, as
they showed selectivity for dots or shape (digits). In contrast, the amount of “abstract” neurons (coding both dots and shapes) was
negligible. AS ¼ arcuate sulcus; CS ¼ central sulcus; PS ¼ principal sulcus; STS ¼ superior temporal sulcus; LS ¼ lateral sulcus.
(Adapted from Diester and Nieder [2007]. A color version of this figure is available online at www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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line with non-abstract representation). In terms of number
research, the PFC has received less attention than the par-
ietal cortex, but it is increasingly being seen as important in
the field of numerical cognition, which starts mainly from
the observation of numerons (neurons which are number-
sensitive) in the PFC by Nieder and colleagues (Nieder
et al. 2002). There is no doubt that the PFC is involved in
numerical processing (for a recent review, see Ansari
2008). However, we argue that the PFC is not involved in
numerical representation, at least not in humans. The
PFC is important for some numerical operations, but not
representations (Duncan 2001; Revkin et al. 2008).
The cognitive system is replete with such dissociations
of cognitive operations and sensory representations – the
hippocampus, while important for reconstructing mem-
ories, does not contain the representations of the objects
in those memories; the PFC is involved in sequencing
behaviours, while not containing the representations of
each action in a sequence; the cerebellum is important
for skilled use of fingers and motor coordination, but its
role may be to support cognitive functions which are
implemented by other brain areas (Glickstein 2007;
Rosenbaum et al. 2001). There are several other reasons
for our emphasis on the parietal cortex.
First, in human adults, only the IPS shows number-
specific activation. This does not mean necessarily that
this area is solely active in response to the given process.
Posner (2003) encapsulates this view in another context
in which he refers to activations observed in the same
brain area under different task conditions:
Although it is not always easy to distinguish between a brain
area being specific for a domain or performing a computation
that is of particular importance for some domains, either can
underlie a form of modularity . . .. Thus these areas and
many others that have been described are modules in the
sense that they perform specific mental operations . . . some-
times the operations are within a single domain, but sometimes
they are more general. (Posner 2003, p. 450)
In line with this idea, parts of the IPS show number-specific
activation (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005; 2008c). This was not
found in the case of the PFC, which shows specificity for
non-numerical magnitudes rather than numbers (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2005) or joint activation for numbers and
other magnitudes (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008c).
Second, the activation in the PFC may reflect other
factors than representation including training, working
memory, strategy application (Gilbert & Burgess 2008),
or changes in response strategy (although some of them
are also modulated by the parietal cortex, as was described
in sect. 5). For example, neurons in the PFC might
respond to dots and digits because there is a similar
response strategy for the digit 1 and the dot 1 when com-
paring them to other stimuli presented. Similarly, Tudus-
ciuc and Nieder (2007) have suggested that the PFC
activation might relate to other functions of the PFC
(e.g., cognitive control, working memory) that operates
on parietal lobe functions (Miller & Cohen 2001).
Third, neuropsychological studies have found that
neurological damage to the PFC leads to deficits in esti-
mation, not because of representation impairment, but
because of impairment at the level of translation from
semantic representation to output (Revkin et al. 2008).
Fourth, there seems to be a shift from relying on the
PFC during numerical processing to the IPS, as age
increases (Ansari & Dhital 2006; Ansari et al. 2005;
Cantlon et al. 2006; Kaufmann et al. 2006). This decrease
in the reliance on prefrontal regions, and the increase in
posterior specialized neuronal circuits, might relate to
increased reliability of processes of cognitive control,
attention, and working memory with age (Ansari 2008),
or might indicate the developmental transition into a
stage in which numerical representation becomes more
automatic, and therefore involves less PFC resources.
Fifth, in contrast to many studies that consistently found
that parietal damage leads to acalculia and basic numerical
processing deficits (Ashkenazi et al. 2008; Dehaene &
Cohen 1997; Delazer & Benke 1997; Delazer et al. 2006;
Lemer et al. 2003; Takayama et al. 1994; Van Harskamp
& Cipolotti 2001; Van Harskamp et al. 2002; Vuilleumier
et al. 2004), there is, at least to our knowledge, a lack of
consistent evidence of acalculia resulting from frontal
damage. In this respect, we do not refer to secondary acal-
culia – numerical difficulties due to non-numerical origin,
such as working memory problems (Doricchi et al.
2005) – but to a primary acalculia, which is rooted at the
level of the numerical representation.
Sixth, in monkeys, numerical information is first coded in
the parietal lobes, and only later in the prefrontal cortex.
This temporal lag is in line with our suggestion that the
PFC is involved in numerically-related processes, which
might be post-representational (Nieder & Miller 2004).
Still, in humans, it is possible that the PFC is involved in
numerical representation, rather than operation, during
early developmental stages. This idea is gaining support
from several neuroimaging studies that found PFC acti-
vation in children and infants during numerical tasks
(Ansari & Dhital 2006; Cantlon et al. 2006; Izard et al.
2008; Kaufmann et al. 2006). The idea that children acti-
vate brain regions that are outside the typical areas
activated in adulthood is not unique to the field of numeri-
cal cognition, and is observed in other fields. For example,
children represent faces in additional cortical areas to the
occipitotemporal network: occipital face area (Pitcher
et al. 2007), fusiform face area (Kanwisher et al. 1997),
and the superior temporal sulcus that are consistently
found in adults (Haxby et al. 2000), including the left
and right PFC (Gathers et al. 2004; Passarotti et al.
2003). (For a review, see Johnson et al. 2009.)
One of the reviewers rightly pointed out that in the
recent fMRI study by Piazza et al. (2007), which we dis-
cussed in section 6, PFC activation was observed as a func-
tion of numerical processing, although the (adult) subjects
passively processed the quantity. However, as was
described in section 7, in this study Piazza and colleagues
draw the attention of the subjects to the different numeri-
cal quantities, to the different formats, and to the change
that will occur.
Future studies should take into account the possibility
that the PFC activation, at least for human adults, might
not reflect number-specific representation, but other
functions that support or utilise numerical representation
in the parietal lobes.
10. Abstract after all?
Our primary intention in this article has been to question
the idea that the default numerical representation is
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abstract. We need, however, to account for the evidence
that points towards abstraction and against our view.
Assuming that abstract representation might after all
exist under certain conditions, our contention, following
Barsalou (2003), is that it occurs as a consequence of the
intentional processing of numbers, which leads to explicit
creation of connections between different notation-
specific representations. We also contend that this cross-
talk between notations occurs on-line on a task-by-task
basis, but does not exist off-line. We can do no better
than Barsalou’s words: “abstraction is simply a skill that
supports goal achievement in a particular situation”
(Barsalou 2003, p. 1184). We therefore suggest that
when numerical representation is probed automatically
(or implicitly), one will be more likely to find evidence
for different numerical representations. However, when
researchers use an intentional task, they might encourage
the subject to modify the default non-abstract represen-
tations. Similar examples can be extracted from the
mapping of numbers into space. There is good evidence
that we map numbers from left to right as numerical
value increases. However, under certain conditions one
can represent numbers in reverse format, from right
to left (Bachtold et al. 1998). Similarly, we argue that
humans do not, as a default, represent numbers abstractly,
but can adopt strategies that, in response to task con-
figuration and demands, can create real or apparent
abstraction.
As numerical representation is highly flexible, and not
static, what are the neural correlates for such represen-
tations? While the IPS shows a consistent modulation for
numerical quantity, in different paradigms and labs
(Ansari et al. 2006a; 2006b; Castelli et al. 2006; Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2005; 2007c; Fias et al. 2003; 2007; Pesenti
et al. 2000; Piazza et al. 2004; Tang et al. 2006a; Wood
et al. 2006b, for reviews, see Ansari 2008; Brannon 2006;
Cantlon et al. 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Dehaene et al. 2003; Nieder 2005; Walsh 2003), other
brain areas outside the IPS also show involvement
during numerical processing – for example, the left pre-
central gyrus (Piazza et al. 2006; Pinel et al. 2004), the
right middle temporal gyrus (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005;
Pinel et al. 2001), the right superior temporal sulcus
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005), the right precentral gyrus
(Piazza et al. 2006), the cerebellum (Fias et al. 2003), or
the primary visual cortex, and the insula (Piazza et al.
2007). However, aside from the IPS, these areas did not
show a consistent activation across studies and tasks.
Therefore, the IPS may be the critical part of a distributed
and highly interconnected network of regions that gives
rise to the representation of numerical magnitude in
particular task contexts.
In his dual code hypothesis, Paivio (1971; for extensions
see Barsalou et al. 2008; Glaser 1992) suggested that
semantic knowledge is represented internally by linguistic
(verbal) and imagery (pictorial) codes, which involved
internal translation between them. Similar to our view
on numerical cognition, he proposed that the involvement
of each code depends on the task demands. Generally,
whereas picture stimuli tend to activate imagery codes,
word stimuli are coded initially by the linguistic codes.
Paivio further suggested that the dual code of linguistic
and imagistic representations might underlie all of cogni-
tive activities.
Our current cognitive neuro-anatomical approach is
partly inspired by cognitive processes as described by
the dual code theory and its extensions. Similarly, we
propose that dual codes are active during numerical rep-
resentation. Instead of the terminology of linguistic and
imagery codes we use the terminology of automatic and
intentional codes, respectively. At the first stage, there is
an automatic activation of the numerical quantity that is
modality- and notation-specific (similar to the linguistic
representations in the Language and Situated Simulation
model; for a review, see Barsalou et al. 2008) in the IPS.
This processing is crude and not as refined (Banks et al.
1976; Cohen Kadosh 2008b; Tzelgov et al. 1992). Later,
the representation of numerical information in the IPS
can be further refined. This refinement depends on the
time of the activation, intentional processing, task
demands, and is resource-dependent. The representation
at this stage can be transferred to an on-line representation
by a few, the majority, or the entire neuronal population in
the IPS, which was activated at an earlier point during
automatic numerical representation. This transition from
automatic to intentional representation can be subserved
by the PFC neural circuitry that is malleable, and its
activity reflects learned associations and rules (Duncan
2001) (e.g., that 5 and FIVE have the same quantity)
(see Fig. 5). Note, that because dot patterns are con-
sidered prelinguistic, the terminology of linguistic code
cannot be applied here. As for the imagery code, which
according to the dual code hypothesis is pictogram, a ten-
tative suggestion is that in the western culture this will be a
digit, as it is the most used pictogram for numbers in the
western culture.
Figure 5. Automatic (gray) and intentional (black) numerical
representations. Automatic numerical always precedes the
intentional numerical processing. However, the height, shape,
and offset of the two distributions are not fixed, and are
context- and task-dependent. The transition from automatic to
intentional representation in the IPS can be subserved by the
PFC neural circuitry that is malleable, and its activity reflects
learned associations and rules (Duncan 2001). Note that this
division also mirrors the separation of approximate and exact
systems with the former being fast and automatic, and the later
slow and intentional. This model is similar to the Language and
Situated Simulation model, in which the automatic and
intentional representations correspond to linguistic and situated
simulation systems (Barsalou et al. 2008).
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As the occurrence of automatic processing per se,
without intentional processing, is rather limited
(Perlman & Tzelgov 2006), the height, shape, and offset
of the distributions of the automatic and intentional
numerical representations that are presented in Figure 5
are not assumed to be fixed, and are context- and task-
dependent. For example, in some tasks the intentional
processing can be more dominant than the automatic pro-
cessing. Thus, the two distributions are only examples and
can take place in many different forms, and in some con-
ditions without or with minimal intentional processing.
This model can explain the different behavioural and
neuroimaging results that we reviewed in favour of non-
abstract representations (automatic numerical proces-
sing), and those that might imply abstract representation
(intentional numerical processing). For example, when
the intentional representation is more dominant, there is
a need for increasing statistical power in order to
uncover the non-abstract numerical representation that
occurs during the previous stage and is masked by the
intentional processing that creates an on-line abstract rep-
resentation. In addition, when no intentional processing is
needed, the detection of non-abstract representation is
easier to observe. Furthermore, this model can further
explain the distinct and shared representations for
general magnitude in the IPS (Cantlon et al. 2009;
Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f; Walsh 2003), which corre-
sponds in the current case also to automatic and inten-
tional, respectively.
As one of the reviewers pointed out, our terminology of
initial automatic processing that is followed by an inten-
tional and deliberate processing with increased
precision can profitably extend the positions in the field
of conceptual processing as reviewed by Glaser (1992)
and Barsalou et al. (2008). In short, Solomon and
Barsalou (2004; see Barsalou et al. 2008, for a review of
further studies) suggested that when task conditions
allow the usage of shallow processing, participants use a
superficial linguistic strategy. However, when a deeper
conceptual processing is needed they use simulation
(imagery), which occurs after the linguistic code. This
interplay between linguistic and simulation codes can
be modulated by automatic and intentional processing,
respectively. Moreover, our terminology helps explain
effects in other domains such as in language comprehen-
sion, conceptual processing, social processes, and edu-
cation (for examples, see Barsalou et al. 2008). For
instance, children with developmental dyscalculia might
experience difficulties in processing numbers because
of deficits in automatic numerical processing (Rubinsten
& Henik 2005; 2006). According to the current frame-
work, this problem leads to a greater reliance on inten-
tional processing, which leaves, in turn, less resources
for manipulations when they are facing more complicated
computation, or when they need to learn more advanced
strategies (Butterworth 2004). However, one important
distinction between our model and other modifications
of the dual-code is that our neuro-anatomical framework
includes the IPS, a critical area for numerical cognition.
Other fields might depend on other brain areas/networks
(e.g., temporal structures during language tasks), but we
assume that the information processing, namely, the tran-
sition from automatic to intentional processing, is based
on similar principles.
11. Future directions
The question of specialisation of numerical representation
has been relatively neglected, compared to other functions
such as face, colour, or object perception (Cohen Kadosh
& Johnson 2007). Several possible directions of research
can remedy this.
1. Single-cell neurophysiology. Following Diester and
Nieder’s (2007) study, it is important to examine how
learning affects numerical representation in the parietal
lobe. It might be that after longer training, neurons in
the parietal lobe will show activation for both digits and
dots. However, following the interactive specialisation
approach (Cohen Kadosh & Johnson 2007; Johnson
2001; Johnson et al. 2009), we believe that learning will
lead to neuronal specialisation, just as observed with
magnitude processing (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh 2008; Holloway & Ansari 2008).
Another direction will be to use automatic and intentional
tasks to examine whether the abstract representation in
the prefrontal lobes is a function of natural representation
or a result of strategies employed according to task
requirements.
†
† Developmental studies. By using habituation para-
digms with sequential and simultaneous presentations, it
is possible to examine whether infants habituate to the
same quantity independent of format. However, one possi-
bility is that the trajectory of numerical representation
follows the same principle as other types of magnitude
representations (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f; Holloway &
Ansari 2008), and other brain functions (Cohen Kadosh
& Johnson 2007), and follows a trajectory from non-
specific to increasingly specialised representations as a
function of learning.
III. Automaticity and intentionality. The passive task
used in different adaptation paradigms also has some limit-
ations; the experimenter cannot know if some subjects
decide to attend to and act on the numbers (Perlman &
Tzelgov 2006). Studying numerical representation by
using automatic processing (e.g., Stroop-like paradigms)
can yield a description of the numerical representation
that is not dependent on specific task demands. Adopting
this approach of contrasting the automatic and intentional
processing of numerical information with different nota-
tions will yield a better characterisation of the abstract
and non-abstract representations, and the conditions
under which each representation is activated.
FOUR. Neuroimaging. Combination of techniques
with good temporal resolution (magnetoencephalography,
ERP) and spatial resolution (fMRI) can shed light on the
model that we presented in Figure 5. These techniques
will allow the detection of the representations under auto-
matic processing, and the interplay between the represen-
tation under automatic and intentional representations in
the IPS, and the possible recurrent processing from the
PFC, in the case of intentional processing. Aside from
fMRI, multivariate pattern recognition, an analysis that
uses pattern classification algorithms to decode fMRI
activity that is distributed across multiple voxels, can also
provides a means to disentangle different neuronal sub-
strates as a function of numerical representation.
5. Neuronal modelling.Not surprisingly, the issue of non-
abstract representation has been neglected, possibly because
of the salience and convenience of the view that numbers are
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represented in an abstract fashion. However, a few studies
have addressed the issue of abstract representation, at least
indirectly. Some of them lead to the conclusion that the prop-
erties of numerical representation for dots and digits might
not be identical (Verguts & Fias 2004; Verguts et al. 2005).
A clear direction for future research in this field is to
examine issues such as task-dependent representation, or
typical and atypical development of numerical represen-
tations as a function of interaction between brain areas
(Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith 2002). A great deal is known
about the behaviour of numerical systems and we also have
good characterisations of the anatomy and functions of key
areas to provide constraints on models.
12. Conclusion
The idea that numerical representation is not abstract has,
in our view, been cast aside too readily. In contrast, the
idea that number representation is abstract has become a
premature default position that is not as strongly supported
by the evidence on which it is based as its predominance
may suggest. Here we have provided evidence from behav-
ioural and neuroimaging studies in humans to single-cell
neurophysiology in monkeys that cannot be explained by
the abstract numerical representation, as they clearly indi-
cate that numerical representation is non-abstract. It is an
open question if numerical representation, at least under
certain conditions, is abstract at all. We therefore suggest
that before sleep-walking into orthodoxy the alternative
idea is revitalised and given further consideration. Future
studies should take into account the different methodologi-
cal and theoretical arguments that we have raised in this
target article, before concluding that numerical represen-
tation is abstract, as well as any other conclusions regarding
the commonalities between processes.
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Abstract: The type of processing of numerical dimensions varies greatly
and is governed by context. Considering this flexibility in tandem with a
fuzzy demarcation line between automatic and intentional processes, it
is suggested that testing the effect of notation should not be confined
to automatic processing, in particular to passive viewing. Recent
behavioral data satisfying the authors’ stipulations reveal a considerable,
though perhaps not exclusive, core of common abstract processing.
In a clearly written and thought provoking article, Cohen Kadosh
&Walsh (CK&W)make three interrelated arguments. First, they
claim that the meaning of numerals – numerical magnitude – is
activated in an automatic fashion just about whenever a numeral
is presented for view. Second, they argue that notation-induced
differences in processing can be tapped when one does not
impose an intentional task, indeed any task, engaging the pre-
sented numerals. Third, they suggest that the best behavioral
avenue to uncover the effect of notation is to perform Stroop-
like conflict studies in which the different notations serve in
turn as the target and the to-be-ignored dimensions. The
generic view advanced by the authors has merit, but there are
difficulties with the arguments.
Concerning the first argument, the authors pinpoint the vast
experience that humans have with numbers and conclude that,
as a result, numbers are over-learned and processed in an auto-
matic fashion. Numbers are certainly ubiquitous in people’s cog-
nitive milieu, but it does not follow that the full arithmetic
properties of a number are activated in an obligatory fashion
just whenever a number is presented for any purpose. As
Stevens noted in his celebrated chapter, a numeral can be “an
ink mark on a piece of paper” (Stevens 1951, p. 22); another intel-
lectual giant of quantitative psychology has similarly remarked
that numerals can sometimes be mere “scratches on paper”
(Guilford 1954, p. 5). Human cognition is a wonderfully adjusta-
ble system, flexible enough to treat numerals as mere shapes
when that suffices to perform the task (if there is one to
perform). This conclusion was reached in a tightly controlled
study by Cohen (2009). Cohen presented participants with a
single numeral (between 1 and 9) and asked perhaps the simplest
possible question: to identify whether the presented numeral was
a 5. If numbers automatically activate their magnitude represen-
tations, then reaction time should be a function of the distance
between 5 and the presented numeral. Instead, magnitude infor-
mation did not affect the data, only physical shape did. Cohen
(2009) concluded that “numerical symbols do not automatically
activate quantity representations” (p. 336) and that, in the
absence of meaning, the shapes determine the results. Ratinckx
et al. (2005) reached similar conclusions with respect to two-
digit numerals.
Typical markers of automatic activation mentioned by the
authors, such as the size congruity effect, are also inconsistent
with a sharp dichotomy between automatic and intentional pro-
cessing. Virtually all studies that demonstrated the effect (of
task-irrelevant numerical magnitude on judgments of physical
size) used a design that favored the numerical over the physical
dimension in the first place. Thus, more values of number than
values of physical size were typically presented (indeed, most
studies used merely two values for size: large, small). Moreover,
the numerals were easier to discriminate from one another than
their physical sizes. When these and further contextual biases
were removed (Algom et al. 1996; Pansky & Algom 1999;
2002), the size congruity effect evaporated – with the numbers
processed as mere shapes. And, when physical size is made the
more salient dimension (Fitousi & Algom 2006) the size congru-
ity effect reverses with physical size intruding on number magni-
tude more than vice versa. Such pliability is inharmonious with
(strongly) automatic processing. The absence of automatic acti-
vation of (cardinal) numerical magnitude has been shown with
respect to another marker of automatic activation, the SNARC
effect (Ben-Nathan et al. 2009). Of even more concern, these
two putative markers of automatic activation were unrelated for
the same numbers with the same observers (Fitousi et al. 2009).
The upshot is that (a) automatic and intentional processing do
not form a dichotomy, but rather, mark the end-points of a finely
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grained continuum, and that (b) the dominant type processing is
under strong contextual control. Consequently, numerical mag-
nitude is not activated in an automatic fashion on an unlimited
scale; it is not the default processing option when a numeral is
presented for view. When contextual demands do not invite
number processing, the presented numerals may well be pro-
cessed as mere shapes or marks. Therefore, it is not prima
facie clear what the recordings in the adaptation paradigms
with passive viewing signify. They might not be pure measures
of number processing (note: numerals in different notation
differ in shape). Alternatively, some features (demand character-
istics?) of the experimental situation might have invited/encour-
aged number processing. Be that as it may, passive viewing seems
to be a suboptimal vehicle to test notation-induced differences in
processing. CK&W seem to admit this when they mention that
the experimenter cannot know what aspect of the stimulus the
observers elect to attend.
Given the fuzzy demarcation of automatic processing, I do not
fully agree with the second claim made by the authors that the
effect of notation should be tested via automatic processing. Of
course, the authors can retort that, regardless of the generic
question of automaticity, the testing can take place in those con-
ditions in which automatic processing has been verified in
advance (e.g., a size congruity effect is demonstrated for the
stimuli). Note that this stipulation cannot apply with passive
viewing. However, I am not convinced that intentional proces-
sing is inherently unsuitable for testing the effects of notation.
Surely, strategies can bias processing but they do not invariably
act to produce a common abstract representation. Thus, Fias
(2001) did find a dissociation between a parity judgment task
and a phoneme verification task with verbal numbers, even
though magnitude information is not needed for performance
in both tasks. Damian (2004) demonstrated a task-dependent
asymmetry in performance across Arabic and verbal numerals.
So, I would not rule out intentional processing as platform for
testing the question of notational effects.
Concerning the third argument, by a fortuitous coincidence,
Ben-Nathan (2009; Ben-Nathan & Algom 2008) performed the
experiment recommended by the authors: A pair of numerals
appeared on each trial, an Arabic digit and a verbal number,
and the participants decided, while timed, whether the number
in the target notation was larger or smaller than a standard
number. The Stroop effect for each notation was calculated as
the difference in performance between congruent and incongru-
ent displays. As the results show (Fig. 1), both Arabic and word
performance was affected by the irrelevant number in the
alternative notation, although the effect was greater for word.
This set of data is not completely decisive, but the Stroop
effects recorded for both notations tap a considerable amount
of common, hence abstract, processing.
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Abstract: The theory put forward by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W)
proposing that semantic representations of numerical magnitude in the
parietal cortex are format-specific, does not specify how these
representations might be constructed over the course of learning and
development. The developmental predictions of the non-abstract
theory are discussed and the need for a developmental perspective on
the abstract versus non-abstract question highlighted.
In several parts of their target article, Cohen Kadosh & Walsh
(CK&W) highlight the importance of taking a developmental
perspective in explorations of the brain’s representation of
number. However, their article does not provide a model of
how non-abstract representation of number in the parietal
cortex might arise over developmental time. Since many of the
representational formats described by CK&W, such as Arabic
numerals and number words, are cultural inventions, their
brain representation(s) must be the outcome of a developmental
process. In other words, the theory raises the question of why
development would involve the construction of a system with
multiple format-specific representations of numerical magnitude
in the parietal cortex?
In this commentary, I explore the notion of non-abstract rep-
resentations of numerical magnitude from a developmental
perspective and contend that currently available theory and
evidence suggests that abstract representations of numerical
magnitude are a more plausible outcome of development than
non-abstract representations.
According to several current theoretical proposals (Dehaene
1997; Verguts & Fias 2004), the acquisition of exact, symbolic
representations of number requires the interaction between, on
the one hand, preverbal systems that have a long evolutionary
history and are shared between species and, on the other hand,
language-related, symbolic representation of number that are
the product of cultural history. Specifically, evidence suggests
that infants and nonverbal animals share the ability to discrimi-
nate between large, non-symbolic numerosities (such as arrays
of dots), and that infants discrimination abilities are, consistent
with Weber’s law, ratio dependent (for a review, see Brannon
2006). In addition to this approximate system for the represen-
tation of large numbers, infants are thought to have a system
for the precise representation of small sets of objects (Feigenson
et al. 2004), which is thought to support the ability of children
and adults to rapidly (without counting) enumerate small (1–4)
items (frequently called “subitizing”). These early represen-
tational systems are thought to play an important role in chil-
dren’s acquisition of higher-level numerical skills. In particular,
recent evidence suggests that infants’ representation of small
sets scaffolds their understanding of the meaning of counting
(Le Corre & Carey 2007). Subsequent to children’s gaining
understanding of the meaning of number words, numerical
symbols such as Arabic numerals are learnt and presumably
these initially meaningless symbols acquire their meaning by
being mapped onto corresponding number words, which are in
turn mapped onto preverbal systems for the representation of
Figure 1 (Algom). The time needed to decide the numerical
magnitude (larger or smaller than the standard) as a function of
target notation and congruity. [Con: congruent, Incon:
incongruent].
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numerical magnitude. Thus, development is thought to involve
the progressive acquisition of the mappings between different
external representations of number. Thus, while the processes
that are involved in mapping from external to internal represen-
tations may differ between stimulus formats, the internal seman-
tic referent does not differ between representation formats. It is
this common representation that allows for the translation
between formats. This is also the prediction made by Verguts
and Fias, who argue that symbolic and non-symbolic represen-
tations of numerical magnitude are mapped onto a shared rep-
resentation of numerical magnitude subserved by the
intraparietal cortex via different pathways. Recent empirical
work has supported this proposal by showing format-general rep-
resentation of quantity in the intraparietal sulcus, as well as
format-specific activation in other brain regions (Ansari & Hollo-
way 2008; Santes et al., in press). In other words, format-speci-
ficity lies in the process of mapping between, on the one hand,
different external representations (i.e., number words to Arabic
numerals) and, on the other hand, the mapping between external
representation and a common, format-general, internal represen-
tation of numerical magnitude. This theory is different from the
model put forward by CK&W in which the representation of
numerical magnitude itself is predicted to be format-specific.
Given that development is thought to involve the progressive
interconnection between different external representations that
refer to a common internal representation of numerical magni-
tude, it seems more plausible that development involves the pro-
gressive specialization of the parietal cortex for format-
independent rather than format-dependent representations of
numerical magnitude, while other brain regions might mediate
between representations and subserve the association between
each external representation and the common, abstract represen-
tation of numerical magnitude.
Indeed, a recent neuroimaging study (Cantlon et al., in press)
provides evidence to suggest that both children and adults exhibit
common activation of the inferior parietal cortex during the pro-
cessing of symbolic and non-symbolic numerical magnitude.
However, children additionally activate prefrontal regions,
which may mediate the association between different formats.
Such data are consistent with the interactive specialization
model of functional brain development, in which functional
brain specialization is the product of the interaction between
multiple brain regions (Johnson 2001).
If the proposal by CK&W is indeed correct, then the current
models of the development of numerical magnitude represen-
tations need to be radically revised. If the semantic represen-
tation, for example, of number symbols differs qualitatively
from the representation of number words and non-symbolic rep-
resentations of numerical magnitude, then the development of
children’s understanding of these external representations must
involve independent developmental trajectories. Specifically,
different external representations of numerical magnitude
would be expected to acquire their meaning independently of
one another, rather than through becoming interconnected. Fur-
thermore, this developmental trajectory would differ between
speakers of different languages and second-language acquisition
would be predicted to involve the construction of a new parietal
representation for the number words in the newly acquired
language. What are the neurocognitive processes that allow for
the construction of these format-specific semantic represen-
tations of numerical magnitude? The implications of such inde-
pendent representations might be that children cannot use
their semantic representation of number words in order to
understand the meaning of Arabic numerals. Furthermore, this
would have educational repercussions and may lead to less
focus on the relationships between different formats of represen-
tations in the classroom.
Taken together, in its current form, the proposal for non-
abstract representations put forward by CK&W does not
account for the emergence of non-abstract representations over
the course of learning and development. Because different
formats for the external representation of numerical magnitude
are acquired over the course of learning and development, the
non-abstract theory must be put to the developmental test.
Numerical abstractness and elementary
arithmetic
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Abstract: Like number representation, basic arithmetic seems to be a
natural candidate for abstract instantiation in the brain. To investigate
this, researchers have examined effects of numeral format on
elementary arithmetic (e.g., 4þ 5 vs. fourþ five). Different numeral
formats often recruit distinct processes for arithmetic, reinforcing the
conclusion that number processing is not necessarily abstracted away
from numeral format.
Cardinal number is an abstract property of a set of elements
because it is invariant for all possible kinds of elements or refer-
ents. The basic arithmetic operations (i.e., addition, multipli-
cation, subtraction, and division), at least when viewed as
formal arithmetical functions, are similarly abstract because the
kinds or referents of problem operands are irrelevant. For this
reason, both number and arithmetic seem to be natural candi-
dates for abstract instantiation in the brain. Not surprisingly,
then, the issue of abstraction has engaged cognitive arithmetic
researchers in much the same debate that has occupied research
on quantity representation. In the target article, Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh (CK&W) have focused on effects of numerical format
(e.g., 4 vs. four) in tasks that directly or indirectly tap quantity
processing, but they have not discussed in any detail the substan-
tial body of research that has examined effects of numeral format
on elementary arithmetic (e.g., 4þ 5 vs. fourþ five).
In fact, the prominent models of number processing advocated
by Dehaene et al. (1998a) and McCloskey and Macaruso (1995),
which assume that different numeral formats activate a common
quantity representation, similarly assume that elementary arith-
metic is abstracted away from surface form (see also Venkatraman
et al. 2005). Alternatively, cognitive processes for arithmetic
could vary with format (see Campbell & Epp [2005] for a
review of relevant literature). In this alternative view, there are
two senses in which elementary arithmetic could be non-abstract.
First, calculation performance could be based on discrete,
format- and operation-specific processes (McNeil & Warrington
1994). This implies non-abstract representation in the same
sense defined in the target article (i.e., different formats recruit
distinct neuronal populations). Second, calculation might be
based on overlapping representations across formats, but calcu-
lation efficiency is format specific. This would occur if
problem-encoding processes and calculation processes were
interactive rather than strictly additive (Szu´´cs & Cse´pe 2004).
As the following paragraphs illustrate, there is evidence that
performance of elementary arithmetic by educated adults is
non-abstract in both senses.
In experimental research examining format effects on elemen-
tary calculation, the most common contrast has involved arith-
metic problems in Arabic digit format (5þ 6) versus written
word format (fiveþ six). It is consistently found that performance
is much slower and more error prone with written-word oper-
ands compared to Arabic digits. Campbell and Epp (2005)
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proposed that relatively poor performance with arithmetic
problems in written-word format occurs because number-fact
retrieval processes are less efficient with word compared to
digit operands. Arithmetic problems are encountered more
frequently in digit format (e.g., 2þ 6, 4  5) than in written
number-word format (twoþ six, four  five). Consequently,
digit problems are more likely to activate a visual retrieval path
than would a written-word problem (McNeil & Warrington
1994). Retrieval, given number words, presumably requires
phonological recoding of problems so that the proximal retrieval
cue is based on auditory-phonological codes. Retrieval with
digits, therefore, would be more efficient because it is mediated
both by well-established visual and phonological routes, whereas
retrieval with number-word format would not provide a direct
visual basis for retrieval.
The proposal that arithmetic-fact retrieval efficiency is lower
with problems in word format than digit format is also sup-
ported by the well-replicated finding that non-retrieval
strategies (i.e., procedural strategies such as counting or
decomposition) are reported more often given word format
(sixþ seven) than digit format (6þ 7) (Campbell & Epp
2005). Educated adults report procedural strategies for simple
arithmetic up to 50% more with problems in written-word
format than digit format (Campbell & Alberts, in press).
Format-induced strategy shifts imply that different formats
often recruit different neural processes for elementary
arithmetic. Indeed, imaging research suggests that retrieval of
arithmetic facts is associated with linguistic representations in
the left angular gyrus, whereas procedural strategies requiring
semantic quantity processing recruit bilateral components of
the intraparietal sulcus (Dehaene et al. 2004). As direct retrieval
and procedural strategies activate distinct brain regions (see
also Dehaene et al. 2003), the effects of format on strategy
choice for elementary arithmetic imply that calculation is not
generally abstracted away from surface form.
Format-related strategy shifts demonstrate that calculation
performance sometimes involves discrete, format-specific pro-
cesses, but calculation also appears to be non-abstract in the
second sense mentioned earlier; namely, that format-specific
encoding processes or context can interact with calculation pro-
cesses. One source of evidence for this comes, again, from
research examining format effects on simple arithmetic: When
procedural strategy trials are removed from analysis and only
retrieval trials are analyzed, there remain substantial word-
format costs relative to digit format, and word-format retrieval
costs tend to increase with problem difficulty (Campbell et al.
2004; Campbell & Penner-Wilger 2006). This reinforces the con-
clusion that arithmetic retrieval processes are not abstracted
away from surface format.
The non-abstractness of elementary arithmetic is demon-
strated further by context-dependent activation of arithmetic
facts. Bassok et al. (2008) found evidence for obligatory activation
of addition facts (4þ 2 ¼ 6) when problems were primed by
word pairs semantically aligned with addition (e.g., tulips-
daisies, which afford addition as a collection of flowers), but
not when they were primed by pairs misaligned with addition
(hens-radios, records-songs). The automaticity of arithmetic
fact retrieval thereby depended on the analogical consistency
of the semantic context activated by the prime and the specific
arithmetic operation to be performed. This implies that the
kinds and referents of problem operands are relevant to cognitive
arithmetic, despite being irrelevant to arithmetic as a formal
operation. Like the effects of surface form, semantic align-
ment phenomena demonstrate that cognitive arithmetic is not
abstracted away from the conditions of problem encoding.
Research on elementary arithmetic thereby aligns with the theor-
etical perspective represented in the target article, and points
toward integrated, multimodal mechanisms in favor of abstract
or amodal representations and processes (e.g., Barsalou 2008;
Clark & Campbell 1991).
Numerical abstraction: It ain’t broke
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Abstract: The dual-code proposal of number representation put
forward by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) accounts for only a
fraction of the many modes of numerical abstraction. Contrary to their
proposal, robust data from human infants and nonhuman animals
indicate that abstract numerical representations are psychologically
primitive. Additionally, much of the behavioral and neural data cited to
support CK&W’s proposal is, in fact, neutral on the issue of numerical
abstraction.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) propose a new dual-code
model of numerical representation that posits a psychological
and neural distinction between fast, automatic notation-
dependent representations and slower, intentional notation-
independent representations. In their model, notation- and
modality-specific (non-abstract) representations are psychologi-
cally more primary than abstract representations. We argue
that this proposal is limited in its psychological and neurobiologi-
cal perspective on numerical abstraction, and that the evidence
they offer is either neutral on the issue of whether numbers
are represented abstractly, or equally compatible with existing
models of number representation.
A central limitation of CK&W’s proposal is the coarse manner
in which it surveys the theoretical landscape of numerical
abstraction. At the psychological level, numerical abstraction
can refer to notation independence, modality independence,
or the representation of number independently of dimensions
such as time, space, size, and color. For instance, the capacity
to recognize that a group of three elephants is equal in
number to a group of three umbrellas, but that both are fewer
in number than a series of ten gunshots, is a feat of numerical
abstraction. We know from scores of behavioral studies that
human infants and nonhuman animals smoothly represent
non-symbolic numerical values across modalities and dimen-
sions (e.g., Cantlon & Brannon 2006; Church & Meck 1984;
Hauser et al. 2002; Jordan & Brannon 2006; Jordan et al.
2005; 2008; Kobayashi et al. 2005; Nieder et al. 2006; Starkey
et al. 1983; Wood & Spelke 2005). Importantly, infants and non-
human animals exhibit these abstract numerical representations
in the absence of symbolic language, and they do so spon-
taneously. Thus, numerical representations can be abstract in
the absence of discrete symbolic representations or explicit
task demands. CK&W’s claim that “numerical representation
is primarily non-abstract” (target article, Abstract) and that
intentional processing is required to achieve notation- and
modality-independent representations of numerical values is
at odds with the demonstrated existence of this non-symbolic
form of numerical abstraction.
Abstract non-symbolic numerical representations are impor-
tant to any theory of numerical representation because they are
hypothesized to provide the evolutionary and developmental
foundation upon which symbolic numerical representations are
psychologically constructed (e.g., Carey 2004; Gallistel &
Gelman 2000). In other words, current developmental and evol-
utionary theories propose that numerical representations are
abstract before they are symbolic. Therefore, CK&W’s proposal
needs to either (1) provide a theoretical account of the alleged
developmental disappearance of automatic numerical abstraction
in human children, or (2) make the case that preverbal infants
and nonhuman animals spontaneously engage in intentional pro-
cessing to represent numerical values across modalities and
dimensions.
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A second theoretical limitation of CK&W’s proposal is that
their neurobiological definition of numerical abstraction risks
reductio ad absurdum. That is, the stipulation that numerical
abstraction requires identical responses in identical neurons is
potentially impossible to satisfy. Yet, even if it were possible to
satisfy that criterion, it is not clear whether it is the appropriate
criterion for establishing numerical abstraction. As the authors
review, regions of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) respond during
numerical processing across notations, modalities, and dimen-
sions. The mounting evidence that numerical representations
across notations, modalities, and dimensions are “distributed
but overlapping” in the IPS is neutral on the issue of whether
the underlying representations are abstract. Instead, such evi-
dence suggests that different numerical forms invoke both
shared and separate neural processes. CK&W’s conclusion that
the neurobiological data weigh more heavily in favor of nota-
tion-dependent neural processes is therefore merely an assertion
at this stage.
Other empirical evidence that CK&W cite in favor of their
account does not do the theoretical work the authors are asking
of it. The authors review both behavioral and neurobiological evi-
dence purportedly revealing notation-specific interactions in
numerical tasks. However, many of the notation-specific inter-
actions they review hinge on generic differences in performance
level. Specifically, if a single psychological process is involved
in judging numerical values from two different numerical nota-
tions (e.g., numerical judgments of Arabic numerals and arrays
of dots), yet the judgment is easier for one of the two notations
(e.g., because the input mode is more rapid, reliable, or fluent),
a notation-specific interaction may emerge simply because
performance on the easier notation hit ceiling accuracy or
floor speed. Such interactions, though cited by CK&W, do
not invite the theoretical implications that CK&W draw.
Instead, notation- or modality-specific interactions that arise
under these circumstances reflect a quantitative difference in
performance between notations or modalities. Note that this
argument may also apply to neurobiological findings under cir-
cumstances in which floor or ceiling response levels are
achieved. While bearing this issue in mind, we encourage
CK&W to re-evaluate the relevance of the following studies
to their argument for notation- and modality-dependent
number representations: Dehaene and Akhavein (1995),
Droit-Volet et al. (2008), Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov (2008),
Hung et al. (2008), and Ito and Hatta (2003). These studies
(and likely others) report interactions that do not necessarily
support a notation- or modality-dependent account of numeri-
cal representation.
Importantly, any notation- or modality-dependent interaction
that survives inspection for a generic performance effect likely
can be accounted for by the two-system view of approximate
and exact numerical representation proposed by Dehaene et al.
(1999). In the pre-existing two-system proposal, notation-specific
interactions may arise from an interplay between the exact and
approximate numerical codes. Unfortunately, CK&W have not
distinguished the empirical predictions of their dual-code view
from the existing two-system view.
In short, although we applaud CK&W for highlighting some of
the many remaining puzzles about the nature of numerical
abstraction in the mind and brain, the solutions they offer do
not adequately account for the data. Moreover, the open ques-
tions surrounding the cognitive and neural basis of numerical
abstraction do not warrant a restructuring of the field of numeri-
cal cognition. Robust evidence demonstrates that with or without
language, number is represented abstractly – independently of
perceptual features, dimensions, modality, and notation. In
fact, this is the very definition of “number.”
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Abstract: In this commentary, I support and augment Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh’s (CK&W’s) argument that numerical representations are not
abstract. I briefly review data that support the non-abstract nature of
the representation of numbers between zero and one, and I discuss
how a failure to test alternative hypotheses has led researchers to
erroneously conclude that numerals automatically activate their
semantic meaning.
There exists in the numerical cognition literature what I call the
triple tautology: that numerical representations are (1) automati-
cally activated, (2) abstract, and (3) analogue. Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh (CK&W) present a convincing argument that numerical
representations are not abstract. Although CK&W focus on the
numerical representation of integers, strong evidence also
exists for the non-abstract nature of the numerical representation
of quantities between zero and one (Cohen et al. 2002). My col-
leagues and I have shown that, although most college students
understand the correct ordinal relation of numbers expressed
in a single numerical format (e.g., decimals), they do not under-
stand the correct ordinal relation of numbers expressed in differ-
ent formats (e.g., comparing decimals to relative frequencies). If
the numerical representation of numbers between zero and one
were abstract, the students should have been able to compare the
semantic meaning of numbers expressed in different numerical
formats once the numbers were converted into the abstract rep-
resentation. Although researchers may discount this evidence for
non-abstract representation of numbers as unique to those
between zero and one, CK&W reveal that it is consistent with
the evidence for the representation of integers.
The crux of CK&W’s argument is that correlations should not
be confused for causal mechanisms – no matter how intuitive the
causal relations may appear. Below, I describe how the remaining
two tautologies (automatic activation and analogue represen-
tation) also rely heavily on correlational evidence.
It can be argued that Moyer and Landaur (1967) started the
modern study of numerical cognition with their discovery of
the numerical distance effect. In short, the authors presented
two integers side-by-side and asked participants to judge which
integer was the larger of the two. The authors found that reaction
time (RT) varied as a function of the numerical distance between
the two presented integers. The robust nature of the finding,
together with its appeal to our intuition about the importance
of numerical distance, has made this finding one of the bedrocks
of the numerical cognition literature. The numerical distance
effect was the foundation of the first tautology of numerical cog-
nition: the analogue nature of the representation.
The numerical distance effect is not only the foundation of the
first tautology, but it is also a foundation of automaticity. A strong
test of the automatic activation hypothesis is a simple task in
which participants are to judge whether two numerical symbols
are the same or different. In previous versions of this task,
researchers dichotomized the stimuli into “close” and “far”
groups by choosing numbers that are numerically “close” (e.g.,
8 and 9) and numbers that are numerically “far” (e.g., 1 and 9).
If semantic meaning is automatically activated, it will interfere
with participants’ same/different judgments and evidence for
the numerical distance effect should be present in the RT data.
Specifically, the time for participants to judge two numerically
close numbers as different (i.e., the “close” group) should be
longer than the time it takes them to judge two numerically
distant numbers as different (i.e., the “far” group). This is
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exactly what researchers found (Dehaene & Akhavein 1995;
Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008), and they reasonably concluded
that numerical symbols automatically activated their semantic
meaning.
Researchers should remember that, despite its name, the
numerical distance effect is correlational. That is, numerical dis-
tance is one of several features that are correlated with the
order of the numbers on the number line. Therefore, although
numerical distance is correlated with participants’ RTs, it may
not be the controlling factor of participants’ RTs. As with all cor-
relational data, there may be a third variable that (1) is correlated
with numerical distance and (2) is the true controlling factor of
participants’ responses. The first step in determining whether a
third variable exists is to test alternative hypotheses. Unfortu-
nately, in numerical cognition research, researchers rarely (if
ever) consider plausible alternatives to the numerical distance
hypothesis. Recently, I did just that when I tested whether
numerical symbols automatically activate their representation.
I ran the numerical same/different task with two simple
changes: (1) I did not dichotomize the stimuli, and (2) I tested
an alternative hypothesis. By not dichotomizing the levels of
the independent variable, I reduced the number of plausible
alternative hypotheses that could explain the data. The plausible
alternative I tested was simple: RT increased as a function of the
physical similarity between the two numbers to be distinguished.
See Cohen (2009) for the operational definition of the physical
similarity function. The data were clear: Physical similarity was
the controlling factor in participants’ RTs, not numerical dis-
tance. Because the semantic meaning did not interfere with par-
ticipants’ response, the data demonstrated that integers do not
automatically activate their semantic meaning. Because the
numerical distance function correlates highly with the physical
similarity function (r ¼ .62), researchers may easily confuse the
effects of physical similarity for those of numerical distance if
they do not actively test both.
CK&W benefit the numerical cognition community by review-
ing the literature addressing the abstract nature of numerical
representations. The authors remind us not to confuse corre-
lations for causal mechanisms. I echo that sentiment and
remind readers that the numerical distance effect is, at its
essence, simply a correlation. By challenging the tautologies of
the field with plausible alternative hypotheses, researchers like
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh keep the numerical cognition field
moving forward.
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Abstract: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) neglect the solid empirical
evidence for a convergence of notation-specific representations onto a
shared representation of numerical magnitude. Subliminal priming
reveals cross-notation and cross-modality effects, contrary to CK&W’s
prediction that automatic activation is modality and notation-specific.
Notation effects may, however, emerge in the precision, speed,
automaticity, and means by which the central magnitude representation
is accessed.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) revive a twenty-year-old pro-
posal in numerical cognition, according to which our capacity
for abstract mathematical thought results from a complex inter-
action of multiple concrete notation-specific codes (Campbell
& Clark 1988). Their conclusions, unfortunately, result from dis-
carding of solid empirical evidence supporting a convergence of
notation-specific representations onto a shared representation of
numerical magnitude, in favor of weak evidence for notation
effects. Thus, their article consists in a catalogue of findings in
which any difference or interaction involving number notation
is taken as strong support for the notation-specific view. In this
commentary, I first return to the evidence for notation-indepen-
dent representations, then discuss interesting reasons why nota-
tion occasionally influences brain and behavior.
Evidence for notation-independent number processing.CK&W
cite, but do not seem to draw conclusions from, the many func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that have
observed shared fMRI activations across different notations for
numbers. Most important, are studies showing cross-notation
fMRI adaptation, because they cannot be dismissed as just
showing activation overlap, or as resulting from artifacts of
response selection (Jacob & Nieder 2009; Naccache & Dehaene
2001a; Piazza et al. 2007). As an example, extending earlier work
by Piazza et al. (2007), Jacob and Nieder (2009) recently demon-
strated that after adaptation to a fraction expressed with Arabic
numerals (e.g., 1/2), anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) shows a
distance-dependent transfer of adaptation to number words (e.g.,
half). As a second example, Figure 1 replots the data in Naccache
and Dehaene (2001a), showing that IPS activation is reduced
whenever the same numerical quantity is repeated, regardless of
whether notation is changed (Arabic digits vs. number words).
Note that in this experiment, the first presentation of the
number was subliminal, and yet the results showed clear
cross-notation convergence. In general, it is surprising that
CK&Wdo not cite the extensive behavioral literature on subliminal
priming demonstrating clear notation-independent effects (e.g.,
Dehaene et al. 1998b; Reynvoet & Brysbaert 2004; Reynvoet
et al. 2002). Even cross-modal subliminal priming was recently
demonstrated, from a subliminal Arabic numeral to a conscious
spoken numeral (Kouider & Dehaene, in press). These effects
argue directly against CK&W’s proposal that when numerical
representations are probed implicitly, convergence across notations
does not occur.
Equally impressive are electrophysiological studies showing
that some single neurons, particularly in prefrontal cortex,
respond identically to symbolic and various non-symbolic
displays of number, with the same exact tuning curve across
the interval of numbers tested (Diester & Nieder 2007;
Nieder et al. 2006). Astonishingly, CK&W dismiss these beauti-
ful data with the claim that the animals are using a “similar
response strategy,” for example, for digit 1 and dot 1 compared
to other numbers – not acknowledging the fact that their
interpretation would require as many putative strategies as
there are numbers!
Returning to fMRI, another method that is likely to play a
strong role in the coming years is multivariate decoding, which
probes fMRI activation for the presence of decodable patterns
and their generalization to novel experimental conditions.
Using this technique, with Evelyn Eger (Eger et al., submitted),
we recently demonstrated that human IPS signals can be used to
decode which number a participant is temporarily holding in
mind. When trained with Arabic numerals, the IPS decoder gen-
eralizes to dot patterns, indicating the presence of an underlying
notation-independent neuronal population. Likewise, with
Andre´ Knops (Knops et al. 2009), we found that a classifier
trained with posterior IPS activation during left versus right sac-
cades could spontaneously generalize to a classification of sub-
traction versus addition trials, whether these calculations were
performed with non-symbolic sets of dots or with symbolic
Arabic numerals.
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The concept of “abstract representation” is never defined by
CK&W, and here the Knops et al. (in press) findings point to
an important theoretical point: A representation may be shared
across numerical notations, and yet rely on a spatial, non
“abstract” format of representation. Knops et al. show that the
putative human homolog of monkey area LIP, a retinotopic
region involved in attention and eye movement, is partially co-
opted for symbolic and non-symbolic arithmetic on the number
line – a clear instance of “cortical recycling” of a sensorimotor
area for a more abstract mathematical use (Dehaene & Cohen
2007).
Interesting reasons why number notation occasionally inﬂu-
ences brain and behavior. If numbers presented in various nota-
tions contact unified representations of magnitude and space,
then why are significant notation effects occasionally observed?
Several explanations can be proposed, none of them requiring
a hasty dismissal of notation-independent representations.
1. Numerical precision. Neural network simulations suggest
that the introduction of symbolic representation can lead to a
refined precision of the tuning curves for number (Verguts &
Fias 2004). Importantly, according to this view, the same
neurons remain responsive to both symbolic and non-symbolic
presentations – only their accuracy changes. Mathematical
developments of this theory (Dehaene 2007) suggest that it has
the potential to explain many of the known effects of education
to symbols on mental arithmetic, including the linearization of
number-space mappings (Dehaene et al. 2008; Siegler & Opfer
2003), the improved accuracy with which Arabic numerals can
be compared or combined into calculations, and the spontaneous
competence of young children when symbols are first introduced
(Gilmore et al. 2007) – an effect hard to explain without assum-
ing cross-notation convergence.
2. Speed and automaticity. There is no reason to expect all
number notations to be equally fast and automatic in accessing
the shared magnitude representation. On the contrary, identifi-
cation is slower for number words than for Arabic numerals. In
number comparison, interactions between the distance effect
and the verbal versus Arabic notation of the targets can be attrib-
uted to a word-length effect unique to written words (Dehaene
1996). Education and over-training also play a role – as children
get older, increasingly automatic effects of numerical magnitude
are seen, particularly with Arabic numerals (Girelli et al. 2000).
These notation effects occur at a perceptual or transcoding
level and are largely irrelevant to the existence of a shared
central representation for number.
3. Neural machinery for transcoding. In the course of convert-
ing from a notation-specific neural code to a numerical magni-
tude code, it is likely that the brain requires special neural
Figure 1 (Dehaene). Evidence for cross-notation subliminal priming and access to a shared representation of Arabic and verbal
numerals. Naccache and Dehaene (2001a) presented a subliminal prime prior to each target number in a number comparison task.
Using whole-brain fMRI, repetition suppression was observed only in bilateral intraparietal cortex: Trials in which the primes and
targets corresponded to the same quantity yielded reduced activation compared to trials in which the quantities differed. Response
times were also accelerated by subliminal repetition. In both fMRI and behavior, it made no difference whether the prime and the
targets appeared in the same or different notations. Reynvoet et al. (2002) later expanded this work by showing that the amount of
priming in response times varies continuously as a function of the numerical distance between the prime and target.
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machinery, possibly including neurons that are attuned to both
quantity and notation. Indeed, in parietal cortex, neurons with
a joint sensitivity to multiple parameters (e.g., eye position and
retinal location) are frequently recorded and are thought to
play a compulsory role in transcoding to and from pure represen-
tations of each parameter (Pouget et al. 2002). Similarly, neurons
simultaneously tuned to both numerical magnitude and notation
(e.g., simultaneous dots vs. serial flashes [Nieder et al. 2006]; or
dots versus Arabic symbols [Diester & Nieder 2007]) may play a
key role in accessing a common magnitude representation via
different routes. Identifying the numerosity of a set of dots may
require special neural machinery for summing size-invariant rep-
resentations of object locations (Dehaene & Changeux 1993),
potentially explaining both the existence of neurons monotoni-
cally tuned to non-symbolic numerosity in area LIP (Roitman
et al. 2007) and the specific form of behavioral priming observed
with dots compared to Arabic numerals (Roggeman et al. 2007).
Conclusion. Considerable evidence points to a notation-inde-
pendent representation of number in the monkey and human
IPS. It would, however, be wrong to think of this representation
as a “module.” First, it does not involve a dedicated area, but only
a fraction of IPS neurons, highly distributed in the IPS, and inter-
mingled with other representations of extent, time, location, and
other continuous parameters (Pinel et al. 2004; Tudusciuc &
Nieder, 2007). Second, it is not “encapsulated,” but communi-
cates broadly with other areas, thus allowing humans to attach
arbitrary spoken and written symbols to it. Because it acquires
its “abstract” character, in large part, through education to
number symbols, it is not surprising that notation effects are
occasionally seen. Such effects should not divert from the incon-
trovertible fact that arithmetic, like much of mathematics, con-
sists in the manipulation of internal conceptual representations
that abstract away from the specific format of input.
Concrete magnitudes: From numbers to time
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Abstract:Cohen Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W) present convincing evidence
indicating the existence of notation-specific numerical representations in
parietal cortex. We suggest that the same conclusions can be drawn for a
particular type of numerical representation: the representation of time.
Notation-dependent representations need not be limited to number
but may also be extended to other magnitude-related contents
processed in parietal cortex (Walsh 2003).
Number (Piazza et al. 2004) as well as time (Rao et al. 2001) have
been found to be represented in the intraparietal sulci (IPS). The
mode of their representation – abstract or not abstract – is put
into question by evidence uncovered by Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh (CK&W). The authors define abstract representation as
the insensitivity of neuronal populations coding numerical quan-
tity to the notation in which the numerical quantity was pre-
sented. CK&W elegantly show in their careful scrutiny of
existing studies that this property cannot be attributed to all
representations of number. We suggest that their conclusion
may be extended to representations of time.
We will refer to representations that are notation-specific as
concrete representations. We will argue that primary neuronal
representations of time (which we speculate may also be found
in IPS) could be concrete. CK&W take as their measure of con-
creteness, the interaction of variations in behavioural data or
neuronal activation with different numerical notations. We will
show that comparable interactions are found in behavioural per-
formance relating to notation- and modality-specific represen-
tations of time. First, we describe some studies that suggest
that the representations of number we use to tell the time from
clocks are concrete. Second, we will discuss studies that
suggest that duration perception may also be concrete.
In a study of clock reading behaviour in children, Friedman
and Laycock (1989) found an interaction effect. They asked
6- to 11-year-old children to detect the time displayed in pictures
of analog and digital clocks. The success at reading the time from
analog displays systematically varied with presented time, but
this was not the case for digital displays. The independent vari-
ation in performance supports a view of representations of
clock time as concrete.
Clock time also seems to be represented concretely in adults.
Goolkasian and Park (1980) also found an interaction of notations
with presented time. They asked subjects to compare clock times
presented as words, with a second clock time presented either in
analog or digital notation. There was an effect of the angular dis-
tance between the two times if the second stimulus was a clock
face as compared to a digital display. This corroborates the
finding by Friedman and Laycock (1989) in children and shows
that concrete representations of clock time do not disappear
during development.
Support for concrete representations of clock time also comes
from repetition priming tasks. In a study by Meeuwissen et al.
(2004), participants had to name the time from analog clocks, fol-
lowed by naming the time from a digital clock. Although there
was no obvious repetition priming effect with respect to the
hour, there was a facilitation present for naming the minutes.
If subjects used an abstract representation to name the hour,
we would expect to find a priming effect. The absence of such
a priming effect suggests that the representations used in
naming the hour are concrete. The authors interpreted this
finding as evidence that we use different strategies to determine
the hour, depending on whether we are using an analog clock or a
digital display. Since determining the hour is the first stage in
telling the time, we conclude that at this first stage, concrete rep-
resentations of clock time are employed. Meeuwissen and
colleagues showed that once the hour is known, determining
the distance in minutes from the hour (e.g., 5 minutes before
or after an hour) relies on the same operation for both display
formats. This two-stage account of the processing of clock time
is consistent with the model CK&W advance concerning the
possibility of transformation of primary concrete numerical rep-
resentations in parietal areas into a common format depending
on task demands.
Representations of clock time seem to exert notation-depen-
dent effects on behaviour. We propose that comparable inter-
action effects can also be found for duration perception,
suggesting that the brain may represent temporal intervals con-
cretely. Smith et al. (2007) employed a duration bisection pro-
cedure to examine interval timing of two different temporal
ranges, 100–500 msec and 1–5 sec, in patients with Parkinson’s
disease and healthy controls. The authors found a significant
interaction between the temporal ranges and modality (visual
vs. auditory). Both patients and controls overestimated visual
short durations and underestimated visual long durations, but
this effect was not observed in the case of auditory durations.
This pattern in performance suggests that duration perception
is modality-specific, hence concrete.
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Further support for this conclusion comes from the following
auditory duration judgment task (Wearden et al. 2007). Partici-
pants were presented with a standard stimulus and a comparison
stimulus consisting of filled or unfilled auditory durations, and
they had to judge if the two stimuli had the same duration or
different durations. There were four conditions, filled following
unfilled (UF) durations, unfilled following filled (FU), filled fol-
lowing filled (FF), and unfilled following unfilled (UU) durations.
The temporal generalisation gradients (i.e., functions plotting the
proportion of “same duration” answers over duration differences
between standard and comparison stimuli) showed slightly but
significantly different shapes for FF trials compared to UU
trials and markedly different shapes between FU and UF trials
(see Fig. 1). These findings suggest that different notations of
auditory stimuli can take distinct processing forms in the brain,
providing additional support for the claim that durations are
represented concretely.
In conclusion, the reported evidence suggests that not only
number, but also time can be represented concretely in the
brain. This shared characteristic is in line with the idea of a
general magnitude system, which codes time, space, and quantity
(Walsh 2003). Both CK&W’s and our evidence strongly suggest
that a general magnitude system could code different forms of
magnitude using concrete representations.
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Abstract:We contrapose computational models using representations of
numbers in parietal cortical activity patterns (abstract or not) with
dynamic models, whereby prefrontal cortex (PFC) orchestrates neural
operators. The neural operators under PFC control are activity patterns
that mobilize synaptic matrices formed by learning into textured
oscillations we observe through the electroencephalogram from the
scalp (EEG) and the electrocorticogram from the cortical surface
(ECoG). We postulate that specialized operators produce symbolic
representations existing only outside of brains.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) define representations as:
“patterns of activation within the brain that correspond to
aspects of the external environment” (sect. 2, para. 2). They
“differentiate representation from processing” that includes
“pre-representation (e.g., visual identification of the digit) and
post-representation components (e.g., working memory,
response selection)” (sect. 2, para. 2). Thereby, CK&W “argue
that the PFC [prefrontal cortex] is not involved in numerical rep-
resentation, at least not in humans. The PFC is important for
some numerical operations, but not representations” (sect. 9,
emphasis theirs). Figure 5 reflects their view that numerical rep-
resentations depend on environmental cues that are “coded”
initially in “linguistic and imagistic representations.” The neural
populations in the parietal area provide early “automatic numeri-
cal representation,” which later transitions to “intentional rep-
resentation subserved by the PFC neural circuitry.”
The authors’ distinction between abstract versus non-abstract
depends on their restriction of “early representation” to the
firings of populations of parietal neurons that are induced or
evoked by sensory inputs, and that are revealed by single
neuron recordings and areas of functional magnetic imaging
(fMRI) activation, while excluding “operations” performed on
those populations by the PFC or other parts of the brain.
We share CK&W’s views that the direct route to understand-
ing how brains do numbers is by study of activity patterns of the
neural populations in question. On experimental grounds, we do
not accept their hypothesis that the patterns can be detected by
microscopic units, because the numbers of neurons observed by
present methods are too few, or by macroscopic fMRI images,
because the time scales are too slow. We believe that the patterns
will be found, if ever, in mesoscopic brain waves (EEG, EcoG,
and the magnetoencephalogram from magnetic sensors fixed
around the head [MEG]), which provide the requisite temporal
and spatial resolutions (Freeman et al. 2009).
Figure 1 (Falter et al.). Temporal generalisation gradients
(mean proportion of “same duration” responses plotted against
duration differences between standard and probe stimuli) for
comparing filled and unfilled auditory durations. Upper panel:
Comparison of filled durations (black circles) versus comparison
of unfilled durations (white circles). Lower panel: Filled
standards followed by unfilled probes (black circles) versus
unfilled standards followed by filled probes (white circles).
(Figure from Wearden et al. 2007.)
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On theoretical grounds, we do not agree that the patterns are
representations, because the mesoscopic wave patterns, which
we have observed to accompany sensation and perception of
invariant conditioned stimuli, lack invariance; the patterns
change with variations in context and experience. We hypoth-
esize that our observed patterns are mesoscopic operators in
the form of synchronized neural oscillations in the beta and
gamma ranges, which map the connection patterns in cortical
synaptic networks shaped by learning into spatiotemporal pat-
terns of amplitude modulations. We see the concept of represen-
tations as a carry-over from Cartesian dualism, which
presupposes the primacy of stimuli as determinants of percepts.
No, the primary determinants are memories.
Certainly the firings of neurons, when they are appropriately
averaged with respect to time and place of repetitive stimulus
onset, manifest the presentations of receptor input into cortex,
which differ across trials. Sensory-driven and motor-related
microscopic activity reported by the authors in the parietal
lobes is consistent with the consequences of lesions in the right
parietal lobe, first described by Gerstmann (1958): the syndrome
of inability to distinguish left from right (disorientation); difficulty
in writing (dysgraphia); difficulty with arithmetic (dyscalculia);
and inability to name the digits (finger agnosia). The syndrome
suggests that skills in elementary arithmetic are closely tied to
intentional actions involving use of the hands in symbolic com-
munication that preceded the emergence in evolution of numeri-
cal skills (Freeman 2009). These data support the authors’
opposition to abstract representation, but the units are too
close to the tactical sensorimotor operations of counting and
too far from the conceptual strategic operations of arithmetic.
In our view, perception begins with intention and not with sen-
sation. The capacities to foresee a goal, to plan action to achieve
it, and to predict the sensory consequences of the action in
mammals clearly involve the PFC in the prior structuring of
the wave operators in recall of experience. We believe that all
species construct neural operators that direct the body in the
action-perception cycle (Merleau-Ponty 1942/1963). What dis-
tinguishes humans is the capacity to construct hypothetical
meta-operators that combine and reshape the ordinary wave
packets that we share with other mammals and make symbols.
These representations are in, on (e.g., tattoos), or outside the
body, serving social planning and communication.
It is easy to suppose that brains work the way computers do,
but the metaphor fails. The mathematician John von Neumann
wrote:
Thus the outward forms of ourmathematics are not absolutely relevant
from the point of view of evaluating what the mathematical or logical
language truly used by the central nervous system is. . . . It is character-
ized by less logical and arithmetical depth than what we are normally
used to. . . . Whatever the system is, it cannot fail to differ considerably
from what we consciously and explicitly consider as mathematics. (von
Neumann 1958, pp. 81–82)
It is likely that the hypothetical symbol-making operators
provide the substrate for both words and numbers. How they
differ from the ordinary operators is not known. We think that
they are not local operators of the kind postulated by CK&W;
instead, they are carried by the patterns of activity that cover
wide regions in intermittent spatially coherent oscillations
(Kozma & Freeman 2008), which are seen in EEG (Freeman
et al. 2003; Pockett et al. 2009; Ruiz et al. in press), ECoG
(Freeman et al. 2003), and MEG (Bassett et al. 2008). The
human brain capacity for this meta-organization can be ascribed
to evolution of the most recent enlargements that sculpt the tem-
poral and frontal fossae in hominid endocasts. The added cortices
should not be conceived of as loci for storage of numerical
representations, but as facilitators of global organization of
meta-operators.
The eminent neuropsychiatrist and neuropathologist Paul
Yakovlev (1962) described human brains as unique in having
areas of cerebral cortex without direct connections to and from
the basal ganglia. He speculated that these areas might provide
the neural insulation from environmental vicissitudes that is
necessary for abstract thought. These areas have not to our
knowledge been otherwise identified. We postulate that a
marker for them might be the lack of identifying cytoarchitecture
that characterizes some neocortical areas having so many see-
mingly identical neurons that their nuclei appear as grains of
dust; hence the venerable anatomical term koniocortex
(Freeman 2009).
Automatic numerical processing is based
on an abstract representation
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990781
Dana Ganor-Stern
Behavioral Science Program, Achva Academic College, M. P. Shikmim,
Israel 79800.
danaga@bgu.ac.il
Abstract: The goal of the present commentary is to show that past results
on automatic numerical processing in different notations are consistent
with the idea of an abstract numerical representation. This is done by
reviewing the relevant studies and giving alternative explanations to the
ones proposed in the target article.
As indicated by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W), looking at
automatic processing provides an informative insight into the
nature of the underlying numerical representations that are
relatively uncontaminated by task-dependent strategies. Auto-
matic numerical processing was explored in past research
using two main paradigms. The first was the size congruency
paradigm, showing that automatic numerical processing takes
place when participants intentionally compare the physical
sizes of numerical stimuli. Of particular relevance are recent
works by Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008e) and Ganor-Stern and
Tzelgov (2008), which examined automatic processing of
numerical magnitude for digits and number words, and for
numbers in Arabic and Indian notations. The second paradigm
was the SNARC effect, showing automatic magnitude proces-
sing and mapping of magnitude to space when participants
perform a variety of tasks that do not require magnitude proces-
sing. Relevant for the present context are works that looked at
the SNARC effect for digits and number words (e.g., Fias
et al. 1996; Nuerk et al. 2005).
The target article authors’ conclusion from past studies is that
the representation underlying automatic processing is notation-
specific. This conclusion is mainly based on the fact that the
evidence for automatic numerical processing was not identical
for the different notations. In this commentary, I suggest that
a notation-specific representation does not necessarily follow
from the empirical findings, and I propose alternative expla-
nations for the patterns of findings reviewed in detail in the
target article.
First, CK&W have cited a series of studies showing more
robust evidence for automatic processing of digits than of
number words, and have interpreted this pattern of results as
supporting the idea of notation-specific representation. It
should be noted, however, that automatic processing is
heavily influenced by skill level. People are not equally skilled
with extracting numerical information from different notations,
but rather, they are more skilled in extracting such information
from digits than from number words. As a consequence, auto-
matic numerical processing of number words might be more
limited than that of digits. Hence, it might take longer time
to occur (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e), it might not take place
when a verbal task is performed (Fias et al. 2001a), or under
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some conditions, it might not occur at all (Ito & Hatta 2003).
Thus, it is possible that there is a common underlying abstract
representation, but it could be that it takes longer to access it
from a number word compared to a digit. In some cases the
processing of the relevant dimension is fast enough so that
the relatively slow process of accessing the abstract numerical
representation from the number word does not interfere
with it.
Second, CK&W have based their argument for a notation-
specific representation underlying automatic processing on
the fact that the size congruency effect took a slightly different
form for the different notations (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e;
Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008). The problem with the argument
is that this effect reflects the interaction between the processing
of the relevant and irrelevant dimensions, and a difference in
this interference effect between notations might stem from
the relevant physical size dimension and not from the irrelevant
numerical one. Therefore, this should not be seen as evidence
for a notation-specific underlying representation. For
example, in Dehaene and Akhavein’s (1995) study, the
absence of a distance effect in the physical same-difference
task for pairs composed of a digit and a number word may
very well be due to the fact that such pairs are so physically
dissimilar – which makes the decision faster and, as a
consequence, too short to be affected by the processing of the
irrelevant dimension. Indeed, our recent study that used two
numerical notations (Arabic and Indian) was able to show
evidence for automatic numerical processing when the
numbers were presented in different numerical notations
(Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008).
The debate over the interpretation of Ganor-Stern and
Tzelgov (2008) or Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008e) seems to be a
case of which half of the glass you are looking at. In my
opinion, the fact that incongruency between numerical and phys-
ical sizes affected performance in the physical task, even in
mixed-notation pairs, seems to be especially strong evidence
for the idea of an abstract representation (Ganor-Stern &
Tzelgov 2008). More support is provided by studies reporting a
size congruency effect not only for numbers but also for
number words (Ansari et al. 2006b; Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008e). CK&W, in contrast, seem to focus on the empty half of
the glass and to spotlight the differences in the pattern
of results for the different notations. As explained earlier, some
of these differences might be a product of other factors and are
not informative as to the nature of the underlying numerical
representation; and some may even be accidental.
More generally, it seems that the authors set the criterion that
any non-additive difference between the numerical processing
of the different notations is evidence for a notation-specific
representation. This criterion might be too lenient, as not all
differences are theoretically relevant for the issue in question.
As explained earlier, some of the differences are due to skill
level, some are due to the nature of the relevant dimension,
and some are truly accidental. In the debate over the issue of
abstract/non-abstract representation, attention should be
given only to such differences that are either theoretically inter-
pretable or at least that are replicable across studies.
Finally, one of the main points made by the target article is
the importance of studying automatic processing in addition
to intentional processing. Behavioral studies indeed provided
evidence for dissociable patterns of results in the two modes
of processing (Ganor-Stern et al. 2007; Tzelgov et al. 2009).
Unfortunately, brain-imaging studies that looked at intentional
and automatic numerical processes did not report such a dis-
sociation in terms of different electrophysiological activity, or
areas being active when the two modes of processing were
taking place (Ansari et al. 2006b; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c).
Future neuropsychological research should attempt to dis-
sociate these two types of processes in terms of the underlying
brain activation.
Expertise in symbol-referent mapping
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Abstract: Much evidence cited by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) in
support of their notation-specific representation hypothesis is based on
tasks requiring automatic number processing. Several of these findings
can be alternatively explained by differential expertise in mapping
numerical symbols onto semantic magnitude representations. The
importance of considering symbol-referent mapping expertise in
theories on numerical representations is highlighted.
The target article by Cohen Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W) can be con-
sidered as very timely in light of increasing evidence suggesting a
strong impact of input format on numerical information processing
(e.g., Campbell 1994).One explanation for suchfindings isCK&W’s
proposal that different neuronal networks represent numerical
quantity depending on the notation. The authors do not only dis-
tinguish between non-symbolic (e.g., dot patterns) and symbolic
formats, but also suggest separate representations for different
symbol systems (e.g., Arabic digits vs. number words). In their
dual-stage model, they argue that the (initial) automatic processing
of numerical information relies on these non-abstract, notation-
specific representations, whereas (later) intentional processing
could lead to the creation of connections between them and give
rise to result patterns congruent with the abstract-representation
view. Therefore, a large part of the findings reported in favor of
their hypothesis comes from studies requiring automatic number
processing,which shouldbe “unaffectedby taskdemands and inten-
tional strategies” (sect. 5, para. 3).
A critical issue that was not considered by CK&W is the role of
expertise in processing different numerical notations. This primarily
holds true for number symbols, which, in contrast to non-symbolic
representations, have an arbitrary relationship to the numerical
magnitude to which they refer (Peirce 1955). Over development,
we learn to map these cultural symbols onto semantic magnitude
information (cf. Ansari 2008) and attain different levels of expertise
for different notations. For instance, we are generally more profi-
cient in the numerical processing of Arabic digits compared to
number words, since the former are the standard visual notation
for quantity processing and calculation. The more expertise we
have acquired for a specific type of numerical symbol, the more
likely its presentation leads to an automatic activation of the under-
lying semantic magnitude representation. A similar account was put
forward by Campbell and colleagues in their encoding-complex
hypothesis: “task-specific retrieval processes will be more efficient
when numerical stimuli appear in a familiar, well-practiced
format, relative to the retrieval processes activated by an unfamiliar
surface form” (Campbell & Epp 2004, p. 231). If differences in
symbol-referent mapping expertise are not considered in tasks
drawing on automatic number processing, notation-related effects
are not conclusive with regard to the question of non-abstract rep-
resentations. This point should be illustrated by briefly reviewing
some behavioral key findings reported in the target article.
CK&W cited two studies in which interactions between notation
and automatic number processingwere observed in the size-congru-
ity paradigm (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e; Ito & Hatta 2004). These
studies revealed that numerical information fromnumberwords did
not interfere with physical size comparison, whereas such an inter-
ference emerged for Arabic digits, indicating that “numerical infor-
mation was not processed automatically” (sect. 6, para. 1). However,
if the semantic representationwas not automatically accessed by the
number words, presumably due to less symbol-referent mapping
expertise for verbal numbers, this result cannot be interpreted asevi-
dence for notation-specific representations. Fias and colleagues
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investigated the well-established SNARC effect using Arabic digits
(Fias et al. 1996) and verbal numbers (Fias 2001). Automatic
number processing was probed by requiring participants to
monitor the occurrence of certain phonemes in the numbers; in
the intentional number-processing task parity judgments were
required. The latter task elicited SNARC effects for both, Arabic
digits and number words. In the phoneme-monitoring task,
however, a SNARC effect was only observed for Arabic digits, not
for number words. A lack of expertise in mapping number words
to semantic magnitude representations can again explain the
absence of a SNARC effect in the phoneme-monitoring task. Also,
the reported results from the priming study by Koechlin et al.
(1999) can be interpreted in a similar vein. Participants were pre-
sented a prime number before they had to compare a numerical
stimulus to a standard. They observed notation-related effects only
when the prime number was subliminally presented (for 66 msec).
Specifically, a quantity priming effect (i.e., shorter response times
in the number comparison task with decreasing numerical distance
between prime and target) emerged for Arabic digits but not for
verbal numbers. Koechlin and colleagues discussed these findings
in terms of notation-specific representations under demanding tem-
poral conditions, which may converge at a later stage of processing.
However, it also appears plausible that the number words were not
presented long enough to sufficiently activate the underlying seman-
tic quantity representation. Taken together, notation-related differ-
ences in symbol-referent mapping expertise, which result in
differential activation of the underlying semantic magnitude rep-
resentation, can explain the reviewed findings without the need
for assuming notation-specific representations.
Symbol-referent mapping expertise may also loom large in
understanding individual differences in mathematical compe-
tence. Recent studies suggest that little expertise or even deficits
in processing numerical symbols are related to poor mathematical
performance. Rousselle and Noe¨l (2007), for example, reported
that children with developmental dyscalculia displayed similar per-
formance as matched controls in a non-symbolic magnitude com-
parison task, whereas they performed more poorly in the symbolic
task version. Holloway and Ansari (2009) investigated typically
developing children and found that only the symbolic, but not
the non-symbolic, distance effect predicted later mathematical
achievement (but see also Halberda et al. 2008).
The point raised in this commentary is compatible with both the
abstract and the non-abstract view of numerical representation in
the brain. We may learn to map numerical symbols onto a unitary
abstract representation (Dehaene et al. 2003), or we may develop
separate representations for these symbols as is proposed by
CK&W. At present, our knowledge about the neurocognitive pro-
cesses involved in the acquisition of symbol processing expertise is
very limited. Recent neuroimaging studies revealing developmen-
tal (e.g., Ansari et al. 2005) and training-related (e.g., Diester &
Nieder 2007) activation changes during basic number processing,
however, suggest a high degree of plasticity in neuronal networks
coding numerical quantity. Whether evidence for abstract or non-
abstract representations is found could thus partly depend on the
acquired level of expertise in numerical symbol-referent mapping.
Abstract after all? Abstraction through
inhibition in children and adults
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Abstract: I challenge two points in Cohen Kadosh &Walsh’s (CK &W)
argument: First, the definition of abstraction is too restricted; second,
the distinction between representations and operations is too clear-
cut. For example, taking Jean Piaget’s “conservation of number task,”
I propose that another way to avoid orthodoxy in the field of
numerical cognition is to consider inhibition as an alternative idea of
abstraction.
I wish to challenge two points in Cohen Kadosh & Walsh’s
(CK&W) argument: First, the definition of abstraction is too
restricted; second, the authors’ distinction between represen-
tations and operations is too clear-cut. I challenge their argument
from the viewpoint of cognitive developmental psychology, using
a famous experimental design by Jean Piaget as an example: the
“conservation of number task” (Piaget 1952; 1984).
CK&W discuss the abstraction of number representations only
in relationship to the form of the input in which the numerical
information was presented; namely, specific verbal or nonverbal
means of denoting numbers (following Dehaene’s definition). In
doing so, they miss directly discussing the question of cognitive
abstraction of number representations in relation to space per
se. However, numbers in the human brain – particularly in the
parietal lobes – also must be abstracted from space. This question
is especially relevant in developmental studies on number conser-
vation. Remember that, in the conservation-of-number task
(Piaget 1952; 1984), when shown two rows containing the same
number of objects, but of different lengths (after the objects in
one of the rows have been spread apart), the child has to deter-
mine whether the two rows have the same number of objects.
Up to the age of 7 years, children erroneously respond that
there are more objects in the longer row, reflecting the use of
the misleading visuospatial “length-equals-number” strategy that
they fail to inhibit (Houde´ 1997; 2000; Houde´ & Guichart
2001). Moreover, adult brains don’t fully overcome this spatial
bias; hence, they require an executive prefrontal network to over-
come it (Daurignac et al. 2006; Leroux et al. 2006; 2009).
Even if, as stated by CK&W, number representations are pri-
marily non-abstract and are supported by different neuronal
populations residing in the parietal cortex, the activation of
number representations may nevertheless require that individ-
uals inhibit irrelevant visuospatial cues. In my mind, this execu-
tive process corresponds to an abstraction process from space
(or perception of space) to numbers. The authors suggest,
however, that such intentional prefrontal processes (executive
functions, cognitive control, selective attention, and so on) are
“important for some numerical operations, but not represen-
tations” (sect. 9, para. 1, emphasis theirs). I disagree. During cog-
nitive development (Houde´ 2000), as well as in the dynamic
large-scale-network cognition which characterizes adult brains
(Fuster 2003), logico-mathematical operations and represen-
tations are not so easily dissociable. The Piagetian concept of
number conservation is a good example. It is both a numerical
operation and a numerical representation, that is, the child’s or
adult’s ability to represent or “keep in mind” (conserve)
numbers independently of any irrelevant visuospatial cues (e.g.,
the unequal lengths of the two rows in Piaget’s task). This
number representation requires “at its heart” an inhibitory oper-
ation. Brain imaging (fMRI) results from our laboratory have
clearly shown that this number-conservation ability is sustained,
both by posterior (especially the bilateral intraparietal sulcus
[IPS] and superior parietal gyrus), anterior-cingulate-cortex
(ACC), and prefrontal activations (Leroux et al. 2009).
Other examples of this kind of abstraction process are available
in the literature on the neural foundations of logical and mathe-
matical cognition (Houde´ & Tzourio-Mazoyer 2003). In the
field of deductive reasoning, it has been shown that, after
error-inhibition training, a clear activation of the cerebral acti-
vation pattern occurred, which shifted from the posterior part
of the brain when individuals relied on an erroneous visuospatial
strategy to the prefrontal part when they accessed abstract logic
(Houde´ 2008; Houde´ et al. 2000; see also Prado & Noveck 2007).
In conclusion, I think that another way to avoid current ortho-
doxy in the field of numerical cognition is to consider, beyond the
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question of input notations, an alternative idea of abstraction;
that is, abstraction through inhibition in children and adults.
A developmental model of number
representation
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Abstract: We delineate a developmental model of number
representations. Notably, developmental dyscalculia (DD) is rarely
associated with an all-or-none deficit in numerosity processing as would
be expected if assuming abstract number representations. Finally, we
suggest that the “generalist genes” view might be a plausible – though
thus far speculative – explanatory framework for our model of how
number representations develop.
Challenging “dogmas” in cognitive neuroscience is important for
the advancement of our professional development. Therefore, we
highly appreciate Cohen Kadosh & Walsh’s (CK&W’s) target
article, which attempts to challenge the widely held belief that
the neural representation of numerosity may be abstract rather
than non-abstract. According to “neural constructivism,” the rep-
resentational features of the human neo-cortex are strongly
modulated by a dynamic interaction between neural growth
mechanisms and environmentally derived neural activity
(Quartz & Sejnowski 1997; see also Fisher [2006] for discussion
of the gene–environment interdependency). Hence, a closer
look at the development of the brain, and in particular, at the
development of neural representations of numerosity, will shed
further light on the question of whether numbers are rep-
resented in an abstract or non-abstract manner.
The primary aim of this commentary is to provide more recent
developmental data revealing that number representations in
children are not stable, but rather, undergo a developmental
shift from distinct (non-abstract) to shared (abstract) represen-
tations. Beyond behavioral data, we attempt to apply a functional
geneticist view as an explanatory framework for the complex data
reported thus far. As outlined rather briefly by CK&W, the find-
ings of the few developmental studies that were dedicated to
examining notation-dependent effects on number processing in
children largely support the authors’ notion that children’s
number representations are likely to be non-abstract (Holloway
& Ansari 2009). Maybe even more interesting is the finding
that 3-year-olds’ abilities to compare non-symbolic number sets
seem to rely on perceptual cues if the ambiguity between (dis-
crete) numerical and (continuous) non-numerical stimulus prop-
erties is overwhelming (Rousselle et al. 2004). The latter results
clearly speak against the notion of an abstract number represen-
tation. A similar conclusion has been drawn by Butterworth
(2005), who argues that “if put into conflict . . . continuous quan-
tity seems a more powerful cue” (p. 5; see also Mix et al. 2002).
Five-year-old children are able to compare and add large sets
of elements presented in different non-symbolic modalities (dot
arrays, tone sequences) (Barth et al. 2005). Importantly, the
authors’ report a significant interaction between the presentation
format and the ratio of the two sets to be compared, being
characterized by a steeper ratio-dependent decline in cross-
modal performance. If one assumes an abstract representation
of numbers, no performance differences within and across mod-
alities should have been observed. Likewise, children’s mapping
between non-symbolic and symbolic number representations
becomes more refined with age, which is contrary to expectation
if one assumes abstract number representations (Mundy &
Gilmore 2009). Findings of dissociations between different nota-
tions are not restricted to typically developing children; dyscalcu-
lic children also are reported to exhibit impaired performance
when comparing symbolic Arabic digits, but not when comparing
non-symbolic object sets (Rousselle & Noe¨l 2007).
With respect to developmental dyscalculia (DD) the distinc-
tion between automatic and intentional performance is an impor-
tant one. Empirical evidence, supporting the authors’ claim that
automatic number processing might be a more powerful tool to
assess differential number processing skills, comes from a
single-case study of DD (Kaufmann et al. 2004). Results are
incompatible with the notion of abstract number representation,
as they revealed that number-processing deficiencies predomi-
nantly emerged upon automatic, but much less upon intentional
number processing. A further interesting issue in this case study
was the finding of operation-specific effects in fact retrieval
(addition and subtraction facts being relatively preserved, while
multiplication facts were severely impaired; Kaufmann 2002).
In our view, operation-specific effects (which have been fre-
quently reported in the patient literature, e.g., Pesenti & van
der Linden 1994) – like effects of notation – are not in line
with an abstract view, but rather, are strongly suggestive of the
existence of distinct number representations.
Finally, we suggest that the “generalist genes” theory may
provide a plausible – though thus far, speculative – explanatory
framework for the view that number representations undergo a
gradual developmental change (Kovas & Plomin 2006). In par-
ticular, concepts of polygenicity (many genes affect one trait/
one cognitive domain) and pleiotropy (one gene affects many
traits/cognitive domains) are not only apt to explain the fre-
quently observed comorbidity between DD and other learning
disabilities such as dyslexia or attention disorders, but may also
provide a useful theoretical framework for the assumption that
number representations become shared (abstract) with more
experience/practice, which is inevitably accompanied by a
more fine-tuned gene–environment interdependency (Fisher
2006; Kovas & Plomin 2006).
In sum, developmental findings challenge the existence of an
abstract number representation. However, in our view, nota-
tion-specific effects are not necessarily indicative for the exist-
ence of non-abstract number representations, especially when
it comes to developmental studies. The observed interactions
between different input modalities could also be a result of
deficient mapping between symbolic and non-symbolic represen-
tations in children with and without DD. We assume that devel-
opmental progress goes along with higher overlap of brain
activation between, as well as across, different numerical input
modalities. Previously, we found no activation differences
between approximate and exact calculation in school children
(Kucian et al. 2008). These results, rather, point to a mutual neur-
onal network for both tasks. However, one has to keep in mind
that both tasks have been presented symbolically, differing
solely in demands.
Taken together, we suggest that brain activation patterns for
different numerical tasks are partly overlapping and that some
brain regions are dependent on notation/input modality. More-
over, activation patterns get influenced by task demands such
as automatic or intentional number processing. If a core region
for number processing exists, it is plausible that this region con-
sists of highly interconnected neurons for different numerical
inputs and that activation of one neuronal population quickly
spreads to other populations, leading to cross-notational acti-
vation, as proposed by CK&W. With development and higher
numerical proficiency, these cross-notational activations might
increase, reflecting automatization processes. There is probably
a gradual difference in definition between non-abstract and
abstract representation of numerosity with respect to both the
strength of connections and to coactivations of different neuronal
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populations. If, for instance, the connection is extremely tight
and both neuronal populations get activated simultaneously inde-
pendent of inputs, one could label it as an abstract numerical rep-
resentation, although this representation is built up by distinct
neuronal populations. Upon summarizing the above-mentioned
findings, we propose the following developmental model
(Fig. 1) of how number representations might be formed:
Symbols in numbers: From numerals
to magnitude information
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Abstract: A dual-code model of number processing needs to take into
account the difference between a number symbol and its meaning. The
transition of automatic non-abstract number representations into
intentional abstract representations could be conceptualized as a
translation of perceptual asemantic representations of numerals into
semantic representations of the associated magnitude information. The
controversy about the nature of number representations should be thus
related to theories on embodied grounding of symbols.
The review of Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) in the target
article demonstrates that numerical representations are modu-
lated by task demands. The authors propose the existence of
two cognitive codes for numbers, that is, (1) an automatic non-
abstract representation, which is notation and modality depen-
dent, and (2) an intentional abstract representation, which is
notation and modality independent. We agree with this hypoth-
esis. However, we think that a dual-code model of number rep-
resentation needs to take into account further aspects about
the differences in the nature of the two representations and
should theoretically distinguish between an asemantic represen-
tation of the symbolic stimulus (e.g., Arabic numeral) and the
representation of its associated meaning (e.g., magnitude infor-
mation). The controversy about abstract magnitude represen-
tation in the parietal lobes relates, therefore, directly to the
ongoing debate about symbol grounding.
Interestingly, CK&W’s model of number processing seems to
be inspired by the recently suggested Language and Situated
Simulation (LASS) theory of Barsalou et al. (2008) and their
proposal of dual codes in embodied representations of concep-
tual knowledge. Indeed, both models hold that automatic and
intentional stimulus processing results in different types of cogni-
tive representations and assume that a deeper deliberate proces-
sing is central to the semantic representation of abstract
concepts. We believe that both notions provide an interesting fra-
mework that contributes directly to the question of whether mag-
nitude representations are abstract or non-abstract. However, we
want to point out some substantial theoretical differences
between the current model of number processing and dual-
code models on conceptual knowledge in psycholinguistic
research.
First, most dual-code models of semantic processing view the
faster emerging automatic representation as an asemantic stimu-
lus coding that does not go beyond a perceptual, linguistic, or
phonological representation of the presented word or number
symbol (see, e.g., Barsalou et al. 2008; Mahon & Caramazza
2008). The target article shows that effects of magnitude proces-
sing are modulated by the notation of the number symbol if and
only if the task does not require any semantic processing of the
numerical magnitude information. Taking a closer look at
studies on automatic processing that provide evidence in favor
of non-abstract number representations, it becomes clear that
effects of number meaning are smaller or even nonexistent if
the number stimulus is perceptually more complex (e.g.,
number words vs. digits: Cohen Kadosh 2008a; or Japanese
Kanji numbers vs. Kana numbers: Ito & Hata 2003) or printed
in an unfamiliar notation (e.g., Indian vs. Arabic digits: Ganor-
Stern & Tzelgov 2008). Moreover, CK&W argue that because
automatic processing is unaffected by intentional strategies,
indirect number tasks provide an unbiased inside look into the
nature of the representation of numerical magnitude infor-
mation. However, an alternative reason for the presence of nota-
tion-dependent effects in these tasks might be that automatic
processing of number words and unfamiliar symbols is likely to
be restricted to a superficial stimulus coding without activation
of the underlying numerical magnitude information. We conse-
quently assume, in line with dual-code models of conceptual
knowledge (Barsalou et al. 2008), that under conditions of auto-
matic processing, complex and unfamiliar number symbols will
be merely transcoded and represented asemantically in a percep-
tual, linguistic, or phonological format. It is therefore questionable
whether the automatic non-abstract number representation pro-
posed by CK&W can be understood as a semantic representation
of numerical magnitude information. Alternatively, the transition
from an automatic to an intentional numerical representation
might be better conceptualized by different levels of semantic pro-
cessing and the translation of a perceptual representation of the
number symbol into a semantic representation of the associated
magnitude.
Second, a central aspect of the LASS theory of Barsalou et al.
(2008) is the assumption that abstract symbols such as words and
numbers become meaningful only when they are somehow
mapped to concrete bodily experiences (the so-called embodied
cognition hypothesis; for reviews see, e.g., Fischer & Zwaan
2008). Following this view, intentional number processing con-
sists of an activation of correlated information in brain areas
that originally evolved to process non-symbolic stimuli, that is,
perceptual and motor areas. This embodied mechanism of con-
ceptual knowledge representation has been described as percep-
tual and motor resonance (Rueschemeyer et al., in press a) and
represents a bidirectional coupling of semantic representations
with processes of action planning and motor control. Interest-
ingly, empirical evidence for such a sensorimotor grounding of
symbol meaning has not only been reported by studies on word
processing (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Lindemann et al. 2006;
Rueschemeyer et al., in press b; Zwaan & Taylor 2006), but has
also been recently shown for the processing of Arabic digits in
numerical tasks (Andres et al. 2004; Fischer 2008; Lindemann
et al. 2007). One might therefore speculate that the abstraction
Figure 1 (Kucian & Kaufmann). Our developmental model of
number representation proposes an increased overlap of repre-
sentations across different number notations with advanced
expertise, and, furthermore, implies a gradual shifting from non-
abstract to abstract representations of numerosity.
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of number meaning consists of an association between the
numerical information and magnitude-related motor codes –
an assumption that is in line with the idea that magnitude rep-
resentations for numbers and actions share common cognitive
codes within a generalized system for size and quantity (Walsh
2003).
Since the notion of embodied cognition is one of the most
controversially debated hypotheses of recent psycholinguistic
dual-code models of conceptual processing, the principle of
motor resonance should also be addressed in the context of
number processing models. In conclusion, we think that the
idea of an action-based number semantics might provide new
insights into the nature of numerical magnitude representations,
and might thereby fruitfully contribute to future theoretical
developments in mathematical cognition research.
Inactivation and adaptation of number
neurons
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Abstract: Single-neuron recordings may help resolve the issue of abstract
number representation in the parietal lobes. Two manipulations in
particular – reversible inactivation and adaptation of apparent
numerosity – could provide important insights into the causal influence
of “numeron” activity. Taken together, these tests can significantly
advance our understanding of number processing in the brain.
Cohen Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W) present a comprehensive argu-
ment against the abstract representation of numbers in the par-
ietal lobes. Their discussion focuses on behavioral and
neuroimaging studies, which comprise the bulk of the numeros-
ity literature. But, as CK&W point out, these techniques do not
provide the sampling resolution necessary to definitively answer
the question of abstract number representation. In contrast,
single-neuron electrophysiology provides high spatial and tem-
poral resolution, allowing researchers to monitor the activity of
individual neurons in real time. This technique is therefore the
most promising avenue for addressing the issue of abstract
number representation. In this commentary, I present two
single-neuron experimental manipulations that, to my knowl-
edge, have not been used in studies of number-sensitive
neurons. These manipulations could help move single-cell
studies beyond simple correlation to a more causal understand-
ing of the neuronal basis of number processing.
First, temporary pharmaceutical inactivation (Li et al. 1999;
Wardak et al. 2002) of number-sensitive patches of parietal
cortex can be used to test the usefulness of reported number rep-
resentations. Although it would be a challenge to demonstrate
that all number neurons were inactivated in the parietal lobe, a
large portion of neurons can be reliably “switched off” and re-
activated over time. Accordingly, animals should show severely
diminished performance on number-related tasks during inacti-
vation if numerons truly support their ability to accurately
process numerosity. Following the lead of the tasks reviewed in
the target article, number-related task performance would have
to be assessed across different number formats. The existence
of abstract number representations predicts comparable
decreases in performance regardless of number format when
compared to pre-inactivation measurements. Temporary inacti-
vation is therefore one way in which our understanding of
number representations can progress beyond correlational
evidence.
If abstract number neurons exist, then they presumably
underlie our ability to perceive and process various numbers.
Thus, to tease apart the influence of number neurons on percep-
tion, it would be useful to have a situation in which perceived
numerosity can be manipulated independently of displayed
numerosity. Fortunately, such a psychophysical “trick” has
been recently discovered (Burr & Ross 2008; see also Durgin
2008).
The second manipulation involves the “apparent numerosity
adaptation” paradigm (Burr & Ross 2008). In this task, subjects
fixate a center target while two patches consisting of many
stationary stimuli are presented, one to the left and one to the
right of fixation. Immediately after an extended period of adap-
tation, test patches are then presented in the same two locations
and subjects are asked to make a numerical judgment, usually in
the form of a two-alternative forced choice task (e.g., “Which
patch contains more items, left or right?”). Burr and Ross
(2008) showed that adapting to a large number of stimuli
decreases subsequent numerosity judgments, while adapting to
a small number of stimuli produces artificially increased numer-
osity judgments. The numerical perception of the subjects can
therefore be manipulated in a controlled manner based on the
number of stimuli in the adapting patch.
For single-neuron recordings, this task could be passively pre-
sented to animal subjects. Better yet, animals could be trained to
make “more” or “less” judgments when the two test patches are
presented after adaptation. We can then ask how number
neurons in parietal cortex respond over time in the adaptation
task (i.e., during and after adaptation). For example, if a
neuron with a preferred numerosity of 20 (Nieder & Merten
2007) is isolated and the animal is adapted with a patch of 100
stimuli, will the subsequent test presentation of 20 stimuli
cause the neuron to fire maximally, consistent with the veridical
presented number? Or, alternatively, will the neuron’s response
shift towards the adapted numerosity, in line with the subject’s
percept? Again, different formats of number stimuli can also be
used for adaptation and testing (Diester & Nieder, in press). Fol-
lowing the labeled-line coding hypothesis (Nieder & Merten
2007), numeron selectivity should be predictably manipulated
by low- and high-numerosity adaptation across formats. A
series of systematic adaptation-and-test conditions on the same
neuron would help elucidate the functional role of number
neurons, and shed light on the issues of automaticity and inten-
tionality raised by CK&W.
A combination of the two manipulations may prove to be the
most fruitful. Changes in task performance during inactivation –
both in the standard delayed-match-to-sample task (typically
used by Nieder and colleagues) and the adaptation task proposed
above – can be used to assess the function of number neurons in
numerosity judgments. This investigation could be extended to
putative number-sensitive neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC).
This extension would help disambiguate the role of parietal and
prefrontal number neurons, as well as allow for the testing of
CK&W’s hypothesis that PFC plays a “post-representational”
role in relation to number processing in the parietal lobes.
These two manipulations are, to be sure, not complete exper-
iments. But they are based on established techniques in the field
that are well within our current capabilities. The onus to carry out
these experiments is on proponents of abstract number represen-
tation because, as CK&W highlight, there are currently too many
issues of interpretation to conclude in favor of abstractness.
Regardless, for both sides of the issue, a straightforward manipu-
lation of the responses of single neurons seems to be the most
definitive method for uncovering the abstractness of number rep-
resentations in the parietal lobes.
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Abstract: Abstraction is instrumental for our understanding of how
numbers are cognitively represented. We propose that the notion of
abstraction becomes testable from within the framework of simulated
cognition. We describe mental simulation as embodied, grounded, and
situated cognition, and report evidence for number representation at
each of these levels of abstraction.
Whether the human mind computes numerical information by
creating uniform abstract representations of magnitude or by
making reference to distinct modality- and notation-specific rep-
resentations is an important theoretical question. Similarly to
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W), we favor the latter view, but
we also propose the notion of “simulation” to further clarify the
quality of such representations. Ambiguity in defining “abstract-
ness” leads to attribution of several features (e.g., automaticity,
implicitness/explicitness, and generalizing power) to number
representations without explaining how they are related hier-
archically and functionally. Without this elaboration, specific pre-
dictions and implications for non-abstract theories of numerical
cognition may also remain ambiguous.
The simulation theory of cognition (e.g., Barsalou et al. 2008)
avoids such ambiguities. Simulation in this view is “the re-enact-
ment of perceptual, motor and introspective states acquired
during experience with the world, body and mind” (Barsalou
2008, p. 618). We agree with the idea that simulation is the prin-
ciple diagnostic feature of non-abstractness and propose a
further distinction between grounded, embodied, and situated
conceptual simulations. The resulting hierarchy helps to clarify
the empirically testable implications of this view for human
cognition in general and explain the wide range of features
specific to numerical representations. In the following, we first
describe this hierarchy and then provide empirical support.
A cognitive representation is grounded when its structure
reflects the properties of the Euclidean world. This is the most
fundamental aspect of non-abstract representations. Next, a cog-
nitive representation can be embodied if it is bound by the
experiential (e.g., perceptual or motor) constraints imposed by
the human organism. Not all cognitive representations are embo-
died (e.g., some dreams). Finally, a cognitive representation
can be situated when it is sensitive to the context in which it is
generated.
The experimental study of number processing provides ample
evidence for a simulation view of numerical cognition. Specifi-
cally, we think that the spatial biases known to accompany
number processing (SNARC effect; see Figure 1 of the target
article) systematically highlight the features of non-abstract
number representation. Grounding, for example, is revealed in
the association of larger numbers with upward positions and
smaller numbers with downward positions (Schwarz & Keus
2004; see also Fischer & Campens 2008). The embodiment of
number processing is evident from effects of finger counting
habits on adult number processing (Fischer 2008) and from the
spontaneous modulation of grasp aperture by task-irrelevant
number magnitudes (Andres et al. 2008). Finally, situatedness
of numerical cognition is indicated by the range-dependence of
the SNARC effect that shows that we take into account (or simu-
late) the current relative meaning of numbers (see Fischer 2006,
for evidence and discussion). CK&W correctly point out that
such context-dependence is especially evident in the cognitive
representation of negative numbers (Fischer 2003; Fischer &
Rottmann 2005). Understanding non-abstract representations
as cognitive simulations along the dimensions of grounding,
embodiment, and situatedness provides a theoretical platform
for real-life number representation. The proposed hierarchy of
features of number representation allows us to interpret
observed effects within an interconnected model.
A recent study of both SNARC and size congruity effect (SiCE;
see sect. 6 of the target article) illustrates how features of non-
abstract number representation interact. In a speeded binary
classification task, 18 participants indicated whether single
digits were more or less than 5. Digits 1, 4, 6, and 9 were ran-
domly shown in either 12- or 60-point font size. In addition to
the typical SNARC (p , .01) and SiCE (p , .01) effects, we
found a positive correlation between the two (p , .05; see our
Fig. 1): Participants with a strong SiCE tend to have a weaker
SNARC. This interaction between SiCE and SNARC indicates
that features of number representation compete for the same
cognitive resource. One possible interpretation of this novel
result from the perspective of cognitive simulation theory is
that attending to irrelevant physical attributes of digits grounds
their cognitive representation. This may, in turn, prevent their
embodiment by inhibiting their mapping onto space. Further
studies of the task-dependence of number simulation
will clarify to which extent SiCE and SNARC can be situated
(Platenburg et al., in preparation).
A re-analysis of recently published data supports the view that
number representations can be simulated on-line. In a pointing
task (Pinhas & Fischer 2008), adults located the results of
addition or subtraction problems on a visually presented line
with flankers 0 and 10 on a touch screen. They located the
same number more rightward during addition (e.g., 4þ 2) than
during subtraction (e.g., 8 – 2). This suggests a simulation of
addition as rightward movement along a mental number line
and a simulation of subtraction as leftward movement. A con-
gruency effect in pointing times supports this interpretation
and shows that our task evoked grounded, embodied, and even
situated number representations. We next tested the prediction
of CK&W’s processing model that non-abstract effects are
more prevalent for fast compared to slow responses. To do this,
we split each participant’s response times in the zero problems
(e.g., 4þ 0, 4 – 0) along the mean of their distribution into fast
and slow responses. The spatial simulation effect was significant
for fast responses, t(13) ¼ 2.66, p , .02, but not for slow
responses, t(13) ¼ 1.65, p . .12. This result supports CK&W’s
proposal (see their Fig. 5) that automatic number processing pre-
cedes intentional processing. It is worth noting that this outcome
Figure 1 (Myachykov et al.). Participants with a typical SNARC
(left side of the graph) tend to have a weaker size congruity effect
(SiCE). This suggests a conflict between attention to physical and
semantic aspects of numbers.
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is actually in conflict with Barsalou et al.’s (2008) suggestion that
situated simulations always follow abstract (language-based)
representations.
Numbers and numerosities: Absence of
abstract neural realization doesn’t mean
non-abstraction
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Abstract: The neural realization of number in abstract form is
implausible, but from this it doesn’t follow that numbers are not
abstract. Clear definitions of abstraction are needed so they can be
applied homogenously to numerical and non-numerical cognition. To
achieve a better understanding of the neural substrate of abstraction,
productive cognition – not just comprehension and perception – must
be investigated.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) provide a compelling argu-
ment for challenging the currently accepted view – intuitively
appealing and convenient – that the nature of numerical rep-
resentation is inherently abstract. They lucidly explain why it is
implausible that number has a single specific representation
center given that classic cases for external world attributes such
as color and motion lack a single locus of representation. In
reviewing relevant behavioral, neuroimaging, and single-neuron
(monkey) studies, they convincingly show that, despite the fact
that many reports appear to support the abstract representation
view, the evidence is incomplete and presents serious methodo-
logical and theoretical problems (e.g., null results, paradigm
insensitivity, task specificity factors). Indeed, the data seem to
support the opposite view. However, contrary to what the
authors’ defend, from this it doesn’t follow that “numbers are
not abstract” (sect. 5’s title). The authors’ definition and usage
of crucial concepts such as “abstraction,” “representation,” and
“number,” lacks conceptual clarity and creates unnecessary con-
fusion and discontinuities with the understanding of other realms
of cognition. Here, I only address the first one – abstraction.
CK&W provide a narrow and confusing characterization of
abstraction. First, they adopt a behavioral definition (sect. 2,
para. 1) that applies exclusively to numbers (and, as an extension,
they operationalize the notion of abstract representation in terms
of neuronal populations’ insensitiveness to the form and notation
of the input in which numerical information is presented). This
operational definition of abstraction is specific but unnecessarily
restrictive, making its extension to other non-numerical areas
of cognition hard, if not impossible. How are we to relate the
authors’ arguments with other, presumably supra-modal concep-
tual domains? Second, the authors’ terms “abstract” and “non-
abstract” as defined in the narrow domain of neural sensitiveness,
become unfortunate misnomers that generate confusion. The
only hint the authors give of the nature of (not specifically
numerical) abstraction, is a reference to Barsalou (sect. 10,
para. 1): “abstraction is a skill that supports goal achievement
in particular situations” (Barsalou 2003, p. 1184). But, this is
vague and incomplete. That work deals with concepts that refer
to entities or state of affairs “about the world” (e.g., chair),
where even the abstract concept of truth is analyzed in that
manner (p. 1185). What can then be said about the passage
from the abstracted cardinal numbers to, say, transfinite or infini-
tesimal numbers (i.e., actual infinity), cases in which there is no
fact about the world that corresponds to the concept (Nu´n˜ez
2006; in press; Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez 2000)? We do need the term
“abstraction” in order to correctly handle such concepts. And
we do need the authors’ arguments to clearly address the fact
that neuronal populations are sensitive to form of input. What
is required is a fruitful theoretical proposal of supra-modal
entity processing (e.g., numbers) that is able to encompass the
authors’ arguments while leaving room for fruitful distinctions
between abstract and non-abstract concepts in a way that is
clearly extendable, without discontinuities, to other forms of
everyday and mathematical abstraction.
In addressing abstraction, CK&W make a distinction between
automatic and intentional processing (of numerical information
with different notations). By automatic, they mean a process that
does not need monitoring to be executed (sect. 5, para. 3). They
argue that by adopting such a distinction, we can yield a better
characterization of abstract and non-abstract representations
(sect. 11, para. 4). And they go on to build a parallel between
this distinction and Barsalou’s linguistic and situated simulation
(imagery) systems. But, again, this is narrow and problematic.
The authors’ arguments are mainly concerned with the side of cog-
nition that deals with perception and comprehension. When we
look at the productive side of cognition we can see that the auto-
matic/intentional (and linguistic/imagery) distinction can be really
troublesome. Consider a person who, during an everyday conver-
sation, says, “that was way back in my childhood,” and while doing
so points with her thumb backwards over the shoulder. Such
speech-gesture coproduction (1) is not monitored (McNeill
1992) and, therefore, is “automatic,” and (2) it is inherently
abstract because the uttered word “back” and the backwards
pointing don’t refer to anything in the real world, but to the
past, which is metaphorically conceived as being spatially behind
ego (Nu´n˜ez 1999; Nu´n˜ez & Sweetser 2006). Moreover, this fast
spontaneous speech-gesture coproduction is, both, linguistic and
imagery-driven. When trying to understand the productive side
of cognition involving abstract concepts (numbers included) and
their neural instantiations, the authors’ distinctions break down.
More conceptual clarity is needed.
But, looking at the productive side of cognition can actually be
quite supportive of the CK&W’s claims. For instance, the
authors argue that “it is entirely possible that similar behavioural
effects can be subserved by different areas, or neuronal populations
in a single brain area” (sect. 5, para. 1). Regarding our space-time
mapping example, it is known that humans can spontaneously con-
ceptualize temporal events as being spatial locations along the
sagittal axis, with events in the future as being in front of ego
and events in the past as being behind. And, neurally, this can be
instantiated through the recruitment of neural populations in the
ventral intra-parietal area (VIP) and the polysensory zone (PZ),
among others (Nu´n˜ez et al. 2007). However, the linguistic and
spontaneous gestural production of the Aymara of the Andes
shows a striking counterexample: They conceive future events as
being behind them and past events as being in front of them
(Nu´n˜ez & Sweetser 2006; AAAS 2006). These two forms of
spatial conceptions of time are internally consistent but mutually
inconsistent, having, presumably, different neural realization. Simi-
larly, numbers and arithmetic can be realized conceptually through
different metaphorical mappings such as object collection and
motion along a path (Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez 2000). These distinct map-
pings can have different neural instantiations while supporting
the same inferential organization (e.g., in both cases “two plus
three is five.”) Both conceptions characterize a cascade of iso-
morphic entailments, which are presumably, as the authors
claim, subserved by different neural populations in the brain.
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The discussion of methodological limitations
in number representation studies is
incomplete
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Abstract: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) discuss the limitations of
the behavioral, imaging, and single-cell studies related to number
representation in human parietal cortex. The limitations of the imaging
studies are grossly underestimated, particularly those using adaptation
paradigms, and the problem of establishing a link between single-cell
studies and imaging is not even addressed. Monkey functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), however, provides a solution to these problems.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) correctly point out that asses-
sing technical limitations is critical in weighing the evidence
favoring one or the other of the opposing views, abstract or
non-abstract, about numerical representation in parietal cortex
(PC). On at least three counts, they have overlooked relevant
limitations.
CK&W state that: “Single-cell neurophysiology offers better
temporal and spatial resolution than human neuroimaging” (sect.
8, para. 1).While strictly true, this seems to imply that the two tech-
niques are measuring the same variable. This is of course untrue:
The functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures a
haemodynamic response, not neuronal activity. Contrary to what
has been conveniently assumed, the relationship between these
two variables is far from resolved and depends upon the exper-
imental conditions: while the link might be relatively direct in
passive sensory stimulation, this is not the case when using task
paradigms (Sirotin & Das 2009). The statement also ignores the
whole issue of homology between the human and monkey brain,
which we have only begun to resolve with the advent of monkey
fMRI (Orban et al. 2004). Two facts are particularly relevant
here. The surface area of the cortical sheet is ten times larger in
humans than in the monkey (Van Essen 2004), which implies
that human cortex includes two to five times more functional
areas than its monkey counterpart. On the other hand, the relation-
ship of these areas with cortical sulci having identical labels can
differ between the species, as the human MT/V5 complex illus-
trates. In human parietal cortex, the regions corresponding to the
lateral bank of monkey intraparietal sulcus (IPS) are located in
the medial bank of human IPS, especially on the posterior side
(Grefkes & Fink 2005). This implies that the homologue of
monkey ventral intraparietal (VIP) area, where Nieder records
his numerically selective neurons (Diester & Nieder 2007), is not
actually located in the human IPS!
CK&W present the results of fMRI adaptation experiments as
one of the main indications for a non-abstract representation in
PC. They neglect the evidence that adaptation differs between
time scales and between cortical areas (Krekelberg et al. 2006;
Verhoef et al. 2008). More seriously, they failed to see the impli-
cations of the Sawamura et al. (2006) study, which they did quote
in their review. Briefly, Sawamura et al. showed that infero-
temporal (IT) neurons which respond equally well to two
stimuli, say, images of a pig and of a hammer, will adapt when
the two identical images follow one another, either two pigs or
two hammers, but not, or much less, when the hammer follows
the pig or the reverse. Thus, adaptation overestimates neuronal
response selectivity and functional magnetic resonance adap-
tation (fMRA) cannot be used to derive neuronal tuning
widths, as in Piazza et al. (2004). The results also imply that at
these high levels adaptation occurs not at the cell soma level,
but somewhere earlier, either in the dendritic tree or in the
inputs. The use of adaptation to prove a non-abstract represen-
tation actually implies adaptation at the soma. If this assumption
does not hold, the predictions for the abstract and non-abstract
case become identical. Exactly the same argument can be
made for the combination of adaptation with transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS), presented by CK&W as their second
main argument for non-abstract representation. If adaptation
does not involve the cell soma, both hypotheses predict that
the parietal neurons will be equally active, and hence, that
TMS will have the same effect, opposite to what has been
assumed. This dramatic example shows that it is of utmost impor-
tance that assumptions made in interpreting fMRI data, be
tested. This also holds for the multivoxel technique.
The final evidence for non-abstract representation are the
Nieder single-cell data (Diester & Nieder 2007), but here
CK&W neglect the limitations that the experimental model
imposes upon these results. To be sure, the monkey is the best
model that we have experimental access to, but it is not
perfect, as there is ample evidence for differences in brain size
(Van Essen 2004) and cognitive competences (Penn et al.
2008) between the two species. Hence, what applies to the
monkey may not necessarily hold for the human. It is conceivable
that the non-abstract representation in the monkey is
supplemented in humans by abstract representations, say, in
the evolutionarily new areas of the parietal cortex.
Does this mean, then, that the evidence for an abstract
representation is solid? This is not the case either. As CK&W cor-
rectly pointed out, even it had been demonstrated that different
numerical notations activated the same voxels in PC, this need
not imply that the representation is carried by a single neuronal
population. It is important to notice that even this demonstration
is unconvincing thus far, given the extensive smoothing and
averaging across subjects that is typical of most fMRI studies
(Georgieva et al. 2009).
Unfortunately, the authors in their discussions of future
directions completely overlooked the studies that provide a sol-
ution to the problems outlined here: fMRI in the awake monkey
(Vanduffel et al. 2001). In fact, it replaces a direct comparison
between human fMRI and single-cell studies in monkeys,
which involves two unknowns, with two comparisons, each of
which involves only a single unknown that can be resolved
(Orban 2002). The comparison between single-cells and MR
signals in the monkey allows one not only to address the
relationship between neuronal activity and MR signals
(Logothetis et al. 2001; Sirotin & Das 2009), but equally impor-
tant, to understand the relationship between MR procedure
and neuronal selectivity. This procedure can take a variety of
forms: it may be a slow adaptation procedure (Nelissen et al.
2006), or a test, based on a comparison of response levels
under different conditions (Georgieva et al. 2009). On the
other hand, a comparison of fMRI in humans and monkeys
allows the homology question to be addressed, when multiple
properties of several neighboring regions are compared
(Durand et al. 2009). The integration of single-cell studies
and human functional imaging using awake monkey fMRI
creates a brilliant future for cognitive neuroscience and lies at
the heart of translational research in cognitive neurology.
Abstract or not abstract? Well, it depends . . .
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Abstract: The target article by Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) raises
questions as to the precise nature of the notion of abstractness that is
intended. We note that there are various uses of the term, and also
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more generally in mathematics, and suggest that abstractness is not an all-
or-nothing property as the authors suggest. An alternative possibility
raised by the analysis of numerical representation into automatic and
intentional codes is suggested.
We support Cohen Kadosh & Walsh’s (CK&W) well-argued
warning against sliding into the dogma of assuming a uniform
abstract representation of number in the intraparietal sulcus,
regardless of modality of input or purpose of the task. This ques-
tion is especially pertinent now, given the last three decades of
research into visual reasoning in mathematics and the recent
application of work in embodied cognition to mathematics rep-
resentation and reasoning. Our interest is from a cognitive
science and philosophical, as opposed to a neuroscientific,
perspective.
In general, we find the notion of abstraction in the field to be
not well-defined. In the article, we are given an initial operational
definition from Dehaene, where the presence of an abstract rep-
resentation, the “behavior depends only on the size of the
numbers involved, not on the specific verbal or non-verbal
means of denoting them” (Dehaene et al. 1998a, p. 356). But
towards the end of the article (sect. 10, para. 1), CK&W cite
approvingly Barsalou’s comment that “abstraction is simply a
skill that supports goal achievement” (Barsalou 2003, p. 1184).
Is this in fact consistent with the earlier operational definition?
Barsalou’s own characterisations in Barsalou (2005) of the use
of the term abstract include a sense in which perception is in
itself typically abstract, inasmuch as it involves categorical judge-
ments out of the “confusion of experience.” As this addresses the
central issue of the target article, a clearer account of what is at
stake here is required.
We do not think that the binary distinction between abstract
and not abstract is the right way to conceptualise the problem.
In identifying the digit 2 over a range of typefaces, or ignoring
the colour of a number of dots in the visual field, it is natural
to consider that there is abstraction from the token that is phys-
ically present. Certainly the mathematical notion of abstraction
allows many levels of abstraction, and we believe that mathemat-
ical cognition in general is built in part on some version of arith-
metical representations. (This notion of abstraction is also
referred to in Barsalou [2005], allowing that there is a question
of the degree of abstractness in this case.)
CK&W’s analysis in terms of automatic and intentional codes
is clearer, and seems potentially of greater explanatory power
than deciding on the question of abstractness. Here we note
the comments on this topic in Wilson (2002), on the apparent
paradox that in more elaborate tasks, the more automated
approach actually allows finer control of the activity than do
more “controlled” strategies. The suggestion is that the auto-
mation builds up internal representations, thereby providing a
more efficient way to deal with some of the regularities of the
problem at hand. Thus, with practice in arithmetical calculation,
more persistent representations will be formed, and on this view
these may well be more abstract.
The distinction between automatic and intentional processing
raises the question of how automatic compares to the so-called
innate arithmetic of Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez (2000). A series of
screen experiments on babies (not mentioned by CK&W)
suggest that babies are born with basic addition and subtraction
skills on small numbers, and indeed appear to recognise same-
ness of number when objects are replaced with an identical
number of different objects (Simon et al. 1995). Presumably,
the processing here is automatic, but we are curious as to how
these results fit with the authors’ account of numerical
representation.
Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez (2000) emphasise the metaphorical process
in mathematical development. They identify four “grounding
metaphors” for arithmetic (metaphors in which the source
domain is a familiar, environmentally grounded domain) that
all abstract into a common target domain. These metaphors are
all principally visual. The sense of abstraction here is close to
the sense in which the term is used in informatics generally,
where structure common to some data or mathematical entities
can be reasoned about while ignoring properties that differ
from instance to instance. Similarly, multi-modal representations
of mathematics such as diagrammatic or algebraic reasoning are
assumed to abstract to a common domain. It may therefore be
relevant to consider work on the cognitive status of metaphor
processes.
In Lakoff (2008), it is claimed that mirror neurons are multi-
modal, that is, the same mirror neurons fire whether we
imagine, or perform/perceive certain actions. The neural
theory is based on the premise that if we see two domains simul-
taneously enough times, then connections between the nodes
that process the domains are strengthened and we build a
strong association. It is not clear to us if there is substantial
disagreement between Lakoff’s views, as applied to arithmetic,
and the views of CK&W. The target article naturally does not
address the issue, of interest to us, of how arithmetical
judgements that quantify over all numbers are represented
(e.g., associativity of addition). This can be expected to relate to
the representation of particular numbers, but remains, as far as
we know, an open question.
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Abstract: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) argue that recent findings
challenge the hypothesis of abstract numerical representations. Here
we show that because, like many other authors in the field, they rely on
inaccurate definitions of abstract and non-abstract representations,
CK&W fail to provide compelling evidence against the abstract view.
Whereas number magnitude was initially assumed to be rep-
resented abstractly as a function of powers of ten (McCloskey
et al. 1985), an analog representation figuring numerical magni-
tudes by overlapping activations on an oriented and compressed
mental line was later proposed (Dehaene 1992). These views
have often been mixed ill-advisedly, and it is now common to
read that the parietal cortex hosts “an abstract numerical rep-
resentation taking the form of an oriented number line” (e.g.,
Cohen Kadosh et al. 2005; Dehaene et al. 1998a). This,
however, is a double nonsense: by definition, analog represen-
tations cannot be abstract; by essence, abstract representations
cannot be oriented or compressed. This conceptual drift from
an analog to an abstract number line occurred because many
authors in the field used loose definitions of abstract/analog
representations leading to several profound mistakes. Abstract
representations capture the ideational content of knowledge
irrespective of the original input modality. Being language-
independent, they are formalized in a propositional code specify-
ing the meaning of assertions, thanks to a logical system called the
predicate calculus; importantly, being amodal (i.e., not tied to any
modality), they possess no isomorphic properties influencing per-
formance (Anderson & Bower 1973; Pylyshyn 1973). In contrast,
analog representations share with the reality they represent a
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first- or second-order isomorphism and are displayed on mental
media preserving physical properties (e.g., spatial distances for
visuo-spatial representations; Kosslyn et al. 1978). Because the
processes acting on analog representations are sensitive to
these properties, they can be traced in behavioral performance.
Using criteria from seminal papers in cognitive (neuro)psychol-
ogy, we highlight three important mistakes compromising
CK&W’s argumentation.
A first mistake consists in attributing the properties of the
content of a representation (representation of [object/concept X
with properties P]) to its format ([representation of object/
concept X] with properties P; Pylyshyn 1978; 1981). Format
and content being independent, content properties can be
represented in modality-neutral and modality-specific formats
(Caramazza et al. 1990). Stating that a numerical representation
is abstract if behavioral effects depend only on magnitude is thus
erroneous. Contrary to what CK&W write, McCloskey’s seman-
tic representation was not abstract because of its quantitative
content, but because of its propositional format. Dehaene’s
magnitude representation on an analog medium provides the a
contrario argument. Another common mistake concerns the
inferences drawn from the (in)dependence between semantic
representations and the various modalities/notations of access.
Although abstract representations are amodal, a representation
accessed through several modalities/notations is not necessarily
abstract. Number semantics could be accessed from and give
rise to similar effects in verbal, Arabic, or non-symbolic inputs
while being non-abstract (e.g., Dehaene’s analog representation).
Conversely, modality/notation-specific effects do not necessarily
sign non-abstract representations, because abstract represen-
tations could be accessed differently by modality-specific
presemantic systems (Riddoch et al. 1988). By simply defining
non-abstract representations as “sensitive to input modalities”
(see sect. 2, para. 1), CK&W fail to provide a constraining frame-
work. For example, finding that, after habituation, magnitude
processing in one notation becomes more vulnerable to virtual
lesions of the parietal cortex than in other notations, does not
contradict the abstract view, as habituation could have modified
the connectivity between notation-specific systems and abstract
representations prior to the lesion. Trying to consider represen-
tations and processes separately constitutes CK&W’s third
mistake: Whatever their format, representations cannot be
conceived as mental entities distinct from the processes acting
upon them (Anderson 1976; Palmer 1978), and processes are
totally determined by the format of the representations upon
which they act (Shepard & Podgorny 1978). Therefore, any pro-
posal of non-abstract representations must come along with a set
of compatible processes clearly specified both at the functional
and anatomical levels.
To properly assess the format of numerical representations, we
make the following recommendations. First, a data type (a way of
organizing information in memory; Simon 1978), and the primi-
tive operations that can be performed on it, must be specified and
supported by unambiguous behavioral effects. Rightward biases
on the number line in neglect patients (Zorzi et al. 2002) is an
instance of how intrinsic properties of representations may
show through behavioral effects, but other frequently cited
effects are not: The distance effect can be accounted by various
types of representations (e.g., abstract semantic labels: Banks
1977; distributed representations: Verguts & Fias 2004), the
congruity effect by a power-of-10-based propositional represen-
tation, and the SNARC effect by associations with abstract
codes (Gevers et al. 2006c). Second, activations must be demon-
strated in brain areas whose general cognitive role and pattern of
activity are compatible with the assumed type of representation.
For example, non-abstract representations tied to space predict
numerical processes isomorphic to spatial orientation, with over-
lapping activations of number and space processing areas.
Finally, a lesional approach must demonstrate that these areas
are necessary to perform correctly the tasks relying on this
representation. Indeed, non-abstract representations could
simply be automatic by-products of mental activity and not its
medium. CK&W’s suggestion to rely on Stroop-like interference
to infer the nature of numerical representations is thus irrelevant,
because automaticity does not guarantee that the activated
representation is functionally required.
The format of representations in memory is a major question
in cognitive neurosciences. It was at the heart of the first archi-
tectures of numerical cognition, and CK&W should be com-
mended for drawing our attention again to this critical but
messy issue. Assessing the existence of abstract representations
is a tricky if not impossible enterprise, because it boils down to
demonstrating the absence of effects (e.g., of modality). Efforts
should therefore rather be expended on testing possible candi-
dates for non-abstract representations. However, although we
believe that non-abstract numerical representations may have a
true functional role, we think that the definitions and evidence
provided by CK&W do not allow them to infer that numerical
representations are non-abstract. We recommend using terms
like “abstract/analog,” “(a)modal,” “supramodal,” or “modality-
(in)dependent,” and so forth, with great care, because each of
these conveys a specific meaning. Far from being a rhetorical
question, this issue has strong theoretical and empirical impli-
cations. It is now time to overcome mistakes that hamper
research on numerical representations and their relationship
with the functioning of the human brain.
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Abstract: The consideration of deliberate versus automatic processing
of numeric representations is important to math education, memory for
numbers, and decision-making. In this commentary, we address the
possible roles for numeric representations in such higher-level
cognitive processes. Current evidence is consistent with important roles
for both automatic and deliberative processing of the representations.
The consideration of deliberate versus automatic processing of
numeric representations is important to both math education
and decision-making. Numeric information is ubiquitous in the
decisions that we make, and thus numeric representation may
play an important role. Basic number skills have only recently
received attention in the decision literature. Numeracy, defined
as the ability to process mathematical and probabilistic concepts,
for example, has been shown to reduce susceptibility to framing
effects and improve judgment accuracy (Peters et al. 2006).
However, the effects of numeric representations in decisions
have been largely ignored with two recent exceptions (Furlong
& Opfer 2009; Peters et al. 2008). These lines of research raise
important questions concerning relations between numeric
representations, math skills, and the use of numeric information
in decisions. This commentary adds to the Cohen Kadosh &
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Walsh (CK&W) viewpoint by addressing the possible roles of
automatic and deliberate processing of numeric representations
in higher-level cognitive processing.
Numeric representations and math skills. Peters et al. (2008)
tested a large sample of healthy younger and older adults
(mean age ¼ 20 and 70 years, respectively) using a distance-
effect reaction-time task with Arabic integers and dots (“Is the
quantity shown bigger or smaller than 5?”), among other nota-
tions. In a reanalysis of the younger-adult data including only
these two notations, the size of the distance effect varied by nota-
tion, with more precise representations (smaller distance effects)
for Arabic integers than dots, supporting CK&W’s point that
numeric representations are not necessarily abstract. CK&W
claim further support from findings that the distance effect
with integers relates to math achievement, but the distance
effect with dots does not. However, in the reanalysis of Peters
et al.’s data, more precise numeric representations for both
Arabic integers and dots were associated with higher numeracy
scores. Halberda et al. (2008) demonstrated a similar positive
relationship between 14-year-old children’s performance on a
task that used only numerosities (dots) and their math ability
back to kindergarten.
The question remains whether this association is based on
automatic or deliberate processing of the representations. An
age comparison may be illuminating because of the shift that
occurs in reliance on more deliberative to more automatic pro-
cesses from younger to older adulthood across a variety of
domains. If the relation between numeracy and numeric rep-
resentations is based on more automatic processes, then this cor-
relation should increase, as older adults tend to rely relatively
more on automatic processes (see Peters et al. 2007 for a
review); if it is based on more deliberative processes, one
might expect a decreased correlation. In Peters et al.’s (2008)
original data, the distance effect was less associated with numer-
acy for older than younger adults (r ¼ .06, p ¼ .64 and r ¼ .41,
p , .001, respectively). These data best support deliberate pro-
cesses underlying numeracy’s association with numeric represen-
tations. In addition, Castel (2007) found that older adults who
were accountants and bookkeepers demonstrated memory
ability remarkably similar to younger adults for arbitrary
numbers, but not for arbitrary non-numeric information
(where the usual age declines in memory were found). In
another study, older adults were exceptionally good at remem-
bering grocery-store prices, but not arbitrary prices (Castel
2005). Such data could support a more precise abstract represen-
tation for these individuals (who have more experience with
numbers in general or grocery prices in particular) that is
carried into later life. However, in combination with Peters
et al.’s data, these findings are also consistent with motivated
selectivity in deliberative processing (Hess 2000), with some
numeric information (or all numbers for some individuals)
being particularly important and valued.
Numeric representations and decision-making. In accord with
CK&W’s notion of a deliberate level of numeric representations,
decision-makers are thought to use numeric information
intentionally and deliberatively (e.g., stock-market indicators,
mortgage rates, and grocery bills). Because human decision-
making likely derives in part from the same mechanisms
evolved by other animals in response to risky natural environ-
ments, intuitive representations of symbolic numbers should
relate to how individuals respond to numeric information in
decision-making. Peters et al. (2008) developed and tested
hypotheses relating an individual-difference measure of the
size of the distance effect to decision-making. They hypothesized
that individuals with more precise representations would weight
proportional differences between numeric attributes in choice
more than individuals with less precise representations.
In addition, a larger proportional difference should result in
a bigger difference between individuals than a smaller
proportional difference.
Results of two decision studies in Peters et al. (2008) sup-
ported these hypotheses. In the first study, individuals with
more precise representations (compared to those with less
precise representations) were more likely to choose larger
prizes received later than smaller, immediate prizes, particularly
with a larger proportional difference between the two monetary
outcomes. In a second study, they were more likely to choose a
normatively worse option that saved a greater proportion of
lives at risk (but a smaller number of lives) compared to those
with less precise representations. Importantly, these findings
were more consistent with the abstract-representation view,
because the results of both studies held after controlling for
numeracy and various measures of intelligence associated with
prefrontal activity. The precision of number representations
appears to underlie: (a) perceived differences between
numbers, (b) the extent to which proportional differences are
weighed in decisions, and, ultimately, (c) the valuation of
decision options. Human decision processes involving numbers
important to health and financial matters may be rooted in
elementary, biological processes shared with other species, and
which depend on an automatic representation of numerical infor-
mation across notations.
It is critical to better understand number representation in the
context of how individuals use numbers. The CK&W article
forces us to consider whether the role of these representations
in higher-order cognitive processing emerges from a shared rep-
resentation across notations resulting more from prefrontal
activity or whether their role results from an abstract represen-
tation. The current results are most consistent with numeracy
being related to the former shared representation and decision-
making being associated with the latter automatic processing of
the representations. Human decision-making, however, often
involves prefrontal activity (Rangel et al. 2008), and further con-
sideration of numeric representations being some combination of
abstract and deliberate may converge with and ultimately explain
some findings in the neuroanatomy of decision-making. It
remains plausible that a shared deliberate representation (that
is separate from what is associated with numeracy) could
explain Peters et al.’s findings. A better understanding of the
automatic versus deliberate nature of these representations’
influences on decision-making will illuminate the important con-
tribution of numeric representations on everyday decisions and
should ultimately lead to improvements in decision aids.
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Abstract:We argue that Cohen Kadosh &Walsh’s (CK&W’s) definitions
of neural coding and of abstract representations are overly shallow,
influenced by classical cognitive psychology views of modularity and
seriality of information processing, and incompatible with the current
knowledge on principles of neural coding. As they stand, the proposed
dichotomies are not very useful heuristic tools to guide our research
towards a better understanding of the neural computations underlying
the processing of numerical quantity in the parietal cortex.
According to Cohen Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W) a neural represen-
tation of quantity is abstract if “neuronal populations that code
numerical quantity are insensitive to the form of input in which
the numerical information was presented” (sect. 2, para. 1). This
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definition is extremely shallow; it does not state at what level the
hypothesized neural code takes place; and it fails in taking into
account that different attributes of stimuli may be coded by separ-
ate yet interconnected brain areas, by separate yet interconnected
neuronal populations within the same brain area, or by exactly the
same neuronal populations, yet with different tuning schemes
(deCharms & Zador 2000). Indeed, in the specific case of the com-
parison between symbolic and non-symbolic numerical processing,
we have proposed that our observation might be compatible with a
common quantity code instantiated in the firing of a common set of
parietal neurons with different tuning schemes for different input
formats (finer tuning schemes for symbolic and broader tuning
schemes for non-symbolic stimuli), as also predicted by a powerful
computational model of number processing (Dehaene 2007; Piazza
et al. 2007; Verguts & Fias 2004).
On CK&W’s view, how should such quantity code be
defined – as abstract or non-abstract? At what level(s) does
abstractness need to be present for a given representation to be
qualified as abstract? What if there are neural populations
within parietal cortex that encode the quantity aspect of each
notation separately, but that these populations are so deeply inter-
connected that the spread of the activation is automatic and the
resulting larger scale population code appears as invariant to
modality? In this case, the abstractness of the coding would
almost literally be in the connections. Would this mean that the
emerging population code is non-abstract? Despite the absolute
centrality of these issues, this discussion is not even approached,
and the existence of different possible levels of neural coding are
not even considered. To us, this reflects an extremely naı¨ve
approach to a question (on what is a neural code) that is central
and highly debated in the current neuroscientific literature. As a
result, the dichotomy between abstractness versus non-abstractness
seems like a very weak heuristic tool for our ability to answer
the most meaningful issue, which is to unveil the computational
principles underlying processing of numerical quantity in
parietal cortex.
We also feel uncomfortable with the more general definition of
neural representations in this target article. CK&W define their
view of neural representations in extremely vague terms (“pat-
terns of activation within the brain,” sect. 2, para. 2), but in the
rest of the article their operational definition of neural represen-
tations appears to be grounded on implicit views inspired by the
classical cognitive psychology notion of module (Fodor 1983).
Despite overtly criticizing the idea of neural module, CK&W
actually embrace two important aspects of the classical definition
of module: encapsulation (which here implies seriality of infor-
mation processing), and domain selectivity.
The assumption of encapsulation and seriality is evident in
CK&W’s strict use of the additive factor method, for which the
presence of statistical interactions between quantity-related
effects and notation effects is taken as evidence in favor of nota-
tion-specific quantity representations. In light of our most recent
knowledge of fine brain structure and function, encapsulation
and seriality are extremely difficult to maintain. It is a known
fact that different and also distant brain regions are massively
bidirectionally interconnected and work in parallel (Felleman
& Van Essen 1991). Not surprisingly, models that do take into
account some degree of parallel processing show that inter-
actions between factors can occur even if the factors affect com-
pletely separate processing stages (McClelland 1979; Rumelhart
& McClelland 1986). This can happen, for example, if one factor
affects one aspect of the information processing (say, the rate of
evidence accumulation), and the other factor affects another
aspect (say, the decision threshold). More refined data analysis
taking into account precise response distributions and testing
alternative (and more neurally plausible) models are therefore
necessary before driving conclusions on the basis of scattered
reports of (often weak) statistical interactions between factors.
Second, CK&W implicitly link abstractness to domain-
selectivity. Thus, the fact that brain regions or individual neurons
that are modulated by numerical quantity may also be modulated
by other quantity- as well as non-quantity-related parameters, like
physical length (Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007), color (Shuman &
Kanwisher 2004), or motion direction (Nieder et al. 2006), is
taken as undermining the possibility of an abstract representation
of quantity. We disagree with this view.
In the first place, selectivity might be a property that arises at
some level of neural coding that is not yet probed by most current
methods of investigation (but see Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007). For
example, in the case of numerical quantity, it is possible that
numerical quantity-selective representations do exist, but
emerge only as the averaged population activity of numerical
quantity-sensitive, but not selective neurons. This would be the
case, if, for example, some neurons respond both to number
and length, others to both number and motion direction, and
others to both length and motion direction (Nieder et al. 2006;
Pinel et al. 2004; Shuman & Kanwisher 2004; Tudusciuc &
Nieder 2007). Under this scenario, at the population level the
codes for number, length, and motion direction would be dis-
tinct, but neither the single neuron spiking activity nor the func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signal averaging
across all three populations would reveal such selectivity. In
this respect, multi-unit recording allowing population coding
properties to be more clearly unveiled, and multivoxel pattern
analysis of the fMRI signal, capitalizing on very small variations
in domain specialization across voxels, might reveal population
codes which are indeed selective (Kamitani & Tong 2005;
Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007). Alternatively, because of massive
local connectivity, functional selectivity may only be revealed
by taking into account long-range connections between distant
brain regions. In either case, the issues of selectivity and of
abstractness are two orthogonal ones. In conclusion, we think
that reasoning in terms of ill-defined dichotomies (selectivity
vs. non-selectivity, abstractness vs. non-abstractness) may
induce unnecessary over-simplifications and is very unlikely to
bring us towards a deeper understanding in this domain.
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Abstract: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) argue that numerical
representation is primarily non-abstract. However, in their target article
they failed to consider recent behavioral priming experiments. These
priming experiments provide evidence for an abstract numerical
representation under automatic conditions.
Recently, there has been a growing consensus favoring an
abstract representation of numerical magnitude. According to
Cohen Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W), this assumption might be pre-
mature, and they raise the alternative possibility that the default
numerical representation is not abstract, but rather, dependent
on notational input. CK&W argue that we will be more likely
to observe evidence for a non-abstract representation under
automatic processing conditions.
We applaud the idea of examining numerical representations
under conditions of automatic processing, because then number
processing is less affected by intentional strategies. However,
based on research using the priming paradigm, the conclusion of
CK&W is not supported. The priming paradigm is a very
popular method to investigate underlying representations under
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highly automatic conditions. In a typical number priming para-
digm, participants have to react on a target number that is pre-
ceded by a prime number while the numerical distance between
both is systematically varied. Interestingly, when the numerical
distance between prime and target is small (e.g., “1” preceded
by “2”), the target is processed faster than when the prime-
target distance is large (e.g., “1” preceded by “9”) – that is, the
priming distance effect. This effect was first shown by Den
Heyer and Briant (1986) and later replicated under more auto-
matic conditions using short stimulus onset asynchronies
between prime and target and visual masking in order to eliminate
strategic prime use (e.g., Reynvoet & Brysbaert 1999).
Certain priming studies manipulated the notation of prime and
target: Prime and target were either presented in the same nota-
tion (e.g., prime “6” – target “7”) or in different notations (e.g.,
prime “six” – target “7”). Originally, Koechlin et al. (1999)
observed an interaction between notational change and distance
priming: no distance priming effect was observed when prime
and target were presented in different notations. This led to the
proposal of notation dependent representations of quantity in
line with the proposal of CK&W. However, the same group of
researchers did observe cross-notation distance priming later on
(Naccache & Dehaene 2001b), and they argued that the inter-
action effect obtained previously was a “spurious effect” and that
“cross-notation priming is the norm rather than the exception”
(Naccache & Dehaene 2001b, pp. 234–35). We ourselves
(Reynvoet & Brysbaert 2004; Reynvoet et al. 2002) confirmed
this observation of cross-notation priming in whichmagnitude pro-
cessing was highly automatic (i.e., short stimulus-onset asynchro-
nies between prime and target). Furthermore, we also extended
this finding by showing cross-notation priming under conditions
in which the target had to be named, which implies that the
numerical magnitude was completely irrelevant for the task. In
addition, we also demonstrated cross-notation priming under con-
ditions in which the formation of intentional links between differ-
ent notation-dependent representations is discouraged. In a first
study, the targets were always presented in the same notation,
while the preceding primes, invisible to the subjects, were pre-
sented in different notations. Still, a distance priming effect was
observed when notation changed (Van Opstal et al. 2005a). In a
second study, investigating the lexico-semantic system of trilingual
speakers, we found distance priming when masked English
number word primes (e.g., “three”) were presented before a to-
be-named Dutch (e.g., “twee”) or French (e.g., “deux”) number
word target (Duyck et al. 2008). This cross-notation and cross-
language priming provide convincing evidence for an abstract
numerical representation under automatic conditions.
If behavioral priming supports the idea of an abstract numeri-
cal representation, how can we account for the interactions
between number notations and magnitude-related effects
observed using other paradigms reviewed by CK&W? It should
be noted that many of the observed interactions are due to the
(near) absence of the magnitude-related effects in particular con-
ditions (e.g., Dehaene & Akhavein 1995; Fias 2001; Hung et al.
2008; Ito & Hatta 2004). These null results may be caused, for
example, by differences in the strength of the associations
between an input notation and the corresponding magnitude
and/or spatial representations (see also Brysbaert 2005).
Because of these notation-dependent associations, it could be
that a magnitude-related effect is not observed for a particular
notation, which results in an interaction when combined with
other notations in an omnibus analysis. We believe that a
better way to address the issue of notation-dependent represen-
tations is to look for positive results, and that is exactly what we
did in our cross-notational priming experiments, where we
found evidence for cross-notation priming in many experiments,
even under highly automatic conditions.
In sum, much of the evidence in favor of a notation-dependent
magnitude representation is based on a null effect in a particular
condition. We reviewed a series of experiments using cross-
notational priming that were based on the presence of an
effect, that is, cross-notational distance priming. These results
are in favor of an abstract magnitude representation and
should be dealt with in any theory on numerical processing.
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Abstract: We concur with Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) that
representation of numbers in the parietal cortex is format dependent.
In addition, we suggest that all formats do not automatically, and
equally, access analog magnitude representation in the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS). Understanding how development, learning, and context
lead to differential access of analog magnitude representation is a key
question for future research.
We agree with Cohen Kadosh & Walsh’s (CK&W’s) central con-
tention that representation of number in the parietal lobes is
format dependent. The authors should be commended for pre-
senting the clearest discussion yet of this topic, and for revisiting
and reinterpreting findings from older studies. It is indeed sur-
prising how many investigators have abandoned their own
results only to reiterate staid theories. In this context, one is
reminded of Ioannidis (2005): “[F]or many current scientific
fields, claimed research findings may often be simply accurate
measures of the prevailing bias” (p. 0696). By explicitly pointing
out research biases extant in the literature, CK&W present the
field with an opportunity to consider new interpretations and
formulate more targeted research questions.
CK&W frame their review in terms of abstract number
representations in the parietal cortex, as is the norm in the
field. However, a more appropriate question is: How do various
symbolic systems exploit magnitude-processing capacities of
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and under what conditions?
CK&W do not address exactly why, or how, numerical formats
differ in the degree to which they evoke effects consistent with
an analog magnitude representation. By focusing on the
absence of transfer of magnitude information across formats,
the authors appear to have overlooked more fundamental differ-
ences between formats that have roots in experience and devel-
opment. Given that numerical symbols are cultural artifacts
that are learned over time, we believe that not all formats will
necessarily access analog-magnitude representations equally,
and, in general, the degree to which a format has access to this
representation depends on past exposure and current task
context.
The findings reported by Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007b) in a two-
trial adaptation paradigm are consistent with our view. This study
found that presenting the same digit twice produced less activity
in the right IPS compared to sequential presentation of two
different digits. When the two numbers were presented in differ-
ent formats (digit and number word), there were no differences
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in activity for same or different quantities, consistent with a
format-dependent view. However, there was also no difference
between same and different quantities when both numbers
were presented as number words. This result is inconsistent
with the view that number words are automatically represented
as magnitudes in the IPS, a central assumption of both the
abstract and non-abstract views.
One intriguing result from Cohen Kadosh and colleagues’
(2007b) study is that although number words did not show
numerosity-related adaptation, they did produce robust activity
in the IPS, comparable to the level observed for digits.
This suggests that the IPS can encode number words in a non-
magnitude-dependent manner. Strong evidence for notation-
dependent activity in the IPS also comes from neurophysiological
studies: Diester and Nieder (2007) found that monkeys who had
learned to pair digits with dots activated distinct neuronal popu-
lations for each format. However, some of the digit-selective
neurons did not demonstrate graded tuning curves; instead
they fired only for a specific digit (Diester, personal communi-
cation). These non-magnitude representations are potential pre-
cursors to the development of automatic analog magnitude
representations. Consistent with this proposal were results
from a training study by Lyons and Ansari (2009) in which par-
ticipants learned a pairing of arbitrary symbols with approximate
magnitudes. Although the IPS was active both early and late in
training, and distance effects grew more pronounced with experi-
ence, only late in training did activity in the IPS correlate with
individual differences in the size of the distance effect.
Our view is also consistent with existing behavioral data,
including those cited by CK&W. For example, among Japanese
participants, digits and Kanji numbers, but not Kana scripts,
showed interference from numerical magnitude on a font size
discrimination task (Ito & Hatta 2004). Like number words,
Kana scripts may not evoke an automatic analog magnitude rep-
resentation. This is possibly because Kanji numbers elicit magni-
tude representations in their visual form more so than Kana
scripts (Kanji number symbols begin with one, two, and three
(horizontal) lines and have closer ideographic connection to
numerosities than do Kana script). In this case, differential
degrees of magnitude representation could be due to limited
experience with Kana scripts in the context of number proces-
sing. Context can influence magnitude representations, even
within formats. For example, adults in the Mundurucu tribe
produce behavior consistent with a compressed analog magni-
tude (i.e., logarithmic) for dot displays. Within verbal number
words, Mundurucu words evoked logarithmic representations,
whereas Portuguese words evoked linear representations
(Dehaene et al. 2008). Grade-school-aged children have both
linear and logarithmic representations on the same stimuli
depending on whether they were in a 0–100 range or a 0–
1000 range (Siegler & Opfer 2003). How these behaviors are rep-
resented in the brain is currently unknown, but we suggest that
this involves more than the IPS – they are likely to depend on
the context-dependent interaction of the IPS with the ventral
visual stream and the prefrontal cortex (Wu et al. in press).
How can we disambiguate the view that different neuronal
populations encode different formats with the same magnitude-
based organization, from the idea that different populations have
dissimilar analog-magnitude representations that are context-
and experience-dependent? Longitudinal developmental research
and learning paradigms, such as Lyons and Ansari (2009), could go
a long way towards clarifying such questions. CK&Wnote that null
effects have been over-interpreted as evidence of notation depen-
dence – many studies may, in fact, have been grossly under-
powered to detect notation-specific effects. Increasing sample
sizes, particularly in imaging studies, would be a simple way to
increase detection and improve interpretability and generalizabil-
ity of research findings. Finally, feature selection and classification
algorithms, which search for consistent patterns of activation
between conditions, could potentially uncover differences
between formats that would not be manifest in differences in
overall levels of activation (Ryali & Menon 2009).
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Abstract: We challenge the arguments of Cohen Kadosh & Walsh
(CK&W) on two grounds. First, interactions between number form
(e.g., notation, format, modality) and an experimental factor do not
show that the notations/formats/modalities are processed separately.
Second, we discuss evidence that numbers are coded abstractly, also
when not required by task demands and processed unintentionally,
thus challenging the authors’ dual-code account
A crucial part of Cohen Kadosh & Walsh’s (CK&W) argument
against abstract representations concerns the fact that different
effects (e.g., distance, SNARC, compatibility effects) are often
not quantitatively the same for different number forms like nota-
tion (e.g., Arabic vs. verbal), format (e.g., symbolic vs. non-
symbolic), and modality (e.g., visual vs. auditory modality). For
concreteness, we will here focus on the distance effect. The
authors note that distance between two numbers in a comparison
task interacts with notation: Cohen Kadosh (2008a), for example,
reports that the distance effect is larger for numbers in Arabic
notation than in verbal notation (notation–distance interaction).
However, the fact that a common abstract coding system is
accessed by different notations does not mean that the represen-
tation of these notations should be exactly equal. In a neural
system, obtaining exactly the same representations for different
notations would be possible only if the input pathways to the
common coding system for the different notations are exactly
the same, which is clearly impossible. If there is a common
coding system, but some divergence between the input pathways
to it, the activation pattern on the common system will be (at least
slightly) different for different notations, and any effects down-
stream from the common representation will be influenced.
This also holds when number formats are different, in particu-
lar when comparing symbolic (Arabic, verbal) with non-symbolic
(collections of objects) number formats. Computational model-
ing has suggested that there is a common abstract coding
system for symbolic and non-symbolic formats (Dehaene &
Changeux 1993; Verguts & Fias 2004), but that the input
pathways for the two formats are different, with one format
(non-symbolic number) being much more noisy and passing via
an extra representational processing stage (Santens et al., in
press). Because of this extra stage, there can again be different
behavioral signatures for the two formats (e.g., format–distance
interaction; Roggeman et al. 2007), even when they eventually
converge on a common coding system. Finally, given that differ-
ent modalities are processed by different sensory input systems, a
similar argument holds for modality–distance interactions.
Having argued that the evidence against an abstract coding
system of number is not convincing, we now turn to some positive
evidence in favor of such a system. CK&W argue that it may exist,
but only in limited circumstances, in particular when participants
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are required as part of the task demands to treat different number
notations (or formats, or modalities) as similar, or when they (for
whatever reason) intentionally choose to treat different notations
as similar. To evaluate this claim, we look at number priming
studies in which (1) prime and target numbers are presented in
different notations (so numbers in the prime notation are not
included in the task demands); and (2) it is explicitly demonstrated
that primes are not consciously processed (so it is excluded that
participants would intentionally create a cross-notation number
system). In such studies, we can then check whether there is a
cross-notation prime-target distance effect, which is commonly
regarded as evidence for access of prime and target to a common
semantic coding system (e.g., Reynvoet et al. 2002). At least two
studies fulfill both criteria. Both studies used a number comparison
task with a fixed standard for comparison. Reynvoet and Ratinckx
(2004) used Arabic and verbal primes, but Arabic target numbers
only, so verbal numbers were not included in the task demands.
In their Experiment 2b, primes were shown to be not consciously
perceived, so participants could not have intentionally included
verbal numbers in their number set. When prime and target were
both presented in the left hemifield (right hemisphere), there was
no cross-notation priming effect; however, the effect was present
in the right hemifield (left hemisphere). Hence, at least in the left
hemisphere, there seems to be a common coding system, even
when it is not required by task demands and outside participants’
intentions. Second, in the study of Van Opstal et al. (2005a),
primes were presented in both notations (verbal and Arabic), and
targets were presented in one notation only (either verbal or
Arabic, varied across participants), so participants were again per-
forming the comparison task on one notation only. Primes were
demonstrated tobeunconscious, so theywerealso awareofonenota-
tion only. A prime-target distance effect was present in this case
(reported in Van Opstal et al. 2005b). Further detailed analysis of
this effect showed a significant cross-notation prime-target distance
effect when primes were Arabic and targets were verbal (F(1,
21) ¼ 8.59, p, .01). The prime-target distance effect was not sig-
nificant when primes were verbal and targets were Arabic (F(1,
21) ¼ 1.64, p ¼ .21), perhaps because verbal stimuli less easily
survive visual masking (cf. Reynvoet & Ratinckx 2004). Whatever
the reason, these priming studies demonstrate cross-notational,
semantic priming even under circumstances in which participants
do not consciously perceive the prime notation during the whole
experiment.
To sum up, interactions of an experimental factor like distance
with notation, format, and modality are not informative with
respect to the existence of an abstract coding system; cross-notation
priming effects are, and they demonstrate that such a system exists.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Filip Van Opstal for executing the analysis reported here. This
commentary was supported by grant P6/29 from the Interuniversity
Attraction Poles program of the Belgian federal government
Beyond format-specificity: Is analogue
magnitude really the core abstract feature of
the cultural number representation?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990884
De´nes Szu´´cs, Fruzsina Solte´sz, and Usha Goswami
Centre for Neuroscience in Education, University of Cambridge, Cambridge
CB2 8PQ, United Kingdom.
ds377@cam.ac.uk
http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/people/staff/szucs/
fs299@cam.ac.uk ucg10@cam.ac.uk
http://www.educ.cam.ac.uk/people/staff/goswami/
Abstract: The issue of abstractness raises two distinct questions. First, is
there a format-independent magnitude representation? Second, does
analogue magnitude really play a crucial role in the development of
human mathematics? We suggest that neither developmental nor
cultural studies support this notion. The field needs to redefine the
properties of the core number representation as used in human
arithmetic.
Can magnitude really be considered the core abstract defining
feature of numbers as cultural products? We argue here that
developmental and other evidence is against this notion. We
agree with Cohen-Kadosh &Walsh (CK&W) that numerical rep-
resentation is primarily not format-independent. However, we
propose that a clear distinction must be made between an evolu-
tionarily grounded sense of approximate magnitude (Dehaene
1997) and a different, culturally acquired, abstract number
concept. We propose that what the field requires are criteria to
define the abstractness of the number representations as used
by humans in mathematics.
In support of CK&W, data of our own suggest that numerical
coding is dependent on surface format. Szu´´cs and Cse´pe (2004)
presented two numbers (N1 and N2) using consecutive visual
presentation. Participants were asked to add the numbers and
to decide whether or not the proposed sum was correct. N1
could be presented as an Arabic digit or as a visual word, or
acoustically as a heard number word. N2 was always an Arabic
digit. The modality of N1 had a systematic effect on the ampli-
tude of event-related brain potentials measured at N2. These
data suggest that N1 was not translated into a common abstract
number representation. Rather, N1 was retrieved from
modality-specific stores when needed. Alternatively, both
abstract and modality-specific stores may be involved in coding
numbers.
Similarly, the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
evidence to date does not necessarily provide clear evidence
for a core common magnitude representation. Current imaging
studies may map the comparison process rather than overlapping
representations. For example, the most frequently used marker
of the putative magnitude representation is the numerical dis-
tance effect. Phenomenologically similar distance effects with
various stimulus materials do not in themselves imply a single
underlying neural representation. Specifically, Pinel et al.
(2004) have shown that comparing numbers and physical size
results in overlapping distance effects in terms of brain activity.
Hence, they assume a shared representation for numerical and
physical magnitude. But it may be the processes operating on
these representations that overlap in terms of brain activity.
Number magnitude and physical size may be represented in
non-overlapping brain areas, with overlapping brain areas
involved in the process of size comparison rather than the rep-
resentation of abstract magnitude. Indeed, fMRI distance
effects are rarely constrained to the intraparietal sulcus (Szu´´cs
et al. 2007). Hence, a single abstract representation is difficult
to define in terms of a simple anatomical hypothesis.
As CK&W note, neural adaptation studies do not provide
unambiguous evidence either. Neural adaptation studies sup-
porting an abstract magnitude representation are based on rep-
etition priming and do not require participants to carry out
comparisons. This research design excludes confounds related
to comparative activity. However, a problem inherent to adap-
tation paradigms still remains. As Naccache and Dehaene
(2001a, p. 967) state, this is a “general problem of potential stra-
tegical or attentional changes elicited by the awareness of rep-
etition.” Hence, “ideally experimental designs based on the
priming method should prevent subjects from becoming aware
of the presence of repeated versus non-repeated trials”
(p. 967). In other words, in number adaptation paradigms partici-
pants may direct attention to the numerical dimension, even if
they are instructed not to. Hence, adaptation results will be con-
founded by simple change detection effects. Such confounds are
especially likely when participants are instructed explicitly to
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“pay attention to the quantity conveyed by the stimuli” (Piazza
et al. 2007, p. 303) or when symbolic numbers are used
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b). A published exception is the
study of Naccache and Dehaene (2001a), which used symbolic
stimuli and combined the adaptation paradigm with masked
priming, so that participants were not aware of any stimulus rep-
etitions. However, this result to date remains unreplicated.
Developmentally, it is important to ask whether a sense of
magnitude is actually important in order to carry out successful
arithmetic. So far, developmental studies have demonstrated
that magnitude comparison performance does not correlate
with early arithmetic skills beyond 3–4 years of age (Brannon
& Van de Walle 2001; Mix 1999; Mix et al. 1996; Rousselle
et al. 2004). This raises the possibility that magnitude discrimi-
nation skills do not play a crucial role in the development of
the cultural number concept.
For example, Halberda et al. (2008, p. 666) claimed that
magnitude comparison skill in ninth grade “retrospectively
predicted” symbolic maths performance. Hence, they concluded
that the magnitude representation “may have a causal role in
determining individual maths achievement.” However, this infer-
ence is problematic, as magnitude comparison was measured at
age 14, whereas arithmetic performance was measured between
ages 5 and 11. Hence, it is equally possible that better mathemat-
ics skills caused bettermagnitude performance. This conclusion is
actually supported by the data from Amazonian Indians. These
data showed that Indians have marginally worse magnitude dis-
crimination skills than adults educated in Europe (Pica et al.
2004). It seems unlikely that Amazonian Indians are worse in sym-
bolicmaths thanEuropeans because their number sense is geneti-
cally limited. A more plausible explanation would be that
Europeans’ number discrimination skills are better because
they are educated. In fact, if we assumed that there was no differ-
ence between Indians and Europeans (given that the difference
was marginal), the conclusion would again be that number dis-
crimination skills have no relationship to mathematical skills (as
the latter would be expected to be better in educated Europeans).
Therefore, both methodogical and theoretical problems sur-
round the notion of an abstract number representation. Further-
more, a distinction may be needed between an evolutionarily
grounded approximate sense of magnitude (Dehaene 1997),
whether abstract or not, and a distinct, culturally acquired
abstract number concept. CK&W cite Barsalou (2003), “abstrac-
tion is simply a skill that supports goal achievement in particular
situations” (p. 1184). Given that the goal of mathematics edu-
cation is to teach children an abstract number concept, the real
question would seem to be whether this putative abstract core
number representation bears any relation at all to the analogue
magnitude representation.
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Abstract: We agree that the default numerical representation is best
accessed by probing automatic processing. The locus of this
representation is apparently at the horizontal intraparietal sulcus
(HIPS), the convergence zone of magnitude information. The parietal
lobes are the right place to look for non-abstract representation of
magnitude, yet the proof for that is still to be found.
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) focus on the mental represen-
tation of numbers. They do not state it explicitly, but it is clear
from their argument that they are interested in the default
internal representation of an external stimulus that corresponds
to a specific magnitude. It should be distinguished from
“working representations” generated to perform specific tasks.
This default representation symbolizes magnitude as stored in
semantic memory and is sometimes described in terms of the
“mental number line” (e.g., Restle 1970). The authors suggest
that the locus of this representation is in the parietal lobes and
propose that it is best probed by automatic processing of numeri-
cal information. The authors review the existing data and con-
clude that it does not allow a conclusion in favor of an abstract
representation of numerical information. As an alternative, they
propose that numerical processing starts with non-abstract rep-
resentation (coded by different neuronal populations for differ-
ent categories/modalities of inputs) in the parietal lobes, which
is automatic in the sense of not being affected by task require-
ments. Abstract representations may emerge later in the prefron-
tal cortex (PFC) as a result of the task requirements.
Whatever the representation of numerical information in the
brain is, it codes the relevant features of the mental number
line, such as the increased discriminability between magnitudes
farther away from each other, known as the distance effect,
and, for a given intra-pair distance, better discrimination for
pairs of small numbers, known as the size effect (e.g., Moyer &
Landauer 1967). The size congruity effect (SiCE) is frequently
used as a marker of automatic processing of numerical infor-
mation (e.g., Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005). It refers to shorter
latencies of physical size decisions when the presented physically
larger number is also numerically larger (congruent condition,
e.g., 5 3) than when it is numerically smaller (incongruent
condition, e.g., 3 5). The SiCE increases with the intra-pair
numerical distance (e.g., Tzelgov et al. 2000), and is larger for
numerically smaller pairs (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008g, but see
Van Opstal et al. 2008; Verguts & Van Opstal 2008; Verguts
et al. 2005). Thus, conceiving magnitudes means activating the
mental number line and mapping the specific magnitudes on it.
We do not believe that representation of magnitudes in
general, and numbers in particular, can be reduced to the
neural activation of specific populations of neurons. Another
definition of the representation of magnitudes would be in
terms of the relevant neural circuit activated when information
in a given domain (e.g., numerical) is processed. Dehaene et al.
(2003) pointed out that the horizontal intraparietal sulcus
(HIPS) is activated by numbers independently of their notation,
and proposed it as the neuronal locus of the mental number line.
Thus, while specific populations of neurons are the locus of
activation of feature detectors for different kinds of stimuli corre-
sponding to magnitudes, it seems to us that the HIPS is a possible
candidate for the convergence zone (Damasio 1989) for magni-
tude information. It follows that even if different populations of
neurons fire for different kinds of inputs, magnitude is rep-
resented once the HIPS is activated. In this sense, the network
resulting from the convergence of the stimulus-specific neuron
populations, corresponding to various kinds of quantities and
numbers in various notations, whose activation converge in the
HIPS, generates what Barsalou (1999; 2005) calls a simulator.
It simulates the “mental number line,” and while it may be
based on perceptual symbols (Barsalou 1999), it summarizes
the magnitudes specifically coded by the various populations of
neurons. In this sense, while the automatically probed numerical
representations may be non-abstract in the sense of being based
on the firing of different population of neurons, they are
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“abstract” in the sense of summarizing the different inputs by the
HIPS. Although, according to CK&W, the existing data do not
allow for a clear conclusion in favor of an abstract representation,
they do not support the opposite conclusion, either.
Only numbers that are stored in memory as part of the mental
number line can be automatically activated, that is, retrieved
from memory without intentional effort (Logan 1988; Perruchet
& Vinter 2002). According to findings from our lab, the set of
numbers included on the mental number line is quite limited.
It seems that the mental number line represents only single-
digit positive integers, that is, it does not include two-digit
numbers (Ganor-Stern et al. 2007), negative numbers (Tzelgov
et al. 2009), or fractions (Kallai & Tzelgov, in press). Thus, the
single-digit positive integers may be considered as the “primi-
tives” of numerical cognition, and are automatically accessed
(or “retrieved from memory”).
The representations of numbers that are not part of the mental
number line are generated on-line, when needed, by intentional
operations. They are generated as part of “working represen-
tations,” as a result of intentionally applying task-relevant oper-
ations on the “primitives” included on the mental number line.
The prefrontal cortex is apparently active in this process, as it
is in additional operations that involve numbers, such as arith-
metic (Ansari 2008). Therefore, neural activity in the prefrontal
cortex reflects the working representations heavily loaded by
the task requirements. Thus, while we agree with CK&W that
probing automatic processing should provide the answer to the
question of whether the representation of numerical information
is abstract, we emphasize that this should be done by analyzing
the numbers that are members of the mental number line. The
data that one can accumulate according to these criteria, at this
point are not strong enough for the rejection of a hypothesis of
abstract representation of numerical information.
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Abstract: The target article undermines the existence of a shared unitary
numerical format, illustrating a variety of representations. The “abstract”/
“not-abstract” dichotomy does not capture their specific features. These
representations are “supramodal” with respect to the sensory modality of
the stimulus, and independent of its specific notation, with a main role
of spatial codes, both related and unrelated to the mental number line.
In their article Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) review an
extensive psychological and cognitive neuroscience literature,
with the aim of showing that, contrary to the dominant view
put forward by McCloskey (1992) and Dehaene et al. (1998a),
numeric representations are primarily not abstract. The process
of abstraction of numbers has a long story (Schmandt-Besserat
1999), starting circa 8000 B.C. from a one-to-one correspondence
between three-dimensional tokens (e.g., an ovoid) and units (e.g.,
a jar of oil), and finally developing, through successive stages, into
the current “abstract” numerical representation, which is
discussed by CK&W. What CK&W mean by “abstract” is that
the relevant representation conveys information only related to
the size of the numbers involved, independent of the particular
number notation (symbolic: number words or Arabic digits;
non-symbolic: e.g., dot patterns), and of the sensory modality
of presentation of the stimuli (auditory, visual, somatosensory)
(Libertus et al. 2007). Over and above its semantic nature, the
specific format of such an “abstract” numerical representation
has been regarded as primarily propositional by McCloskey
(1992), while Dehaene et al. (1998a) have emphasized its
spatial characteristics.
CK&W’s review, more than focusing on what is promised by
their title (“Numerical Representation: Abstract or not
Abstract?”), presents evidence drawn from a variety of exper-
imental paradigms to the effect that, under specific experimental
conditions and task requirements, different numerical represen-
tations may be generated. The conclusion here is that “multiple”
representations versus a “single” or “shared” numerical represen-
tation exist in the brain. More specifically, CK&W suggest that a
shared numerical representation does not exist as default, but
may result by connecting on-line multiple representations only
when intentional processing of numbers occurs. This shared
versus multiple numerical representation distinction, however,
speaks little as to the abstract/non-abstract dichotomy, unless
the relevant representational formats are specified. In particular,
as CK&W note, it is generally assumed that the occurrence of a
behavioral effect, as for example the SNARC effect, across differ-
ent notations (Nuerk et al. 2005), speaks in favor of a unique
numerical “abstract” representation. The fact that the SNARC
effect is independent of notation or modality may well suggest
that it comes from the activation of a unique “supramodal” repre-
sentation – but this says little about its abstractness.
For example, in the experiments by Ba¨chtold et al. (1998), the
observation that the SNARC effect is preserved when numbers
are conceived as distances on a “ruler,” but reversed when they
are conceived as hours on a “clock-face,” suggests the existence
of distinct numerical representations. These results indicate
that the involved representation is primarily “spatial,” rather
than “abstract,” as shown by the observation of a SNARC
(“ruler” condition), and of a reversed-SNARC (“clock-face”
condition) effect, as well as flexible enough to be modulated by
the experimental instructions (i.e., ruler, mental number line-
related, vs. clock-face). Accordingly, Ba¨chtold et al. (1998)
discuss their results in terms of spatial stimulus-response
factors, which may be conceived as analogical processes, rather
than with reference to “abstract” versus “non-abstract” codes.
Other studies suggest the existence of “supramodal,” “non-
abstract” numeric representations, independent of the mental
number line, and affecting spatial processes. De Hevia et al.
(2006), using a manual line bisection paradigm, found that neu-
rologically unimpaired participants displace the subjective mid-
point of lines and of unfilled spaces, flanked by two different
Arabic numbers (e.g., 2–9, 9—2) towards the larger digit, inde-
pendent of its left-sided or right-sided position. This effect is
not modulated by numerical distance, making unlikely an
interpretation in terms of mapping onto a mental number line.
These findings may be accounted for by the hypothesis of a “cog-
nitive illusion,” largely independent of the allocation of atten-
tional resources, whereby visually presented larger digits are
associated with an expansion of the closer portion of space, be
it a segment or an empty space. This “position of the larger
number” effect reflects the processing of relative numerical mag-
nitude, since the bisection of horizontal strings composed by
larger or smaller digits (i.e., absolute numerical magnitude)
does not modulate bisection according to a mental number line
effect, namely, with leftward/rightward errors associated with
smaller/larger numbers, as found by Fischer (2001). In a later
study, de Hevia et al. (2008) extended these findings that larger
numbers are associated with an expansion of spatial extent,
using a task whereby participants were required to reproduce
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the perceived length of an empty space, delimited by pairs of
smaller/larger digits. De Hevia and Spelke (2009) have recently
replicated and extended these findings, using not only pairs of
visual digits flanking a line, but also non-symbolic visual displays,
for example, with nine smaller circles denoting a larger numerical
magnitude, and two larger circles a smaller magnitude. With non-
symbolic displays, adult participants, young school (7-years-old),
and preschool (5-years-old) children show a line bisection bias
towards the larger numerical magnitude. With symbolic cues
(digits), the deviation towards the side of the larger digit is
present in adult participants, but not in 7-year-old children.
Taken together, these findings suggest the existence of a “supra-
modal” (i.e., independent of the particular format of the stimu-
lus) representation of numerical magnitude – unrelated to the
mental number line – which modulates spatial representations.
With reference to the operational definition adopted by
CK&W, this representation is “abstract,” being accessed by
different notations. We would however qualify this representa-
tion – present as early as in 5-year-old children – as “supramo-
dal” or, more precisely, “notation-independent,” and closely
related to, or possibly overlapping with, spatial representations.
In conclusion, CK&W’s review is definitely successful in
showing that multiple numerical representations exist. The
empirical data we have briefly reviewed here, however, indicate
that the “abstract”/“not-abstract” dichotomy is too general to
capture the variety of possible supramodal numerical represen-
tations, to which spatial codes provide a main format.
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Abstract: We discuss methodological problems and present our own
empirical data on calculation tasks in toddlers. We propose to develop
enriching theoretical models concerning quantity representations,
based on empirical findings from developmental psychology. A
revitalization of the debate is worthy, because it is reminiscent of the
philosophical dispute on universal entities in scholasticism and Plato’s
theory of ideal numbers.
Cohen Kadosh&Walsh (CK&W) brilliantly discussmethodological
and theoretical limitations of neurophysiological evidence support-
ing the claim that numerical representation is abstract. However,
this reasoning can also be applied to their own arguments:
1. Finding no difference in BOLD signal intensity in func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies between
different modalities (“null result”) may be due to a lack of statisti-
cal power. However, even by increasing the statistical power (i.e.,
increasing the number of subjects, or the intensity of the para-
digm, respectively), thus potentially resulting in a significant
difference in BOLD signal between different forms of input,
would not necessarily imply a relevant notation-dependent corti-
cal output (Logothetis 2008).
2. Single-cell neurophysiology does not solve the problem of
reduced spatial resolution of fMRI experiments, because only a
small portion of neurons in a specific brain region can be
explored using this technique.
3. Although single-cell physiology is used in clinical settings
(e.g., Engel et al. 2005), single-cell experiments are not yet
applicable to humans. Thus, this method cannot yield direct
evidence of a non-abstract numerical representation in the
human brain.
4. The fact that CK&W address single neurons as abstract or
non-abstract neurons is questionable. First, any understanding of
abstract representations as neuronal populations that are insensi-
tive to the form of input does not imply the existence of abstract
neurons. Second, how do the authors classify a mental represen-
tation localized in a specific brain region, including abstract and
non-abstract neurons that are highly co-located?
Despite these methodological concerns, we share the authors’
doubts that an abstract number representation exists in the
human brain. According to recent developmental approaches, pre-
verbal infants, as well as monkeys, have two different systems for
representing quantitative information: one system for small
numbers of objects that can be tracked over space and time, and
one system that represents large, approximate numerosities
(Spelke 2000). Both systems are independent of verbal information
processing and apply to different sensory modalities, stimuli, and
task contexts. In that sense, one could say that they are abstract.
But this is not the type of abstract representation that CK&W
talk about. The authors focus on an adult number concept.
In order to communicate about number representations in an
adult-like way, young children must learn to (a) abstract the
general meaning of number words as representations for quantities,
(b) say number words in the correct sequence, (c) identify number
symbols, and (d) associate words as well as digits with exact quan-
tities. To form some sense of a number scale, they also need experi-
ence in bringing exact quantities in a linear order. Children who
have already acquired basic counting skills cannot yet solve math-
ematical equations, but are able to solve the same problems using
less abstract representational formats. This can be illustrated by
data from our own laboratory (Pauen, in preparation).
A study with 138 4–5-year-olds tested performance on simple
addition problems involving small numbers (x , 10). Four different
task formats were presented: (1) Real objects: Children were shown
two groups of objects and were asked, “How many marbles are
there together?” (2) Object words: No object was presented, but
children were asked the same kind of question as before, combining
object and number words, for example, “Howmany are one banana
and five bananas together?” (3) Number words only: For example,
“How many are three and three together?” As revealed by our
Figure 1, performance systematically varied with task format. Per-
formance was highest when real objects were presented, lower
for questions combining object and number words, and very low
when only number words were involved.
These findings illustrate that number operations strongly
depend upon how numerosities are presented at preschool age.
With the beginning of elementary school training, task format
gradually loses importance and children learn to flexibly shift
from one format to another.
Based on developmental research, one can conclude that there
is no such thing as an innate abstract representation for exact
numbers in terms of their representation format (words, digits,
quantities). The cognitive subsystems involved in processing
different types of numerical information seem to be distinct at
the beginning. They become gradually associated as a result of
repeated exposure to simultaneous presentation of different rep-
resentation formats (e.g., number words combined with specific
object quantities and/or digits).
In summary, we argue that two distinct innate systems repre-
senting small numbers of objects and large quantities may exist,
and that they are not tied to any verbal or visual symbols of
numbers (Spelke 2000). Hence, they are abstract in a different
sense than that defined by CK&W. A more elaborate represen-
tation of exact numbers evolves by forming associations
between exact quantities and symbolic systems identifying
digits and numbers during preschool years.
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Based on this conclusion, we think that the work of CK&W could
be extended by taking into account a developmental (ontogenetic)
perspective. Could it be useful to combine the authors’ theoretical
approach with the knowledge about the emergence of represen-
tation in infancy? This might mean that a representation of quan-
tities is more basic than a representation of exact numbers.
Fonagy and Target (2003) claim that we need “something more”
than knowledge about cognitive-behavioral pathways for under-
standing representations/mentalization in general. This could be
a key to understanding why neuroimaging alone does not reveal
how numbers/quantities are represented in the human mind.
May the results from paradigms of preferential looking in the
newborn and early infancy period (infants love “A” more than
“B”; e.g., Meltzoff 1990) represent the pre-existence of abstract
quantities? Could this be reminiscent of the philosophical dispute
on universal entities in scholasticism (“universalia sunt ante res”)?
This question is associated with Plato’s theory on the existence of
ideal numbers. The Renaissance of this in Neo-Platonism contrib-
utes to the current scientific debate. It could be enriched by
further trans-disciplinary research between neuroscientists, devel-
opmental psychologists, clinical practitioners, and philosophers.
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Abstract: The commentators have raised many pertinent points
that allow us to refine and clarify our view. We classify our
response comments into seven sections: automaticity;
developmental and educational questions; priming; multiple
representations or multiple access(?); terminology;
methodological advances; and simulated cognition and
numerical cognition. We conclude that the default numerical
representations are not abstract.
So, do we represent numbers non-abstractly? We appreci-
ate the tone and the quality of the commentaries on our
target article in general. The commentators provided us
with a mixed view: Only 7 commentators defend the
abstract view, 11 commentators are agnostic and their
arguments tend toward the non-abstract representations
or abstract representation, and 10 commentators support
the idea that numerical representations are non-abstract.
Clearly, our view has facilitated an important debate. In
this response, we integrate the different positions,
explain why some of the arguments against the non-
abstract view are invalid (mainly based on clarifications
of arguments that we provided in the target article), and
conclude that the default representations of numbers are
non-abstract.
R1. Automaticity
Algom raised important concerns, and contentious topics.
Before dealing with his main points, we would like to point
out several places in his commentary where our perspec-
tive was extended to places that we did not state in our
article. It might be that we were not clear enough on
these topics in our article, and for some of the readers
these misinterpretations might be minor, but we would
like to state them for the sake of theoretical clarity. We
neither said nor believe that numerical magnitude is pro-
cessed automatically whenever a numeral is presented for
view. This is a very strong definition of automaticity, and
Algom and others have shown that such a definition of
automaticity does not hold. We also did not state that
Stroop-like tasks are the best behavioural tasks to reveal
the effect of notation on numerical magnitude. We do
believe that there are some advantages for using this para-
digm (and also some disadvantages).
Cohen and Algom describe findings by Cohen (2009),
in which the physical shape, rather than the numerical
magnitude, was processed. There is no reason to be sur-
prised by this result. If the physical shape is more salient
than the numerical magnitude, it will mask the effects of
the numerical magnitude. We expect that the reverse
will be obtained if the numerical magnitude is made
more salient using the same paradigm.
The other point that Algom mentioned is one raised
some years ago, researched extensively, and we believe,
refuted. Algom states that,
virtually all studies that demonstrated the effect (of task-irrele-
vant numerical magnitude on judgments of physical size [i.e.,
size congruity effect]) used a design that favored the numerical
over the physical dimension in the first place. Thus, more
values of number than values of physical size were typically
presented (indeed, most studies used merely two values for
size: large, small) [termed variability]. Moreover, the numerals
were easier to discriminate from one another than their phys-
ical sizes [termed discriminability]. (Our explanations added to
Algom’s in square brackets.)
Figure 1 (Wiefel et al.). Mean number of correct answers for
two simple addition problems presented in three different task
formats (real objects, object words, number words).
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These are potential problems that Algom has raised pre-
viously (Algom et al. 1996; Pansky & Algom 1999; 2002),
and that were ignored by some researchers, including us
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007d; Girelli et al. 2000; Henik &
Tzelgov 1982; Rubinsten et al. 2002; Tzelgov et al. 1992).
However, recently we examined whether the factors
discriminability and variability affected the size congruity
effect. We found that modulating these factors does not
affect the size congruity effect, even when they are comple-
tely biased toward the other dimensions in discriminability
or variability, and the size congruity, in contrast to Algom’s
arguments, does not disappear (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008e). Furthermore, a careful examination of Algom and
colleagues’ previous studies reveals that the size congruity
effect disappears when only two numbers are being pre-
sented (Pansky & Algom 1999). This limited amount of
stimuli increased the chance for response repetition, thus
creating a confound. Cohen Kadosh, Gevers, and Notebaert
(submitted a) examined this issue, and found that the size
congruity effect disappears when the response sequence
of the irrelevant, rather than the relevant dimension, is
repeated. In light of the issues that we raised here, we dis-
agree with Algom’s theoretical perspective. Variability and
discriminability play little role in the appearance of the
size congruity effect, and other factors, such as response
repetition (or processing speed; Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008e) that were confounded with variability and discrimin-
ability in some experiments, might diminish the size con-
gruity effect.
Our view of automaticity, however, is compatible with
Algom. We agree with Algom that automatic processing
and intentional processing are not dichotomous, but are
end-points of a fine-grained continuum, and that numeri-
cal magnitude is not activated in an automatic fashion on
an unlimited scale (see also, Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003;
Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005).
Algom’s concern from the adaptation paradigm is partly
justified (as we mentioned in sect. 11). Namely, he suggests
that some features of the experimental situation might
encourage numerical processing, and this is totally compa-
tible with our claims in the target article, as we suggested
that the specific instructions by the experimenters might
lead to different patterns of activation (see also, Piazza
et al. 2007). In addition, other non-numerical factors
should be controlled, as was done in other studies (Ansari
et al. 2006a; Cantlon et al. 2006; Cohen Kadosh et al.
2007b), and preferably the level of activation in the parietal
lobes should be modulated by numerical quantity factors
(e.g., numerical deviation from the adapted quantity;
Ansari et al. 2006a; Piazza et al. 2004; 2007). However,
stating that a passive viewing task is a suboptimal tool to
explore neuronal specialization is overstating the case.
Passive viewing is just another task, and one should not
use a single approach to characterize how cognitive
processes are operationalized, and how the brain is orga-
nized. This seems to be a general problem that many com-
mentators such as Orban; Wiefel, Pauen, & Dueck
(Wiefel et al.);Mayo; and Freeman & Kozma have criti-
cized (e.g., paradigm/technique x is not suitable) or praised
(e.g., paradigm/technique y is the solution) (see sect. R6).
However, we believe that integration and variety of differ-
ent paradigms/techniques is the right approach to pursue,
and our theory in the target article is not based on a
single given paradigm/technique.
Other commentators are not convinced that intentional
processing is inherently unsuitable for testing the effect of
notations. We are puzzled by this position, as we showed
that several studies (Cohen Kadosh 2008a; Dehaene
et al. 2008; Droit-Volet et al. 2008; Ganor-Stern &
Tzelgov 2008; Holloway & Ansari, 2009) used intentional
numerical processing and still obtained different numeri-
cal quantity effects for different notations. To be accurate,
we argued that non-intentional tasks are more sensitive to
differences in the representations for different notations,
and this is also reflected in our model (see target article,
Fig. 5).
Algom also provides some experimental evidence that
allegedly supports the existence of an abstract represen-
tation. However, in the discussed task, both Arabic digits
and verbal numbers are presented, and the task is an
intentional comparison task. We cannot understand how
such a design can overcome the limitations that we men-
tioned in our review. Moreover, the effect of the Arabic
digits on verbal numbers processing was approximately
twice as large as the effect of verbal numbers on Arabic
digits, although the processing time for Arabic digits and
verbal numbers seems to be equal. This finding is not com-
pletely in line with the abstract view, and actually is in line
with the idea of multiple numerical representations, and
our model.
Finally, some authors consider parity a suitable measure
for non-magnitude processing, for example, in priming
tasks. Tzelgov and Ganor-Stern (2005) noted that the
level of triggering (i.e., activation of the irrelevant dimen-
sion, in this case magnitude, provided by the experimental
task) by numerical parity task is high. This is due to the fact
that both dimensions are numerical and require semantic
access to numerical information. Therefore, the proces-
sing of the relevant parity dimension can trigger the pro-
cessing of the irrelevant magnitude dimension. This
notion of triggering is also important to priming studies
that are cited in the priming section.
Cohen argues that numerical representations are
neither abstract nor automatic. We agree with the first
part of the statement and, to some degree, also with the
second part. Numerical representation is not always auto-
matic (see our reply to Algom). Different tasks will lead to
different degrees of automaticity. This relates to the notion
of triggering that we mentioned in the previous paragraph.
The comment made by Cohen that numerical distance is
one of several features that are correlated with the order
of the numbers on the number line, and that researchers
rarely (if ever) consider plausible alternatives to the
numerical distance hypothesis is true (for similar views
see Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008b; Van Opstal et al. 2008a).
For example, the numerical distance effect might be
affected by linguistic frequency (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2009; Landauer & Dumais 1997). However, some
studies were able to limit the number of other factors
that might affect the numerical distance effect (Lyons &
Ansari 2009; Tzelgov et al. 2000; Van Opstal et al.
2008b), and still observed the distance effect. We believe
that numerical information can be processed automati-
cally, but further processing is required for it to affect
performance (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e). The results
by Cohen (2009) are important, and should be examined
with other paradigms, and also under conditions in
which the physical shape is harder to process.
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Ganor-Stern raises important points to consider when
one finds differences between notations under automatic
processing, before concluding that numerical represen-
tation is not abstract. We agree with part of her comments,
and considered them in previous works. For example,
Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008e) found that the processing
of verbal numbers differs from digits not only quantitat-
ively, but also qualitatively. In addition, at least in size con-
gruity tasks, slower access to abstract representation (see
also Grabner and Santens, Fias, & Verguts [Santens
et al.]) should have led to larger size congruity effects
with the slower processed notation when it is the relevant
dimension, and smaller size congruity effect when it is the
irrelevant dimension (Schwarz & Ischebeck 2003), but
these patterns of results were not obtained (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008e; Ito & Hatta 2003). Therefore,
speed of access to the representation cannot (fully)
explain the interaction between notation and congruity.
Ganor-Stern mentions that finding a size congruity for
the mixed notations, as in Ganor-Stern and Tzelgov
(2008), is evidence for an abstract representation. This
might be the case, but a more likely explanation, in our
view, is that each notation activated a separate represen-
tation and the conflict arose at the response level. This
response-related explanation for the size congruity effect
has support from recent studies that examined the
source of the size congruity effect (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2007c; 2008d; Szu´´cs & Solte´sz 2007; Szucs et al. 2007;
Szu´´cs et al., in press) (see also our remarks in response
to Algom).
Even the argument that the size congruity effect is
obtained not only for digits, but also for verbal numbers
(although the effect is qualitatively and quantitatively
different), does not indicate that numbers are represented
abstractly, as size congruity is obtained also for non-
numerical dimensions, for example, animals’ names
(Rubinsten & Henik 2002); but it will be odd to claim
that animal names shared an abstract representation
with digits. This type of argument demonstrates our view
that similar behavioural results do not indicate shared rep-
resentation. Even if one assumes that some of the par-
ameters that Ganor-Stern mentioned are correct, it is
not apparent why she concludes that automatic numerical
processing is based on an abstract representation. We
nevertheless agree with Ganor-Stern that not any non-
additive difference between numerical processing of the
different notations is evidence for a notation-specific rep-
resentation, and the differences should be theoretically
relevant to the issue in question. The results that we
reviewed in Section 6 of the target article are in line
with this view.
Nu´n˜ez gave some examples from the productive side of
cognition. We think that more research on the issue of the
productive side in numerical cognition is required, and
thank Nu´n˜ez for pointing out this issue. We nevertheless
think that some of the examples might not be suitable
for examining automatic processing. The reason, in our
view, is that they do not fit with the view of automaticity,
that is, they are all task-relevant, and therefore are moni-
tored (e.g., are parts of the conversation, and therefore
deliberative; Dulany 1996).
Tzelgov & Pinhas suggest that although different
populations of neurons are sensitive to difference numeri-
cal representations, at the level of brain area (horizontal
IPS) numerical representation is abstract. We do not
agree with this definition. The question is one of
(spatial) resolution, and the better it is, the better one
will be able to discriminate between different represen-
tations or other processes. For example, looking at
Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem on a map with a scale of
1 : 30,000,000 cm one will not find any difference in the
location of these cities; however, at a scale of
1 : 10,000,000 cm the differences between these cities are
apparent. One would not conclude that at the more
crude scale these cities are the same. The same logic can
be applied when one needs to detect differences in the
human brain.
Another issue, as Tzelgov & Pinhas rightly pointed
out, is that single-digit positive integers may be considered
as the “primitives” of numerical cognition and are auto-
matically accessed. However, the same is also true for
non-symbolic numbers (Gebuis et al. 2009; Roggeman
et al. 2007), and for verbal numbers (Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008e; Dehaene & Akhavein 1995).
R2. Developmental and educational questions
The commentators raise very important issues about the
construction of numerical representation over the course
of learning and development. We are grateful for these
comments, as they make the discussion much fuller and
complete, and we dealt in our review mainly with adults
and less with infants and children.
Ansari suggests that abstract representations of
numerical magnitude are a more plausible outcome of
development than non-abstract representations. He
claims that, “while the processes that are involved in
mapping from external to internal representations may
differ between stimulus formats, the internal semantic
referent does not differ between representation
formats.” We agree with the first part of his claim, but
could not understand what is the evidence for the last
part, that is, that the internal semantic referent does not
differ between representation formats.
Ansari further suggests that format-specificity lies in
the process of mapping between different external rep-
resentations, and the mapping between external represen-
tation and internal numerical representation. However,
this suggestion is invalid given the experimental evidence
that we provided mainly in section 6. The differences are
not only in general processing speed, and the parameters
that reflect the numerical representation differ quantitat-
ively and even qualitatively both for symbolic and
non-symbolic numbers. Ansari also discusses the develop-
mental trajectory for format-independent representation,
which Kucian & Kaufmann extend and for which they
provide a theoretical framework that hypothesises the cre-
ation of increased format-independent representation
from format-dependent representation. Kucian &
Kaufmann and Ansari might be right, and further research
is needed, but we suggest that: (1) this format-indepen-
dent representation is partly due to maturation of the pre-
frontal cortex, and (2) that it is a working representation
and not the default representation (and therefore it
needs a mature prefrontal cortex). The results from chil-
dren and monkeys (Cantlon et al., in press; Diester &
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Nieder 2007), which have a less developed prefrontal
cortex (Striedter 2005; Tsujimoto 2008), support this idea.
Another possibility that the commentators did not
mention is that infants might have initial shared represen-
tation for numbers, but with learning, and interaction with
the environment, there is a neuronal specialisation in the
brain that leads to multiple numerical representations.
This idea is feasible (Johnson 2001), and has been shown
in other domains (Cohen Kadosh & Johnson 2007). For
example, children do not show cortical specialisation for
face processing and other non-facial objects. However,
as a function of development and interaction with the
environment, their brain becomes tuned to different cat-
egories (Johnson et al. 2009). We see no reason why
numbers, which depend much more on education, and
are acquired later in life, will not follow a similar trajectory
of neuronal specialisation. (See also the comment by
Szu´´cs, Solte´sz, & Goswami [Szu´´cs et al.].)
Ansari also bases his suggestions on the recent study by
Cantlon and colleagues (Cantlon et al., in press), however,
this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
involved an intentional comparison task, and therefore
has the limitations that we mentioned in section 5. More-
over, the discussed study focused only on what is shared
between symbolic and non-symbolic numbers, and neg-
lected the important question of the differences between
the notations, and whether children show more evidence
of the existence of non-abstract representations than
adults. However, as this study suffers from the limitations
that we discussed in section 5 (e.g., the insertion of
response selection to the experimental task, spatial resol-
ution), we are not sure if it is the most optimal study to
shed light on this question.
An important point Ansarimentions is that, “If the pro-
posal by CK&W is indeed correct, then the current models
of the development of numerical magnitude represen-
tations need to be radically revised,” and that “children
cannot use their semantic representation of number
words in order to begin understanding the meaning of
Arabic digits.” Therefore, this may have educational reper-
cussions and lead to less focus on the relationships
between different formats of representations in the class-
room. However, cognitive psychologists have shown that
humans are able to learn artificial digits to a high level of
expertise, and show numerical effects, even without any
connection to numerical information, symbolic or non-
symbolic (Tzelgov et al. 2000). This might suggest that it
is not necessary to map one numerical notation to
another in order to have intact numerical understanding.
Moreover, it might be that this mapping is even maladap-
tive. For example, children with visuospatial impairments
might suffer from mapping digits to numerosity, or chil-
dren with dyslexia might have similar problems if required
to understand digits by mapping them to verbal numbers.
At this stage, our discussion is purely theoretical, but a
better understanding might be able to shed light on the
connection between visuospatial impairment and dyscal-
culia (Rourke 1993), as well as dyslexia and dyscalculia
(Rubinsten & Henik 2009).
Cantlon, Cordes, Libertus, & Brannon (Cantlon
et al.) (see also Nu´n˜ez) argue that the stipulation that
numerical abstraction requires identical responses in iden-
tical neurons is potentially impossible to satisfy. We find
this statement paradoxical, since Cantlon and colleagues
stated recently that, “different quantitative dimensions
can be represented by generic magnitude-coding
neurons” (Cantlon et al. 2009, p. 89). For other non-
numerical features in the ventral stream, it is also possible
(e.g., Sawamura et al. 2006). Cantlon et al. argue that even
if it is possible to satisfy this criterion (see Diester &
Nieder [2007] for fulfilling this criterion for numerical rep-
resentation in the prefrontal cortex), it is not clear whether
it is the appropriate criterion for establishing numerical
abstraction.
We would like to thank Houde´ for his suggestion that
the initial numerical representation is not abstract, and
that abstract numerical representation is gained through
inhibition processes. This leads to support for our sugges-
tion that abstraction is created intentionally, but does
not exist as a default representation, or, in Tzelgov &
Pinhas’s terminology, it is a “working representation.”
The involvement of inhibitory operations is subserved by
prefrontal cortex maturation (Tsujimoto 2008; Wood
et al., in press), and therefore, the involvement of prefron-
tal cortex in creating an abstract representation is also in
line with our dual-code model. Houde´ provides important
evidence that children up to the age of 7 years confuse
the layout of the display with the numerical estimation.
Kucian & Kaufmann provide another example from
3-year-old children, who seem to rely on perceptual cues
if the ambiguity between numerical and non-numerical
stimulus properties is overwhelming (Rousselle et al.
2004; cf. Hurewitz et al. 2006, for evidence with adults;
but see Gebuis et al. 2009). Wiefel et al. present data
on calculation tasks in toddlers showing that number oper-
ations strongly depend upon how numerosities are pre-
sented at preschool age. Elementary school education
teaches the children to flexibly shift between the different
numerical notations. Future studies should examine
whether this shift is due to maturation of the prefrontal
cortex, expertise, and education. However, these results,
as well as others that were mentioned in this section, are
in contrast to Cantlon et al.’s argument against the exist-
ence of non-abstract representations in early developmen-
tal stages.
We would like to thank Peters & Castel for highlighting
the influence of the nature of numerical representation,
whether intentional or automatic, on decision-making.
Indeed, this will generate a new area of research that will
elucidate the significance of numerical representation in
everyday decisions. Another important comment is that,
to have a better understanding of numerical represen-
tations, researchers need to examine this question in
connection with individual use of numbers. Will high exper-
tise with numbers be associated with non-abstract represen-
tation, or vice versa? We believe that this question will be of
interest for cognitive psychologists and developmental
psychologists.
Rosenberg-Lee, Tsang, & Menon (Rosenberg-
Lee et al.) highlight the scenario in which various
numerical notations exploit magnitude-processing
capacities in the IPS to different degrees. More specifi-
cally they suggest, based on behavioural, neuroimaging,
and single-cell neurophysiology studies, that at a first
stage, different numerical notations are encoded in the
IPS in a non- magnitude-dependent fashion. As a func-
tion of experience these non-magnitude representations
become involved in automatic analogue magnitude
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representations. This is a powerful prediction, and as
suggested by Rosenberg-Lee et al., future studies that
will use learning paradigms and longitudinal develop-
mental research will shed light on this developmental
hypothesis. One interesting question is how different
hemispheres are influenced by these developmental tra-
jectories. Why, in Cohen Kadosh et al. (2007b), did the
right IPS not show adaptation for verbal numbers (which
is in line with Rosenberg-Lee et al.’s suggestion), while
the left IPS did show an adaptation?
Szu´´cs et al. emphasize the educational perspective in
numerical cognition. They make a clear distinction
between an evolutionarily grounded sense of magnitude
and a culturally acquired abstract number concept.
They further suggest that developmental and cultural
studies do not support the idea of format-independent
numerical representation. They also raise another issue
that is of high importance: whether numerical represen-
tation causes better math skills, and vice versa, or
whether there is any correlation between these two
abilities at all. We believe that further studies are
needed to examine this issue, which at the moment
shows more support for the connection between numeri-
cal abilities and math skills (Booth & Siegler 2008;
Rubinsten & Henik 2009)
In contrast to the nativist approach that is dominant in
the field of numerical cognition, Kucian & Kaufmann
base their discussion on “neural constructivism” – which
suggests that the representational features in the human
neocortex are dynamic and influenced by interactions
between neural growth mechanisms and environmentally
derived neural activity. This view is also in line with the
suggestions made by Szu´´cs et al. We are more sympath-
etic to this approach; numerical skills that are heavily influ-
enced by education and environment (e.g., Hung et al.
2008; Tang et al. 2006b) will probably be modified as a
function of development and training. After Kucian &
Kaufmann provided evidence for non-abstract numerical
representations from studies that include children with
typical and atypical development, they presented a
model that describes the overlap between different
numerical representations as a function of age, experience,
and schooling. We found this model stimulating, and it
emphasizes the dichotomy in the field of development
on numerical representation: Kucian & Kaufmann,
Wiefel et al., Ansari, and Houde´ suggest that the
numerical representation at early developmental stages
is non-abstract, whereas Cantlon et al. suggest that the
numerical representation de novo is abstract.
On the whole, it seems that commentators from the
field of developmental psychology/neuroscience did not
reach a consensus, but most of the commentators sup-
ported the existence of non-abstract representations.
One should note that the computational model by
Verguts and Fias (2004) assumes abstract representation
by training digits and non-symbolic numbers together
(thus also biases the model from the beginning toward
abstract representation). In light of the comments in
this section, it seems that this model should examine
different methods for learning and development of
numerical representations.
In sum, we are happy to trigger such a scientific dis-
agreement and hope that future studies will shed further
light on this issue.
R3. Multiple representations or multiple access?
Grabner emphasizes the importance of considering
symbol-referent mapping expertise in theories of numeri-
cal representation. We agree with his suggestion, and
believe that such an approach can provide better under-
standing of learning, education, and development, and in
addition, provide knowledge on how the different rep-
resentations can be created and modified as a function
of symbol-referent mapping. We would like to stress
that, in our case, the differences between numerical rep-
resentations cannot stem from differences in the access
to the numerical representation. In this scenario, one
would find differences in the overall processing time
and/or accuracy, but not different numerical represen-
tation-related effects for different notations (e.g., different
Weber-ratio: Droit-Volet et al. 2008; mapping of number
into space: Dehaene et al. 2008; distance effect: Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008e; Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008;
Holloway & Ansari 2009), or size congruity effect (e.g.,
different facilitation, interference, and differences between
incongruent and congruent conditions: Cohen Kadosh
et al. 2008e; Ganor-Stern & Tzelgov 2008; Ito & Hatta
2003). Moreover, in some cases, even when the differ-
ences in the processing time between the different
notations is taken into account, this cannot explain the
differential effects for different notations (e.g., Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008e). Lastly, the difference in symbol-
referent mapping expertise cannot explain why, in brain
imaging studies, left or right IPS is notation-sensitive,
while the contralateral IPS does not reach significance
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007b; Piazza et al. 2007).
Another argument by Cantlon et al. is that the
observed interactions are due to some ceiling or floor
effects for one dimension but not the other. This might
apply to a small fraction of the studies that we presented
(e.g., Dehaene & Akhavein 1995), but cannot explain
other results. The interactions between different formats
and factors that originate from the mental number line
include different Weber-ratios for different modalities
(Droit-Volet et al. 2008), different mappings of different
numerical formats on a physical line (Dehaene et al.
2008), or correlations between math abilities and perform-
ance in one numerical format, but not another format.
These are all instances of evidence of non-abstract
representations that are not due to floor or ceiling
effects. The same holds also for the neurobiological evi-
dence that we provided, and especially the case of
double dissociation (sect. 6).
Furthermore, the argument that the classification by
Dehaene et al. (1999) for approximate and exact can
explain our results, is not accurate. Although, we agree
that there is overlap between our model and the approxi-
mate–exact numerical codes, which we originally men-
tioned in section 10, our model has more explanatory
power. For example, our model presents a continuum
rather than a binary classification to approximate and
exact systems that are subserved by different brain areas.
In addition, our model explains the classification
between different symbolic notations, and not only
between symbolic and non-symbolic notations.
Dehaene’s rebuttal of the non-abstract view dismisses
some of the data that we provided – which found differ-
ences between a variety of numerical formats in different
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paradigms, labs, and techniques – by calling them “weak
evidence.” Dehaene’s description of the data from behav-
ioural, neuroimaging, transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), and single-cell neurophysiology that showed evi-
dence for multiple numerical representations as
“occasional” also avoids serious discussion. Dehaene
states that our review of findings (which he terms a “cata-
logue”) of difference or interaction involving number nota-
tions in support for the notation-specific view is wrong.
However, looking at previous studies by Dehaene on this
question shows that he bases his argument toward the
abstract view by not finding differences between notation,
or an interaction (Dehaene 1996; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995; Dehaene et al. 1998a; 2003).
Dehaene also discusses the single-cell neurophysiology
results from the prefrontal cortex, while not considering
the results in the IPS that were observed in the same
study (Diester & Nieder 2007). We are said to dismiss
these results. However, we focus in our target article on
the IPS, the key area for numerical cognition, which is
highlighted by Dehaene in many papers (Dehaene et al.
1998a; 2003; 2004). It may be that Dehaene is revising
his position, and now suggests that numerical abstraction
is in the prefrontal cortex, rather than the parietal
cortex. However, before this conclusion can be reached
one has to take into account that these data were: (1)
obtained after explicit training of associating digits with
numerosity (e.g., 1 is one dot), and (2) in intentional
task. Both of these factors might have contributed to the
results that were obtained in the prefrontal cortex, as we
discussed in the target article.
Dehaene also gives some new unpublished data from
his lab (i.e., Eger et al., submitted). It is clear from his
description that the task was intentional, and we stressed
in our article the limitations of using such tasks. On the
other hand, it is unclear if response selection was required
in this study, and moreover, the IPS decoder is still limited
to the voxel level; and therefore Dehaene ignores our
comment that not finding a difference between the nota-
tions does not imply that there is an abstract represen-
tation: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; a
single demonstration of a dissociation is more compelling
than a failure to find evidence of segregation. Neverthe-
less, if one would like to seriously consider these results
as indicative of abstract representation, there are two
further analyses that we suggest Eger, Dehaene, and col-
leagues conduct: First, to show also that when trained
with dots, the IPS decoder generalised to digits. Second,
to examine the existence of segregation in the multivoxels
pattern by using multivariate pattern analysis. Accord-
ingly, in a recent fMR-adaptation paradigm in which sub-
jects processed the colour of the stimuli, we found that
that the numerical representation for digits and dots is
subserved by overlapping multiple representations that
are format-dependent (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008a). One
of the analyses that support such a view is a multivariate
pattern analysis. If we are right, and indeed the task that
Dehaene reported is intentional, this provides strong
support for the model that we presented in section 10.
Other evidence is offered showing that the classifier
trained with the posterior IPS activation during saccades
could be generalised to a classification of subtraction
versus additional trials independent of the notation
(digits, or dots) (Knops et al., in press). Reading this
work reveals that the activation that Dehaene mentions
was found in the bilateral posterior superior parietal
lobule (PSPL), an area that according to him and others
is outside the classical areas that are involved in numerical
representation per se (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Dehaene et al. 2003). Moreover, in previous works
Dehaene and others considered the PSPL as involved in
attention, orienting in space, and attentional selection,
rather than numerical representation per se (Dehaene
et al. 2003). Surprisingly, the horizontal IPS (hIPS) that
has been found to be involved in numerical representation
in meta-analyses by us (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f) and by
Dehaene and colleagues (Dehaene et al. 2003), did not
show a shared decoding for numerostity and digits. This
point supports the idea that the shared coding for numer-
osity and digits did not occur at the level of the
representation.
We found Dehaene’s contention that the PSPL is a
“cortical recycling” of a sensorimotor area for a more
abstract mathematical use puzzling. This is a new argu-
ment that does not appear to be consistent with his pre-
vious position that the horizontal segment of the IPS
(hIPS) is the area that is involved in abstract numerical
representation and calculation (Dehaene et al. 2003;
2004), and the putative area for the cortical recycling
seems to fall out of the PSPL (see Figure 2 in Dehaene
& Cohen 2007). Indeed, in a meta-analysis the hIPS was
found by Dehaene et al. (2003) to be involved in abstract
mathematical use. As Dehaene puts it: “Those parametric
studies are all consistent with the hypothesis that the HIPS
codes the abstract quantity meaning of numbers rather the
numerical symbols themselves” (p. 492). In a more recent
meta-analysis of numerical cognition (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008f) we found that the middle IPS is involved in numeri-
cal representation. In a comprehensive review of the
literature, Dehaene identified the PSPL as “being involved
in attention orienting in space, can also contribute to
attentional selection on other mental dimensions that are
analogous to space, such as time, space, or number”
(Dehaene et al. 2003, p. 498). The differences in the coor-
dinates of the PSPL and hIPS are too large to be ignored
(more than 2 cm on the anterior to posterior axis) (hIPS:
x ¼ 41, y ¼ 247, z ¼ 48 [Dehaene et al. 2003]; mIPS:
x ¼ 37, y ¼ 246, z ¼ 42 [Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f]),
and PSPL: x ¼ 32, y ¼ 268, z ¼ 46 [Sereno et al. 2001).
Moreover, the behavioural part (Knops et al. 2009) of
the cited work is based on several important differences
between symbolic and non-symbolic notations that are in
line with Campbell & Metcalfe’s view. This part was
not considered by Dehaene.
Dehaene ignores other results that are not in line with
the abstract view. For example, he claims that notation
effects “occasionally” affect performance because of
numerical precision. Numerical imprecision is observed
with non-symbolic numbers (Izard & Dehaene 2008).
However, this cannot explain the differential effects
between symbolic notations (Arabic digits, Indian digits,
Kana, Kanji, verbal numbers in different language),
which others, including Dehaene, have observed (see
sect. 6 of the target article). Another invalid argument is
that the effects – for example, between digits and verbal
numbers – are due to speed of processing and perception,
or occur at the transcoding level. However, these factors
were taken into account in previous studies (e.g., Cohen
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Kadosh et al. 2008e), and again some effects that we men-
tioned cannot be explained by these factors (e.g., Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2007b; Dehaene et al. 2008; Droit-Volet
et al. 2008; Holloway & Ansari 2009). It is ironic that
this comment is made by Dehaene, who based the abstract
numerical theory partly on null differences between digits
and verbal numbers (Dehaene 1996; Dehaene & Akhavein
1995). If the effects in the studies that we mentioned are
due to speed of processing, or are perceptual, or occur
at the transcoding level, then his earlier results should
have being interpreted as evidence toward the non-
abstract view.
Dehaene concludes that considerable evidence points to
a notation-independent representation in the monkey IPS.
We ask which evidence? The only evidence is for notation-
dependent representation in the monkey IPS (Diester &
Nieder 2007; see section 8 of the target article and Fig. 4).
We agree with Dehaene that the IPS in humans and
monkeys is not a module for representation, and it
includes highly distributed neurons in the IPS that are
intermingled with other representations of time, space,
and other continuous dimensions, including numbers as
proposed by Walsh (Walsh 2003), and has been tested
and confirmed later by others (Cohen Kadosh et al.
2005; Pinel et al. 2004; Tudusciuc & Nieder 2007; for a
review and meta-analysis, see Cohen Kadosh et al.
2008f). We do not see any reason why the principles of
these distributed magnitude neurons should not be
extended also for different numerical notations.
Santens et al. suggest that the differences between
notations in behavioural and neuroimaing studies can
occur because of some divergence between the input
pathways to this common representation. One should
notice that the model by Verguts and Fias (2004) does
not include any different pathways for different symbolic
numbers, but only differentiates between symbolic and
non-symbolic numbers. Moreover, none of the models
(including Verguts & Fias 2004) can explain the inter-
action between effects that stem from numerical represen-
tation and different symbols for numbers. Therefore, we
do not see any support for Santens et al.’s suggestions,
even from their own studies (Santens et al., in press) and
model (Verguts & Fias 2004).
Some commentators argued that the effects we discussed
might occur prior to the level of numerical quantity rep-
resentation. Therefore, some clarification is needed. We
did not intend to challenge the idea that number words
and digits are processed differently at the perceptual stage –
and it would be wrong to do so, since there are many studies
that showed this difference in processing, including
Dehaene (1996) and Schwarz and Ischebeck (2000). There-
fore, we did not base our conclusions on the overall differ-
ence in reaction times (RTs) between number words and
digits, which stems also from differences at the perceptual
stage. Rather, the crucial point is the interaction between
notation and effects that are post-perceptual and stem
from the level of the numerical representation or even
later. For example, many studies have shown that the dis-
tance effect is independent of the perceptual stage since it
takes place at a post-perceptual stage, whether at the level
of numerical representation (e.g., Barth et al. 2003; Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2007c; Dehaene 1996; Pinel et al. 2001;
Schwarz & Ischebeck 2000) or response selection (Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2008b; Link 1990; Van Opstal et al. 2008a;
Verguts & Fias 2004). Note that in the case of an interaction
between distance effect and notation, it does not matter
whether the locus of the distance effect is at the level of
numerical representation or response selection, because
response selection follows the level of the numerical rep-
resentation. All studies that examined the differences
between notations involved different visual displays for
their notations, and there were differences in the overall
RTs. However, the distance effect is the key effect for exam-
ining the question of abstract numerical representation
because it taps post-perceptual stages (as reflected by
event-related potential (ERP) (e.g., Dehaene 1996; Libertus
et al. 2007; Pinel et al. 2001), fMRI (e.g., Eger et al. 2003;
Pinel et al. 2001), and behavioural results, which have
been shown specifically and convincingly by the sequential
paradigm (Cohen Kadosh 2008a; Schwarz & Ischebeck
2000). Another piece of evidence is that in ERP studies,
the number of letters (but not the distance effect) modulates
the N1 component (perceptual component) (Dehaene
1996). However, the distance effect affects only later post-
perceptual components (P300: Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007c;
Schwarz & Heinze1998; P2p: Dehaene 1996). In addition,
we are not familiar with any findings in the neuroimaging lit-
erature (or any other method) that have shown modulation
of the perceptual areas by numerical distance and notation
when words and digits were used (e.g., Pinel et al. 2001).
Falter, Noreika, Kiverstein, & Mo¨lder (Falter
et al.) support the non-abstract view for numerical rep-
resentation, and extend it to other domains such as time.
They show that not only numbers are represented non-
abstractly, but also other representations that involve the
IPS, such as time. In our view, this idea should generate
further experiments that will examine the representation
of time, similar to our suggestions for numbers.
Campbell & Metcalfe support our theoretical view,
and extend it to basic arithmetic. They provide evidence
that basic arithmetic is not abstract in two ways. First, it
is based on discrete, format- and operation-specific pro-
cesses. Second, calculation efficiency is format-specific.
Our view is very close, and indeed, Campbell was one of
the few who has supported the idea of non-abstract
numerical representation in the last 20 years (Campbell
1994; Campbell & Clark 1988; Campbell & Epp 2004;
2005). Moreover, our view that strategies might play a
role in numerical representation is similar to his view
that arithmetic is affected by subjective strategies. We
believe that future studies should examine the issue of
strategies on numerical representations, as it will clarify
why some labs reveal non-abstract representations while
others do not find any differences between the different
formats. We need to take into account what exactly the
researcher tells the subject. This has been shown to
affect the results in some studies that reported these
instructions (Piazza et al. 2004; 2007).
R4. Priming
Part of the evidence that Dehaene, Reynvoet & Note-
baert, and Santens et al. focus on is subliminal
priming. Surprisingly, they all ignore the good evidence
that subliminal priming can originate at the level of
response (for behavioural evidence, see Kiesel et al.
2007; Kunde et al. 2003; 2005; for fMRI and ERP
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evidence, see Dehaene et al. 1998b). More surprising
is that Dehaene uses the cross-notation subliminal
priming data from Naccache and Dehaene (2001a) in his
commentary (see Dehaene’s Fig. 1) to argue that digits
and verbal numbers have a shared representation.
However, these data are based on the same data in
earlier work by Dehaene et al. (1998b). In this work,
Dehaene et al. showed that an unconscious prime (digit
or verbal number) is processed up to the response level
(see Figs. 3 & 5 in Dehaene et al. 1998b). Therefore, the
results by Naccache and Dehaene (2001a) can be
explained perfectly by response selection rather than
shared numerical representation, which is in line with
other behavioural evidence in the field of subliminal
priming (Kiesel et al. 2007; Kunde et al. 2003; 2005).
Therefore, both digits and verbal numbers were processed
up to the response level, a result that is in line with the
non-abstract view (e.g., the digit 1 activated response by
the left hand and the verbal number NINE activated
response by the right hand), and can explain the subliminal
priming effect (Kiesel et al. 2007; Kunde et al. 2003; 2005).
Support for our view also comes from another study that
used functional connectivity analysis. It was shown that
the IPS and the frontal eye field, that are involved in
response selection, are also coactivated with the motor
cortex, when numerical magnitude is processed up to
the response level (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008d). Therefore
the activation in the IPS in Naccache and Dehaene
(2001a) and the motor cortex activation in Dehaene
et al. (1998b) that were observed in the same data, can
be argued to be functionally connected and involved in
response selection, rather than shared representation.
Another issue is that some of the results from the cited
subliminal priming studies actually support the non-
abstract view, for example, by suggesting a preferred
format to which the different numbers are mapped (e.g.,
digit; Noe¨l & Seron 1993). Unfortunately, alternative
explanations are given to explain these effects that are
not compatible with the abstract view, rather than men-
tioning the additional support for the non-abstract view
(see, e.g., Santens et al.).
Reynvoet & Notebaert also raised the issue that some
of the evidence in favor of a notation dependent magnitude
representation is based on a null effect in a particular con-
dition. It is true that in some results a null effect was
observed for one notation and not for another, but this is
only a small fraction of the data, and other studies show
that the numerical representation depends on the notation
both qualitatively and/or quantitatively (e.g., Cohen
Kadosh et al. 2007b; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008e;
Dehaene et al. 2008; Droit-Volet et al. 2008; Ganor-Stern
& Tzelgov 2008; Holloway & Ansari 2009; Nuerk et al.
2002; Piazza et al. 2007).
The researchers who are working on priming suggested
that subliminal priming is automatic. However, they would
need to take into account the view that the priming distance
effect is not evidence for automatic processing, but rather of
incidental processing (Tzelgov & Ganor-Stern 2005).
R5. Terminology
Several commentators raised the issue of the definition
of abstract. We based our review on a previous and
well-accepted definition in the field of numerical cogni-
tion, and we are grateful for their contributions that will
provide us with a better definition for the abstract
representation.
Nu´n˜ez criticizes our characterization of abstraction. He
mentioned that this definition is specific and unnecessarily
restrictive, thus making the extension to other non-
numerical areas of cognition hard. We are sympathetic
to this concern, but see no reason why the terminology
of abstract in the field of numerical cognition cannot be
applied to other domains. It is interesting to note that
numbers as a concept do not clearly fall into abstract or
concrete categories. For example, chair is more concrete
than truth but 2 does not fall clearly into one of these cat-
egories, and can vary among these dichotomies.
Pease, Smaill, & Guhe (Pease et al.) also comment on
the definition of abstraction in the field. We agree with
their view that a binary distinction between abstract and
non-abstract is not the optimal way to conceptualise the
problem, and our model reflects this view. Pease et al.
suggest also that multi-modal representations of math-
ematics, such as diagrammatic or algebraic reasoning,
are assumed to abstract to a common domain. We do
not agree with this claim, and several researchers argued
that the deeper knowledge of experts facilitates the
ability to integrate the different representational formats
(Ainsworth et al. 2002; Kozma et al. 2000; Tabachneck
et al. 1994) (see Peters & Castel, for some support with
this view in numerical cognition). This idea is similar to
the one made by Lakoff (2008) that Pease et al. cite, and
is similar to our suggestion, that the numerical represen-
tation is composed from multiple representations, and
that a strong association can be created between them
by the subject as a working representation.
Piazza & Izard raise many questions that will be of
interest for future studies. We agree with them that
abstract representation has become the default theory of
the mathematical brain; indeed the need for our target
article is partly predicated on the fact that it has become
an unhealthily unquestioned default. However, in contrast
to their claim, we do not offer a dichotomy (see Fig. 5), and
our focus on non-abstract representations was done in
order to shake the foundations of the prevailing orthodoxy,
which leading researchers have ignored to some degree
(Piazza & Dehaene 2004; Piazza et al. 2007; Pica et al.
2004).
In contrast to Piazza & Izard’s claims, we also do not
view numerical representation as a module, and we
stated in our review our divergence from such a view
(see sect. 5). Neuronal populations that code numerical
quantity can be modality-sensitive, but they can still be
sensitive to other non-numerical features. As for the
issue of serial processing: albeit that there is ample evi-
dence that supports the idea that numbers are processed
serially (Blankenberger & Vorberg 1997; Dehaene 1996;
Schwarz & Ischebeck 2000), the interaction between
modality and numerical effects, such as the distance
effect, does not depend only on serial processing,
because the additive factor method analysis is also valid
in most of the cases of cascade processing (Sanders 1998).
It is worrying that researchers in the field of numerical
cognition, such as Piazza & Izard and Santens et al.,
consider interactions between modality and the represen-
tation-related effects as an indication of abstract
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representation. We have explained in this section, and in
section R3, why this view is wrong. Nevertheless, these
commentators’ view is a new view, but a risky one. If addi-
tive or interactive effects indicate abstract representation,
the abstract view is immune to falsification – the death
knell for any scientific idea.
We like very much the idea of selectivity of neurons to
numbers and other features, a view that is partly in line
with previous works by us (Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008f;
Walsh 2003). Piazza & Izard gave an example of how
when one examines single neuron spiking activity or the
fMRI signal, some neurons that respond both to number
and length, or number and motion, or length and
motion, will not show selectivity when averaged across
populations. Extrapolating their idea, the same can also
hold when one examines dots and digits, digits and
verbal numbers, and dots and verbal numbers. Given
that all the studies so far were confined to only two mod-
alities, the chance that abstract representation was con-
cluded mistakenly is increased.
Vallar & Girelli pointed out that the dichotomy
between abstract and non-abstract is too general to
capture the variety of possible supramodal numerical rep-
resentations. We agree with their argument, and would
like to stress that our view is not that there is a dichotomy
between abstract and non-abstract, but that both are end-
points of a continuum, and may interact with spatial codes.
However, we believe that spatial codes do not affect differ-
ent numerical notations to the same extent (see Dehaene
et al. 2008, for support for our view), and therefore, that
spatial codes are notation-dependent.
Pesenti & Andres raise very important points as to the
definitions of abstract and non-abstract representations
that are used by many authors in the field, including us.
These definitions prevail also in the current issue (e.g.,
our target article review, the commentaries by
Dehaene, Cantlon et al., etc.). Some of Pesenti &
Andres’ comments are thought-provoking, such as that
analog representations cannot be abstract. We are grateful
for their comments, and agree that the researchers in the
field of numerical cognition need to use more accurate defi-
nitions. However, we believe that their commentary raises
more concerns for the existence of abstract representation.
It seems that differential effects at the semantic level as a
function of notation (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2008; Diester &
Nieder 2007; Droit-Volet et al. 2008; Tudusciuc & Nieder
2007) cannot be compatible with abstract representation,
whereas results that support the existence of shared rep-
resentation do not necessarily indicate abstract numerical
representation. Nevertheless, even if one abandons the
definition of abstract/non-abstract representations and
adopts instead the idea of shared/multiple representations,
or alternatively, modality-(in)dependence, the weight of
evidence seems to support the existence of multiple rep-
resentations (or modality-dependence).
R6. Methodological advances
Freeman & Kozma,Mayo, andOrban offer several sug-
gestions to advance our understanding of numerical cogni-
tion in humans and nonhuman primates.
Freeman & Kozma suggest that aside from single-cell
neurophysiology, and fMRI, additional techniques such as
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalogra-
phy (MEG) are required to examine the nature of numeri-
cal representations, and that these techniques will enable
one to uncover the involvement of wide regions in inter-
mittent spatially coherent oscillations. We entirely agree
with their suggestions and mentioned some of them
toward the end of our article.
Mayo suggests two manipulations in single-neuron
recording: reversible inactivation and adaptation of appar-
ent numerosity. We agree that these new manipulations,
which to date have not been used in this context, will be
of help and can provide a causal understanding of the
neuronal basis of numerical processing. It is worth
asking, however, whether in principal this could be estab-
lished in neurons in the rat brain that responded to numer-
osity, or by using TMS adaptation techniques in humans.
Orban suggests that monkey fMRI provides a solution
to the limitations of neuroimaging studies that we raised
(which, according to him, we grossly underestimated).
He correctly mentions the study by Sirotin and Das
(2009) – which appeared after our target article had
been accepted – to stress the idea that, compared to
intentional tasks, passive tasks (e.g., adaptation paradigm)
provided a better link between the haemodynamic
response and neuronal activity. Indeed, adaptation para-
digms have some limitations, but this is clearly a better
tool to explore the theoretical question at hand, as also
implied by Orban. Orban further mentions the important
study by Sawamura et al. (2006) (also cited in our review),
which shows that cross-format adaptation (e.g., adaptation
for two consecutive trials for pigs, or hammers, vs. pig
follows a hammer or vice versa) overestimates neuronal
response selectivity. This point should be taken into
account when the conclusions toward abstract/non-
abstract are based on the level of cross-notational adap-
tation. After mentioning several possible methodological
problems, Orban suggests the use of fMRI in the awake
monkey as the solution to the theoretical question. We
would suggest a note of caution in using monkeys as a
model for human numerical cognition. Human numerical
cognition cannot be studied independently of language
(Carey 2004; see also Ansari). We must also take into
account the large hemispheric asymmetries in different
numerical functions, as well as deal with the human ten-
dency to represent numbers spatially. Monkeys do not
speak, do not show our pronounced lateralisation, do not
represent numbers from left to right, or right to left, as
far as we know, and they do not learn about numbers
and quantity in the same way as humans. Technical
muscle may therefore not be the answer to these concep-
tual questions.
R7. Simulated cognition and numerical cognition
Lindemann, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering (Lindemann
et al.) provide a new point of view on numerical cognition,
by suggesting an action-based number semantics to
provide new insights into the way that we represent
numerical magnitude. They suggest that abstract rep-
resentation might emerge from association between the
numerical information and action. We agree with this
view, which is in line with Walsh (2003), and is in
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accordance with our suggestion in the target article (i.e.,
abstraction requires intention).
Similarly, Myachykov, Platenburg, & Fischer
(Myachykov et al.) extend our theory to the simulated
cognition framework. We appreciate their innovative
thinking, which suggests that understanding non-
abstract representations within the framework of
simulated cognition provides a theoretical platform for
real-life numerical representation. Their view provides
a hierarchy of features of numerical representation,
which includes embodied, grounded, and situated cog-
nition, and can explain effects in the field of numerical
cognition, and provide support for some of the effects
that we discussed and for our theoretical view. Further-
more, Myachykov, et al. provide the first independent
experimental data to examine our dual-code model
(sect. 10).
R8. Conclusions
We are grateful to the commentators for their valuable
comments that helped us to refine and clarify our theoreti-
cal perspective. We have shown that even if one takes into
account factors that might affect numerical representation,
numerical representation is primarily non-abstract. Many
questions were raised by the commentators and we are
sure that new questions will come from this interaction.
It is now time to return to the lab and generate new data
on the ways that humans represent numbers.
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